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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1972, the Maryland General Assembly drastically altered 
Maryland's public policy regarding reparations for automobile acci-
t B.A., summa cum laude, 1980, Wilkes College; J.D., cum laude, 1983, The 
Washington College of Law, American University; M.A., 1984, Johns Hopkins 
University; Partner, Mudd, Harrison & Burch, Towson, Maryland. 
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dent victims· by enacting "substantial changes in the insurance law 
pertaining to motor vehicles."2 The legislative changes were designed 
to protect members of the public "from the economic harm produced 
by automobile accidents."3 The most significant change4 was the 
addition of sections 538 through 5465 to the Annotated Code of 
Maryland, Article 48A-the Insurance Code. These sections com-
prised Subtitle 35, entitled "Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance."6 
Designed to supplement the Transportation Article's financial 
responsibility provisions,7 Subtitle 35 mandates that every automobile 
1. Jennings v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 360, 488 A.2d 166, 
168 (1985). 
2. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 810, 506 A.2d 641, 
643 (1986). 
3. Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 240, 528 A.2d 912, 916 (1987). 
4. See Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. at 810, 506 A.2d at 643 (stating addition of Subtitle 
35 to motor vehicle insurance law was "of particular significance"). The list 
of changes was extensive, as the court of appeals explained: 
In addition to mandating compulsory automobile insurance with re-
quired coverages, Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1972 effected many other 
changes, such as creating the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 
a state-owned automobile insurance company, to insure persons having 
difficulty obtaining automobile insurance policies in the private sector, 
abolishing the former assigned risk program, abolishing the former 
Unsatisfied Claims and Judgment Fund and transferring to some 
extent its functions to the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 
v' enacting new procedures for the cancellation and nonrenewal of 
automobile insurance policies, and authorization under some circum-
stances for prejudgment interest in money judgments in automobile 
personal injury cases. 
Jennings, 302 Md. at 357-58 n.3, 488 A.2d at 169 n.3. 
5. Section 547 was added by Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 775, 1975 Md. Laws 3345; 
§ 547A was added by Act of June I, 1982, ch. 844, 1982 Md. Laws 4660. 
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-547A (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
7. These provisions regulate owners, and to some extent operators, of motor 
vehicles by requiring each owner of a motor vehicle registered in Maryland to 
provide proof of financial responsibility. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-104 
(1992). The financial responsibility provisions are self-regulating and self-
enforcing. See Grant v. Allison, 616 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Md. 1985). The 
Motor Vehicle Administration may not "issue or transfer the registration of a 
motor vehicle unless the owner or prospective owner of the vehicle furnishes 
evidence satisfactory to the Administration that the required security is in 
effect." MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 17-104(a) (1992). Failure to maintain the 
required security will result in an automatic suspension of the vehicle's regis-
tration, id. § 17-106(a)(1), and the imposition of fines, id. § 17-106(e)(I). 
Moreover, a person "who has knowledge that a motor vehicle is not covered 
by the required security" is forbidden to drive the vehicle, id. § 17-107(a)(1); 
or, if he is the owner, to "knowingly permit another person to drive it," id. 
§ 17-107(a)(2). A violation of this provision is a misdemeanor. [d. § 27-IOI(a). 
The violation does not give rise to civil liability, and, although the statutory 
scheme is comprehensive, there is "nothing in the legislative scheme meant to 
imply an independent, private cause of action against financially irresponsible 
owners and operators." Grant, 616 F. Supp. at 1222. 
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liability policy issued, sold or delivered8 in Maryland must include 
personal injury liability coverage, property damage liability coverage, 
personal injury protection, and uninsured motorist coverage.9 These 
required coverages generally mirror the Transportation Article's re-
quired security.1o Certain amounts of coverage, again mirroring the 
required security under the financial responsibility provisions, are 
also required. If a policy "omits or purports to exclude a particular 
coverage required by law, the omission or exclusion is ineffective, 
and the insurance. policy will be applied as if [it contained] the 
minimum required coverage."l1 The enactment of Subtitle 35 repre-
8. The phrase "issued, sold, or delivered" has not been given any specific judicial 
interpretation by Maryland courts. Each of the words presumptively has 
independent meaning, but the Insurance Code suggests that "issued" and 
"sold" are synonymous. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 481A (1991) 
(policies "issued or delivered") with id. § 541(c)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (policies 
"issued, sold, or delivered") and Act of May 26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. 
Laws 3749, 3754, § 2 ("issued or delivered"). The "issuing" of a policy is 
clearly different than the "delivery" of a policy. See 1 GEORGE J. COUCH, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, §§ 10:1-10:2 (1959 & Supp. 1983). "Delivery" 
was probably used in the 1972 statute to account for policies issued or sold 
before January 1, 1973, but physically delivered after that date. See 12A 
COUCH, supra, § 45:692 (2d ed. rev. 1981 & Supp. 1991) (stating construction 
of statutes and policies issued under compulsory insurance law to be made in 
favor of the legislature's purpose). The language was then carried over for the 
same reason when uninsured motorist insurance became mandatory for policies 
issued, sold, or delivered after January 1, 1975. The primary purpose of the 
"issued, sold, or delivered" phrase, however, is to ensure that all policies that 
become binding contracts in Maryland will be interpreted according to Maryland 
law and the requirements of Subtitle 35. For a discussion of final acts that 
will bind the insured and insurer to a contract, see Grain Dealers Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 65-66, 2i"5 A.2d 467, 471-72 
(1965), and Sun Insurance Office v. Mallick, 160 Md. 71; 81, 153 A. 35, 39 
(1931). See also infra notes 13 & 89 (discussing choice of laws questions 
regarding uninsured motorist claims). 
9. A fifth coverage, collision, is optional. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541 (1991 
& Supp. 1992). Personal injury protection can be waived by the first named 
insured. [d. § 539(f). 
10. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 Md. 
131, 135-36, 550 A.2d 69, 71 (1988); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 539, 
541(a), 541(c)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992). The required security must provide, at 
a minimum, for "[t]he payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising 
from an accident of up to $20,000 for anyone person and up to $40,000 for 
any two or more persons." MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b)(1) (1992). 
It must also provide a minimum of $10,000 property damage liability protection, 
id. § 17-103(b)(2) (1992), as well as personal injury protection, id. § 17-103(b)(3) 
(1992), and uninsured motorist coverage, id. § 17-103(b)(4) (1992). 
11. 314 Md. at 135, 550 A.2d at 71; accord Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 528 
A.2d 912 (1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986); Jennings v. Government Employees 
Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 360, 488 A.2d 166, 170 (1985). 
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sen ted a shift from relying solely on the personal financial respon-
sibility of motorists to provide compensation to automobile accident 
victims to a recognition of public responsibility with regard to those 
victims. 12 This responsibility arises from Maryland's interest in the 
welfare of its citizens and in the social and economic problems 
following in the wake of a serious injury. 13 Subtitle 35 is part of a 
comprehensive automobile insurance scheme designed to alleviate the 
state's burden of providing disability benefits to victims of motor 
vehicle accidents.14 By regulating owners, operators, and insurers of 
12. See Joseph P. Murphy & Ross Netherton, Public Responsibility and the 
Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEO. L.J. 700 (1959) (discussing the theoretical shift 
from financial responsibility to public responsibility underlying state automobile 
insurance schemes). 
13. In resolving a conflict of law issue, the court of appeals stated in Hutzell v. 
Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1968), that 
the State of Maryland has a genuine interest in the welfare of a person 
injured within its borders, who may conceivably become a public 
charge due to a disabling injury. The social and economic problems 
following in the wake of a serious injury as they may affect the 
dependents of the person injured are properly matters of public 
concern. 
[d. at 233, 249 A.2d at 452; accord Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. 
Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978). In Belcher the court of appeals 
rejected the appellant's position that personal jurisdiction over an absent 
defendant could be acquired by attaching the insurer's obligations under the 
motor vehicle insurance policy insuring that defendant. In reaching its decision, 
the court noted: 
Our decision today is not rendered without cognizance of the peti-
tioners' strong public policy arguments in favor of allowing suits 
against insurers in situations similar to the one presented in this case. 
There is more than a modicum of appeal in their contention that the 
General Assembly's action in setting up a system of compulsory 
automobile insurance . . . indicates its growing belief that all those 
injured while using the highways of this State should be properly 
recompensed. Furthermore, citizens of Maryland will have to bear the 
brunt of the expense when the injured are forced to rely on public 
aid for support due to their loss of employment and concomitant 
inability to pay medical bills incurred as a result of their injuries -
even though the insurer has collected his fees to pay for just such 
occurrences and very likely has set up a reserve fund containing all 
the money necessary to reimburse the injured parties. 
[d. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775. 
14. The insurance scheme contains three major components: compulsory motor 
vehicle liability insurance, mandatory uninsured motorist coverage, and the 
Uninsured Division of the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF). The 
components are intended to be "complementary - when one is inapplicable 
another should compensate the injured party." Donna M. Maag, Comment, 
Compensation jor Victims oj Uninsured Motorist Accidents, 12 U. BALT. L. 
REv. 314, 315 (1983) (citing Ralph P. Higgins, Note, Uninsured Motorist 
Coverage Laws: The Problem oj the Underinsured Motorist, 55 NOTRE DAME 
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motor vehicles, the insurance scheme protects the state's interest, 
providing economic protection to nearly all Maryland residents. IS 
Personal injury protection and uninsured motorist coverage play 
lead roles in the insurance scheme. The state's desire to provide 
immediate economic relief to all motor vehicle accident victims is 
accomplished by personal injury protection, which provides medical, 
hospital and disability benefitsl6 without regard to fault,17 therefore 
constituting a type of "limited no-fault" coverage.'8 Uninsured mo-
torist insurance is specifically designed to ensure compensation for 
victims of uninsured or underinsured motorists. 19 Besides filling the 
L. REv. 541, 541-42 (1980». Added to this three-tiered system is the Property 
and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation (PCIGC), which guarantees 
obligations owed to insureds of insolvent motor vehicle liability insurance 
companies. PCIGC protects both claimants and insureds by providing "a 
mechanism for the prompt payment of covered claims under certain insurance 
policies and to avoid financial loss to residents of Maryland who are claimants 
or policyholders of an insurer ... which has become insolvent." MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A, § 504(a) (1991); accord McMichael v. Robertson, 77 Md. App. 
208, 549 A.2d 1157 (1988) (discussing the PCIGC in connection with uninsured 
motorist insurance). 
15. See National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 284 Md. 694, 399 A.2d 877 
(1979), where the court of appeals noted that 
under the combination of required uninsured motorist endorsements 
in policies issued in Maryland and the provision for payment from 
the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, the only persons injured 
in Maryland not afforded protection equal to the minimum which 
would be provided under an omnibus clause are those persons from 
places not having the equivalent of our Maryland Automobile Insur-
ance Fund and a few people disqualified in such instances as that 
under Art. 48A, § 243H(a)(l)(i) where a claimant might have been 
riding in an uninsured motor vehicle owned by him. 
Id. at 704-05, 399 A.2d at 881-82. Since Pinkney, the uninsured motorist 
statute has expanded the ambit of the permissible exclusions. See infra notes 
341-43 and accompanying text. 
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (1991 & Supp. 1992). Personal injury protection 
is also called "Economic Loss Protection." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Insurance Comm'r, 283 Md. 663, 664-65, 392 A.2d 1114, 1115 (1978). 
17. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 540(a)(1) (1991). 
18. Harden v. Mass Transit Admin .• 277 Md. 399, 407 n.5, 354 A.2d 817, 821 
n.5 (1976). 
19. The uninsured motorist in Maryland is most likely to live in an urban area 
(68.4070); be Caucasian (65.1%); be male (76.9%); be 21 to 44 years old 
(71.6%); have no points on his driving record (59.4%); and have a class "D" 
license (67.4%). STEPHEN V. VERSACE, MARYLAND DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE 
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE UNINSURED MOTORIST IN MARYLAND 31 (1977). 
Although Versace's study is sixteen years old. his conclusions are interesting 
and, in some cases, startling. For instance, based upon a finding within his 
study that the uninsured rate in Maryland was 2.8%, he concluded that "the 
evidence clearly indicates that the problem of the uninsured in Maryland has 
been grossly over-estimated." Id. at 31-32. But see REpORT OF THE {NSURANCE 
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gaps inherent in financial responsibility and compulsory insurance 
legislation,20 uninsured motorist insurance directly furthers the state's 
desire to shift the risk of loss to the private sector by providing the 
injured insured with a minimum amount of compensation. 
Uninsured motorist insurance was initially an optional coverage, 
but became mandatory in 1975.21 As originally designed, uninsured 
motorist coverage in Maryland was supposed to place the accident 
victim in the same position as if the uninsured tort feasor maintained 
liability coverage in an amount equal to the minimum required 
coverage under the financial responsibility laws of Maryland. The 
Maryland legislature has made substantial changes to the uninsured 
motorist statute since its enactment. 22 Instead of providing recovery 
of the minimum required coverage, the uninsured motorist statute 
now seeks to provide the victim of an uninsured motorist the op-
portunity. for full recovery. 
This article analyzes uninsured motorist insurance in Maryland. 
It discusses various topics that have been addressed by Maryland 
courts and attempts to clear up the confusion surrounding the concept 
of stacking of uninsured motorist coverages. Particular attention is 
paid to how the nature of uninsured motorist coverage changed with 
TASK FORCE OF THE HOUSE ECONOMIC MATTERS COMMITTEE (Jan. 1983) (finding 
the number of uninsured motor vehicles in Maryland ranges from 90,000 to 
300,(00); see also I ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
INSURANCE § 1.12 (2d ed. 1987) (estimating that 5 to 20 percent of motorists 
nationwide are uninsured). 
20. Winner v. Ratzlaff, 505 P.2d 606, 610 (Kan. 1973). Maryland's courts have 
indicated that automobile insurance is compulsory in Maryland. See, e.g., 
Jennings v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 360, 488 A.2d 166, 
170 (1985). Technically, however, Maryland is not a true compulsory automobile 
insurance state, for a vehicle owner in Maryland is not required to have an 
automobile liability policy, but instead may offer another form of security. 
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 17-103(a)(l)-(2) (1992). Since the usual form of 
security is an automobile insurance policy, however, id. § 17-103(a)(1), and 
because a self-insurer must provide the same coverage as if he maintained an 
automobile liability policy, see infra note 58, Maryland may be characterized 
as a de facto compulsory insurance state. 
21. Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 562, 1975 Md. Laws 2716. The descriptive title for 
§ 541 has always read "Required and Optional Additional Coverage." The 
descriptive titles of Subtitle 35 were not merely captioqs inserted by the codifier, 
but rather were part of the act. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Insurance Comm'r, 283 Md. 663, 675 n.4, 392 A.2d 1114, 1120 n.4 (1978). 
The title originally referred to required liability coverage, and optional unin-
sured motorist and collision coverage. In 1975, uninsured motorist coverage 
became a required additional coverage, but collision stayed optional. See MD. 
CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b)(4) (1992) (categorizing uninsured motorist 
insurance as "required additional coverage"). 
22. As used herein, the uninsured motorist statute refers to MD. ANN. CODE art. 
48A, §§ 538, 541, 543 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
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the introduction of "underinsured" motorist coverage in 1981.23 In 
addition, this article considers several· issues that have not been 
addressed by Maryland courts.24 
Because any analysis of uninsured motorist insurance must focus 
on both the statutory requirements and the insurance policy provi-
sions, this article uses the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsement to the Personal Auto Policy as its primary reference point. 
Earlier versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
are considered in order to highlight the new provisions of the 1989 
version. 2s Moreover, the earlier versions retain their significance 
despite being modified or replaced by other forms because, as one 
commentator has noted, "uninsured motorist coverage provisions 
figure in litigations long after revisions or new forms are intro-
duced."26 Reference will also be made to the 1966 Standard Form, 
not only because modified versions of that form continue to be used 
in Maryland, but also because the substantial body of law that has 
developed regarding its provisions is helpful in culling discernable 
judicial trends and in construing the terms and provisions in the 1989 
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. 
II. THE STANDARD FORMS AND THEIR REVISIONS 
In order to understand uninsured motorist insurance in Mary-
land, a basic appreciation of three standard insurance forms is 
required: the 1966 Standard Uninsured Motorist (UM) Form, the 
1977 Personal Auto Policy, and the Maryland Uninsured Motorist 
Endorsement to the 1977 Personal Auto PolicyY Many judicial trends 
23. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text. 
24. Topics beyond the scope of this article include contractual arbitration provisions 
and procedure, property damage claims; self insurers, trial procedure, and 
uninsured motorist insurance in commercial auto policies. 
25. There are, for instance, significant differences between the 1987 and 1989 
versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. See infra note 27 
and accompanying text. 
26. I WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.1. 
27. Uninsured motorist insurance in commercial automobile policies is beyond the 
scope of this article; however, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
(ISO Form CA 21 13) to the Commercial Auto Policy (ISO Form CA 00 01) 
(both created by the Insurance Services Office, see infra note 38) is similar to 
the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement to the Personal Auto Policy. 
There are slight differences, and, arguably, uninsured motorist coverage in a 
commercial policy deserves different treatment than uninsured motorist coverage 
in a personal policy. See infra note 419 and accompanying text. The Maryland 
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement to the Commercial Auto Policy currently 
bears a 3 90 revision mark (earlier versions: 12 87 and 5 83). 
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can be understood only in connection with specific forms, and, in 
reality, only in connection with a particular revision of a specific 
form.28 References to a "standard policy," usually in reference to 
the 1966 Standard UM Form, are, at best, misleading;29 it is "both 
unwise and unwarranted to assume that any particular dispute in-
volves the standard terms,' '30 since the language of any insurance 
contract will govern as long as it does not contravene public policy.31 
In no instance, however, may the policy provide less coverage than 
what the statute requires. The original 1966 Standard UM Form,32 
developed by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the 
Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau as part of the Family Automobile 
Policy,33 is no longer used in Maryland because several of its sections 
have been invalidated by Maryland courts34 or superseded by statutory 
provisions.3s Some companies, however, continue to use forms, which, 
to some extent, mirror the language used in the 1966 Standard Form.36 
Although the 1966 Standard Form, as modified, continues to be 
used, a growing number of insurance companies have switched to 
the Personal Auto PolicyY The Personal Auto Policy was developed 
in 1977 by the Insurance Services Office, a national nonprofit or-
28. It is unfortunate in this regard that many of the court opinions do not recite 
the particular policy language at issue. 
29. One commentator writes that "[s)ince 1966, there has been a wide divergence 
in the forms used, as many states require certain language while voiding other 
provisions. Similarly, as the trend to more readable policies gains momentum, 
the traditional language is less prevalent." 3 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF 
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.01 (1992). 
30. 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.5. 
31. E.g., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 416 
A.2d 734 (1980). 
32. The only other commentary on uninsured motorist coverage in Maryland 
follows this approach. See Maag, supra note 14. This is understandable given 
the number of cases that have considered the 1966 Standard Policy. 
33. See 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, §§ 3.1-.2. The form was initially developed in 
1956, then revised in 1958, 1963, and, finally, 1966. See also 3 LONG, supra 
note 29, § 24.01. 
34. E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465 (1981) 
("consent to sue" clauses invalid). 
35. The 1966 Standard Form contained mandatory arbitration provisions. MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(iv) (Supp. 1992), provides that any uninsured 
motorist insurance provision that "commands or requires the submission of 
any dispute between the insured and the insurer to binding arbitration, is 
prohibited and shall be of no legal force or effect." Part C of the Personal 
Auto Policy also contains an arbitration clause. 
36. 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.01 ("Although many insurance companies still 
follow the basic provisions of the [1966) Standard Form, several insurers, 
including many of the larger companies, utilize their own forms under which 
provisions may differ from the Standard Form. Thus, situations may arise in 
which coverage would exist under the Standard Form but not under the 
applicable provisions of an individual policy, or vice versa. "). 
37. [d. 
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ganization which drafts model forms for the insurance industry.38 
The Personal Auto Policy which bears the PP 00 01 identification, 
was revised several times in the 1980s,39 most recently in December 
198940 by the Insurance Services Office in response to court decisions, 
legislation, regulation, or perceived need by the insurance industry 
for changes in coverage.41 Part C of the Personal Auto Policy contains 
the uninsured motorist insurance provisions. 
The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, which bears a 
PP 04 59 identification, supersedes Part C of the Personal Auto 
Policy.42 It is significantly different from the 1966 UM form, but is 
similar to Part C of the Personal Auto Policy. Many of the definitions 
in the general definition section of the Personal Auto Policy, how-
ever, as well as many of the notice and cooperation provisions, apply 
to coverage under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 
and care must be taken to consider the entire policy. Like the Personal 
Auto Policy, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement was 
revised several times in the 1980s.43 Although the Insurance Services 
Office developed the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
specifically in response to the Maryland uninsured motorist statute 
and Maryland case law, some companies use Part C of the Personal 
Auto Policy with slight modifications, excising or modifying those 
portions that are not valid under Maryland law. 44 
38. Insurance Services Office, Inc., is a non-profit organization that provides 
statistics gathering and advisory actuarial and rating services to the property 
and casualty insurance industry, as well as supplying advisory forms and 
insurance manuals to the industry. Letter from John P. Salvato, Insurance 
Services Office, Inc., to author Andrew Janquitto (Jan. 25, 1990) (on file with 
the University oj Baltimore Law Review). Where necessary or helpful, citations 
and other references herein to forms issued by, and subject to the copyright 
of, the Insurance Services Office, Inc., are delineated by the term "ISO 
Form .... " 
39. Letter from John P. Salvato, Insurance Services Office, Inc., to author Andrew 
Janquitto (Dec. 6, 1989) (on file with the University oj Baltimore Law Review); 
see also 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, §§ 3.1-.2. 
40. Revision dates appear on the ISO forms immediately following the identifying 
form mark. Thus, the December 1989 revision bears the mark PP ()() 01 12 
89. Prior versions of the Personal Auto Policy include April 1986 (4 86) and 
June 1980 (6 80). In August 1983, the Personal Auto Policy was revised by 
an amendatory endorsement (ISO Form PP ()() 03). Additionally, the Insurance 
Services Office offers endorsement PP 01 68, to be used with the Personal 
Auto Policy, which is specifically tailored to Maryland law regarding the scope 
of liability insurance. 
41. Letter, supra note 39. 
42. In addition, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement replaces paragraph 
C.2. of Part E of the Personal Auto Policy. See supra note 40. 
43. The revisions _occurred in February 1982 (2 82), June 1983 (6 83), May 1986 
(5 86), December 1987 (12 87), and December 1989 (12 89). See Letter, supra 
note 39; see also Letter, supra note 38. 
44. The Maryland Insurance Commissioner has the authority to review all motor 
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III. THE NATURE OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
Uninsured motorist insurance is considered first-party coverage 
by Maryland courtS.4S In reality, however, it is neither first-party nor 
third-party insurance. It has aspects of both, and has been called a 
hybrid form of coverage.46 True first-party coverage is premised on 
payment directly to the insured without regard to fault. Personal 
injury protection falls into this category. 47 Third-party insurance, in 
vehicle liability policies issued, sold, or delivered in the State of Maryland. 
Section 546 of the Insurance Code states as follows: 
The Commissioner shall have the authority to issue and promulgate 
all necessary rules, regulations and definitions not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this subtitle, and to review all policies of motor 
vehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this State to 
determine whether they are in compliance with this subtitle and the 
rules, regulations, and definitions promulgated thereunder. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 546 (1991); see a/so ide § 541(c)(2)(iii) (Supp. 
1992) ("The coverage required under this subsection (c) shall [be] in such form 
and subject to such conditions as may be approved by the Commissioner of 
Insurance."). Approval by the Insurance Commissioner does not, however, 
render the provision enforceable. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605-06, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976) 
(" [Although] the construction placed upon a statute by administrative officials 
soon after its enactment should not be disregarded except for the strongest 
and most compelling reasons, it is also true that an administrative interpretation 
contrary to the clear and unambiguous meaning of the statute will not be given 
effect."). Moreover, the Insurance Commissioner's approval does not require 
the Motor Vehicle Administration to accept the policy as satisfying the financial 
responsibility provisions. 59 Ope Att'y Gen. 451, 457 (1974). 
45. E.g., Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 Md. 548, 552, 403 A.2d 
1229, 1231-32 (1979) ("[UJninsured motorist coverage is in insurance parlance 
'first party coverage' like collision, comprehensive, medical payments or per-
sonal injury protection, and not 'third party coverage' such as personal injury 
or property damage liability insurance. "). The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has defined "a first party claim" as "the demand' an insured may make on 
his or her own insurer pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract between 
them," Insurance Comm'r v. Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Group, 313 Md. 
518, 525 n.3, 546 A.2d 458, 461 n.3 (1988), whereas "[aJ 'third party claim' 
refers to the claim which a third party has against the insured tort-feasor." 
Id. 
46. ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 4.9(d) (1971). 
47. See Reese, 285 Md. at 552, 403 A.2d at 1231-32. Personal injury protection is 
considered "[bJasic required primary coverage." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 
539 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (heading). The meaning of the term "primary" as 
used in Maryland's statute is not the same, however, as the insurance industry's 
definition. The Court of Appeals of Maryland explained as follows: 
Primary coverage generally refers to the policy that first must answer 
for the loss. As used [in section 538J, however, it may well have 
referred to first-person as opposed to third-party coverage. In that 
sense, the term would apply equally to [personal injury protectionJ, 
collision and [uninsured motoristJ, but not to liability coverage. 
Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 812-13, 506 A.2d 
641, 644 (1986). 
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contrast, premises payment to a person not a party to the insurance 
contract based on the acts of the insured; liability coverage is the 
typical example. 48 
Unlike other first-party coverages, uninsured motorist insurance 
is based on a showing of fault. In this sense it is unique, being "the 
only widely marketed first-party insurance that predicates indemni-
fication on the negligent conduct of a third party. "49 The insurer 
does not pay benefits to its insured unless and until the liability of 
the uninsured tort feasor is established. Moreover, the insurer has the 
right to defend the insured's claim for uninsured motorist benefits 
by asserting all of the defenses that the tortfeasor possesses.50 On 
the other hand, the insurer retains its identity as an insurer, and 
owes the insured a duty to act in good faith.51 Uninsured motorist 
claims, then, are simultaneously "quasi-adversarial" and "quasi-
fiduciary. "52 
Although the insurer stands in the shoes of the tortfeasor, 
uninsured motorist insurance is not designed to benefit the tortfeasor, 
though it may have that indirect effect. The primary purpose of 
uninsured motorist insurance "is to assure financial compensation to 
the innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to 
recover from financially irresponsible uninsured motorists."53 The 
uninsured motorist statute is a remedial piece of legislation and, as 
such, courts construe it liberally.54 The remedial nature of the unin-
sured motorist statute points to another unique aspect of uninsured 
motorist insurance: "The courts have been disposed to favor the 
48. See Reese, 285 Md. at 552, 403 A.2d at 1231-32. 
49. Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Observations on Litigating Over 
When a Claimant is "Legally Entitled to Recover, " 68 low A L. REv. 397, 399 
(1983). 
50. Such defenses include: lack of negligence, contributory negligence, assumption 
of the risk, extent of damages, causation, immunity, statute of limitations, and 
res judicata. See Winner v. Ratzlaff, 505 P.2d 606, 610 (Kan. 1973); see also 
Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 Md. 548, 555, 403 A.2d 1229, 
1233 (1979) (quoting Winner). In this sense, the tort feasor becomes a fictional 
insured, receiving the benefits of the insurer's defenses. See Hines v. Wausau 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
51. The duty of good faith is not a separate tort duty. See infra notes 518-19 and 
accompanying text. Notwithstanding the duty to act in good faith, the insurer 
is still able to assert whatever policy defenses it possesses: misrepresentation in 
the application, failure to pay premiums, breach of duty to cooperate, and 
breach of duty to notify. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
52. Henry A. Hentemann, Uninsured Motorist Coverage Claims and the Bad Faith 
Issue, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 168, 170 (1988). 
53. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 
A.2d 734, 735 (1980); see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
54. Gartelman, 288 Md. at 157, 416 A.2d at 738 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1988». 
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interests of the insureds to a greater degree than was previously true 
in regard to any other insurance coverage. lOSS 
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute requires that every insur-
ance policy contain coverage for damages which "[tIhe insured is 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor 
vehicle."s6 In addition, the insurance must cover damages that "[t]he 
surviving relatives . . . of the insured are entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of the 
death of the insured as the result of an accident arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. "S7 
Self-insurers must provide uninsured motorist insurance,s8 but 
neither the state, S9 nor the owners of private buses or taxis,6O are 
required to maintain uninsured motorist insurance. Uninsured mo-
torist insurance is also not required for vehicles not registered for 
use on a highway.61 The minimum required uninsured motorist pro-
tection is $20,000 for injury or death of anyone person in an 
accident, $40,000 for injury or death of any two or more persons 
per accident, and $10,000 for property damage in anyone accident. 62 
55. 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.6. 
56. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (Supp. 1992). 
57. [d. § 541 (c)(2)(ii). 
58. In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Rose, 47 Md. App. 481, 424 A.2d 
160 (1981), Rose, a Baltimore City firefighter, was injured while riding on a 
fire engine that was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle. The City was self-
insured. The court rejected the City's contention that it was not liable for 
uninsured motorist benefits because Rose had not complied with notice re-
quirements concerning suits against the City, stating that "the City, having 
elected to act as its own insurer, was required to assume the same responsibilities 
and provide the same minimum coverage as a private carrier" and could not 
impose additional conditions on, or further limit the extent of, coverage which 
it provided. [d. at 485, 424 A.2d at 162; accord MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 
17-103(a)(2) (1992). 
59. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Ouar. Co., 314 Md. 
131, 550 A.2d 69 (1988); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 354 
A.2d 817 (1976). 
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538(b) (1991), defines a motor vehicle as an 
automobile and any other vehicle, including a trailer, operated or designed for 
operation upon a public road by any power other than animal or muscular 
power but does not include a vehicle as defined in §§ 11-105 [a bus] and 11-
165 [a taxi] of the Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 
See also MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 11-105, -165 (1992); Pope v. Sun Cab 
Co., 62 Md. App. 218, 488 A.2d 1009 (1985), a//'d sub nom. Maryland Auto. 
Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 506 A.2d 641 (1986) (discussing taxi 
exclusion). 
61. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(e) (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
62. See id. § 541(c)(2)(i); see also MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b) (1992). 
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These amounts comport with the minimum amounts of required 
coverage under the financial responsibility provisions,63 as well as 
with the public policy embraced in Subtitle 16A of the Insurance 
Code.64 
Subtitle 16A creates the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund 
(MAIF). MAIF serves two functions and is divided into two divisions. 
The Insured Division of MAIF is the liability insurer of last resort 
in Maryland. It provides "automobile insurance to those eligible 
persons who are unable to obtain it in the private market. "65 In 
addition to being the liability insurer of last resort, MAIF is the 
statutory successor to the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund.66 
In order to make a claim against the Uninsured Division of MAIF, 
"the claim [must not be] covered by a policy of motor vehicle 
liability insurance. "67 If a victim has his own uninsured motorist 
Section 541(c)(2) does not expressly require that insurers provide uninsured 
motorist property damage coverage; most insurers, however, offer this type of 
coverage. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, for instance, pro-
vides: 
We will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" is legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an "uninsured 
motor vehicle" because of: 
2. "Property damage" caused by an accident. 
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Insuring 
Agreement. Property damage is defined as injury to or destruction of a covered 
motor vehicle or property contained in a covered motor vehicle. Id, Some 
insurers, however, do not offer uninsured motorist property damage coverage. 
Whether this is permissible has not been decided in Maryland. Arguably, 
however, uninsured motorist property damage protection of $10,000 is man-
datory. Section 541(c)(2)(v) of the Insurance Code states that in no instance 
may the uninsured motorist coverage be less than the coverage afforded a 
qualified person under section 243H and 243-1 of the Insurance Code. MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(v) (Supp. 1992). Those sections require 
property damage coverage of $10,000. See id. §§ 243H(a)(1)-(3), 243-I(a) (1991). 
In addition, Title 17 of the Transportation Article also requires property damage 
liability protection of $10,000. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b) 
(1992). For consistency, the Title 17 required security, the mandatory uninsured 
motorist insurance, and the compensable losses recognized by the Uninsured 
Division of MAIF should be the same. Moreover, the Motor Vehicle Admin-
istration apparently interprets Title 17 and § 541(c)(2) as mandating uninsured 
motorist property damage coverage. When a person seeks to become a self-
insured under Title 17, he must provide uninsured motorist coverage of $20,0001 
$40,000 for bodily injury or death as well as $10,000 for property damage. 
See Application for Maryland Self-Insurer (FR-l), available from the Motor 
Vehicle Administration. 
63. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 17-103(b) (1992). 
64. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 243B, 243-1 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
65. Id. § 243B(a). 
66. Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 240, 528 A.2d 912, 915 (1987). 
67. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a) (1991). 
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insurance, then he must pursue that coverage.68 In this regard, the 
Uninsured Division of MAIF functions as the uninsured motorist 
insurer of last resort. The maximum amounts payable under the 
Uninsured Division of MAIF in section 243-1 for bodily injury are 
$20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence.69 The maximum 
amount payable for property damage is $10,000 per occurrence.70 
There are five deductions, or set-offs, from the maximum amounts 
recoverable against the fund. 71 
The scope of required coverage under the uninsured motorist 
statute must be ascertained by cross-reference to the Uninsured 
Division of MAIF. Section S41(c)(2)(v) provides that "[i]n no case 
shall the uninsured motorist coverage be less than the coverage 
afforded a qualified person under [MAIF] Article 48A, §§ 243H and 
243-1."72 Section 243H delineates the type of claims that can be made 
against the Uninsured Division of MAIF. Section 243-1 states the 
amounts of required coverage. The articulation of sections S41(c)(2) 
and 243H is best seen in two cases concerning hit-and-run vehicles. 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maryland 
Automobile Insurance Fund,73 Daniel Saxon was injured while driving 
an automobile owned by Kathleen Koegel. Saxon claimed that the 
accident was caused when he was forced to take evasive action to 
avoid striking another vehicle, which then fled the scene. There was 
no physical contact between the Saxon vehicle and the phantom 
vehicle.74 State Farm insured the Koegel vehicle. 7s The uninsured 
motorist provisions of the State Farm policy required physical contact 
between the insured vehicle and a phantom vehicle. 76 Saxon made a 
claim for uninsured motorist benefits, and State Farm denied cov-
erage based on the lack of physical contact. 77 
Saxon then sought recovery from MAIF, which, in turn, filed a 
declaratory judgment action against State Farm, seeking a declaration 
that the State Farm policy's physical contact requirement was con-
trary to Maryland law. 78 The trial court ruled that Saxon was covered 
68. Uninsured motorist coverage is primary to any right of recovery from MAIF. 
[d. 
69. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243-I(a) (1991). 
70. [d. 
71. [d. § 243-I(b) (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
72. [d. § 541(c)(2)(v) (Supp. 1992). 
73. 277 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1976). 
74. [d. at 602-03, 356 A.2d at 561. 
75. [d. Saxon qualified as an additional insured because he was using the vehicle 
with Koegel's permission. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
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by the State Farm policy, and State Farm appealed. 79 The soh:i 
question before the court of appeals was the interpretation of section 
S41(c)(2)'s cross-reference to sections 243H and 243_1.80 
The court first examined section 243H to determine the scope 
of coverage afforded by that section. Section 243H recognizes three 
different claims involving uninsured motorists. 81 Section 243H(a)(1) 
establishes a qualified person's right to make a claim against MAIF 
when an accident was caused by a phantom vehicle,82 but does not 
contain any distinction between impact and non-impact phantom 
drivers. Therefore, the court ruled that the State Farm policy provided 
less coverage than section 243H(a)(1): "The aggregate of risks against 
which the State Farm endorsement insures is 'less than' the aggregate 
against which MAIF provides protection under § 243H, since the 
former does not insure against the non-impact phantom driver who 
causes an accident, while the latter does. "83 Accordingly, the court 
held that State Farm's impact requirement violated section S41(c)(2) 
and was void.84 
Eleven years after State Farm v. MAIF, the court of appeals 
again considered the interplay of sections S41(c)(2) and 243H(a)(1). 
79. MAIF petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the court of appeals granted the 
petition. [d. at 603, 356 A.2d at 561. 
80. At the time of the dispute, the cross-reference to sections 243H and 243-1 was 
contained in MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c). It is now contained in § 
541 (c)(2)(v). For consistency herein, both the earlier and later versions will be 
referred to as section 541(c)(2)(v). 
81. The first type of claim involves an unidentified motorist, MD. ANN. CODE art. 
48A, § 243H(a)(1) (1991); the second involves a disappearing motorist, id. § 
243H(a)(2), and the third, an uninsured motorist, id. § 243H(a)(3). An "uni-
dentified motorist" is "an owner or operator of a motor vehicle whose identity 
and whereabouts are not known." MD. R. BW1(a)(5) (1992). A "disappearing 
motorist" is "an uninsured owner or operator who was originally identified 
but whose present whereabouts cannot be ascertained for the purpose of serving 
process." MD. R. BW1(a)(4) (1992). An "uninsured motorist" is "an owner 
or operator of a motor vehicle whose whereabouts are ascertainable for the 
purpose of serving process, but who was uninsured at the time of the act or 
omission." MD. R. BWl(a)(6) (1992). 
82. Section 243H(a)(1) also covers claims caused by a stolen vehicle. It states that 
the following may be made against MAIF: 
Claims for the death of or personal injury to a qualified person or 
for damages to property in excess of $100, arising out of the own-
ership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State where the 
identity of the motor vehicle and of the operator and owner thereof 
cannot be ascertained or it is established that the motor vehicle, at 
the time of the accident occurred, was in the possession of some 
person other than the owner without the owner's consent and that 
the identity of the person cannot be ascertained. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a)(1) (1991). 
83. State Farm v. MAIF, 277 Md. at 605, 356 A.2d at 562. 
84. [d. 
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In Lee v. Wheeler,8s Ark and Olivia Lee, Maryland residents, were 
jnjured in an automobile accident in Washington, D.C., when a 
vehicle driven by Marlene Wheeler swerved to avoid an unidentified 
vehicle that had suddenly entered her traffic lane.86 Wheeler's vehicle 
struck the Lees' vehicle. The Lees sued Wheeler in tort. They also 
sued their insurer, Pennsylvania General Insurance Company, seeking 
uninsured motorist insurance as a result of the phantom vehicle's 
negligence.87 The Lees recovered against Wheeler, but their claims 
against Pennsylvania General were dismissed because the insurance 
policy contained a provision that required physical contact with the 
phantom vehicle in order for the uninsured motorist provision to 
apply. The trial court found that the physical contact requirement 
was valid under District of Columbia law. 88 The Lees appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, which disagreed with the trial court and ruled that Maryland 
law should apply.89 Uncertain whether Maryland courts would follow 
State Farm v. MAIF and invalidate a provision requiring impact with 
a phantom vehi<;le when the accident occurs outside of Maryland, 
the court certified the issue to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 90 
The court of appeals began its analysis in Lee with a review of 
State Farm v. MAIF and section 541 (c)(2). Reaffirming its interpre-
85. 310 Md. 233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987). 
86. [d. at 235, 528 A.2d at 913. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. Lee v. Wheeler, 810 F.2d 303, 304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court noted that 
Maryland law applied because the policy issued by Pennsylvania General was 
clearly a Maryland contract and "[tlhe fact that the accident occurred in the 
District does not endow the District with an interest in the contractual rela-
tionship between the contracting parties." [d. at 305. The hybrid nature of 
uninsured motorist insurance often gives rise to choice of law difficulties. See 
1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.15. In Maryland, the nature, validity and 
construction of contracts are generally governed by the doctrine of lex loci 
contractus. Under this doctrine, the interpretation and enforcement of the 
policy is determined by the law of the state where the policy became a binding 
contract. [d. The scope of the policy, and whether certain exclusions are 
permissible, would also be governed by the law of the state where the contract 
was made. An automobile insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in Mar-
yland is meant to comply with Maryland law. Since the insured's right to 
recover uninsured motorist benefits is based on a contract theory, the law of 
Maryland should thus apply. See Galford v. Nicholas, 244 Md. 275, 281, 167 
A.2d 783, 786 (1961) (stating that insurer's liability under an automobile liability 
policy is generally to be determined in accordance with the law of the place 
where the contract was entered into, not some other jurisdiction). 
90. Lee, 810 F.2d at 306. The federal appellate court noted that Reese v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 285 Md. 548, 403 A.2d 1229 (1979), 
implicitly supported the Lees' position that § 541(c)(2) mandated coverage of 
accidents occurring out of state, but did not find Reese conclusive. Lee, 810 
F.2d at 306 n.4. 
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tation of section 541(c)(2) in State Farm v. MAIF, the court rejected 
Pennsylvania General's argument that section 541(c)(2) contained an 
implied territorial limitation when read in conjunction with section 
243H(a)(1).91 According to the court, no territorial limitation was 
evident. The court then noted that sections 541(c)(2) and 234H did 
not "always operate to qualify or supplement each other."92 In the 
court's view, section 541(c)(2) established "a floor below which an 
insurer may not go, but it [did] not establish a ceiling. "93 Given the 
"broadly-protective public policy" underlying the uninsured motorist 
statute, the court invalidated Pennsylvania General's physical contact 
provision in order to "safeguard the integrity of the uninsured 
motorist law and promote its remedial purpose of compensating the 
innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents."94 
91. Lee, 310 Md. at 238, 528 A.2d at 914-15. Pennsylvania General based its 
argument on Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a)(1), which "authorize[dJ 
qualified persons to present claims against MAIF for personal injuries 'arising 
out of ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State . .. 
(emphasis supplied).'" Lee, 310 Md. 233, 238, 528 A.2d 912, 914. The court 
of appeals declined to rule whether § 243H(a)(I) had a residential requirement: 
In our discussion of § 243H(a)(I) we have assumed arguendo, that it 
does include a residential requirement with respect to claims against 
MAIF. That is the way Pennsylvania General reads the law, but we 
reject Pennsylvania ·General's conclusion even if the law be read that 
way. We note, however, that this reading· of the statute is not 
inevitable. We expressly do not decide whether it is correct. 
Lee, 310 Md. at 243 n.4, 528 A.2d at 917 n.4. The federal appellate court, 
however, noted that a "parsing of the statutory language suggests the possibility 
that section 243H(a)(1) can apply to accidents that occur outside of Maryland." 
Lee, 810 F.2d at 305-06. 
92. Lee, 310 Md. at 242, 528 A.2d at 916-17. 
93. [d. at 243, 528 A.2d at 917. 
94. [d. The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not decide whether a physical 
contact provision would apply above-and-beyond the $20,000/$40,000 required 
minimum: 
Pennsylvania General among other things argues that its exclusion of 
non-impact phantom vehicle claims should be held to be enforceable 
as to claims that exceed the statutory mandatory minimum coverage 
required by Maryland law. Because that point is not encompassed 
within the certified question, we decline to address it. For the same 
reason, we likewise express no opinion on the issue raised by amici 
in this case: whether Maryland law prohibits a physical contact re-
quirement in uninsured motorist coverage in commercial policies as 
opposed to personal policies. 
[d. at 235-36 n.l, 528 A.2d at 913 n.l (citation omitted); see Royal Ins. Co. 
v. Austin, 79 Md. App. 741, 558 A.2d 1247 (1989) (discussing physical contact 
requirement in commercial automobile policy). In Austin, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland decided that the phrase "hit and run" in a commercial 
uninsured motorist endorsement included instances of nonphysical contact and 
did not consider the validity of a physical contact requirement in a commercial 
policy. [d. at 746-48, 558 A.2d at 1250. 
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The court's holding in Lee is illustrative not only of the expansive 
interpretation that courts give the uninsured motorist statute, but 
also serves to recognize that reference to section 243H must be done 
with great care. An exacting scrutiny of both section S41(c)(2) and 
section 243H must be made when addressing a scope of coverage 
issue. In addition, a review of all of the provisions of the uninsured 
motorist statute must be made. Although they are related, sections 
S41(c)(2) and 243H have different functions9S and, as the Lee court 
noted, they "do not always operate to qualify or supplement each 
other."96 Therefore, section S41(c)(2) may provide for broader cov-
erage than the minimum delineated in 243H.97 In Lee, for example, 
section S41(c)(2)'s "arising out of" clause was determined to be more 
. expansive than 243H(a)(2)'s "arising out of" provision.98 The Lee 
court's notion that section S41(c)(2) establishes a floor, rather than 
a ceiling, then, is merely a statement that the public policy underlying 
the uninsured motorist statute will give effect to more comprehensive 
provisions in that statute over less comprehensive provisions in section 
243H of Subtitle 16A. 
Lee also reinforces the often repeated proposition that only 
expressly authorized exclusions will be recognized by the courts.99 
Statutory exclusions from, or limitations on, uninsured motorist 
insurance must be clear and unambiguous; any doubts will be resolved 
based on the underlying remedial nature of the uninsured motorist 
statute. In this sense, the public policy underlying the uninsured 
motorist statute acts as a limitation on the insurer's ability to contract 
95. Lee, 310 Md. at 240, 528 A.2d at 916. 
96. [d. at 242, 528 A.2d at 917. Nor do sections 542(c)(2) and 243-1 always 
supplement each other. The permissible offsets in section 543, for example, do 
not comport with the permissible offsets in section 243-1. Compare MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A, § 543 (1991 & Supp. 1992) with id. § 243-I(b) (1991 & Supp. 
1992). 
97. The definition of uninsured motor vehicle in § 541(c)(I) is clearly broader than 
the definition of uninsured motor vehicle in § 243L(f). Section 541(c)(I) defines 
"uninsured motor vehicle" to include a vehicle with less insurance than the 
injured person's uninsured motorist coverage. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 
541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992). In this way, the uninsured motorist coverage 
mandated by Subtitle 35 functions as a type of underinsured motorist coverage 
as well. Moreover, an "insured" under § 541(c)(2) is not necessarily the same 
as a "qualified person" under § 243H. See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Reliance Ins. 
Co., 63 Md. App. 612, 617-18, 493 A.2d 405,407-08 (1985). 
98. In contrast to § 243H(a)(I), § 541(c)(2)'s "arising out of" clause did not 
contain the prepositional phrase "in this State." See supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
99. In Lee, the court stated that "[a] corollary principle in our construction of 
Art. 48A is that we will not imply exclusions nor recognize exclusions beyond 
those expressly enumerated by the legislature." Lee, 310 Md. at 239, 528 A.2d 
at 915. 
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freely. The insurer is not restrained from contracting for coverage 
beyond that contemplated by the statute; the insurer, however, has 
no legal right to contract for coverage below the statutory minimum, 
even if it could find a willing insured. Any provision which condi-
tions, limits, or dilutes the unqualified uninsured motorist coverage 
mandated by the statute is void and unenforceable,loo and Maryland 
courts have "consistently rejected attempts by insurers, as well as 
insureds and the insurance commissioner, to circumvent the plain 
language of the required coverage provisions of the statutes dealing 
with automobile insurance. "101 Only those policy provisions that 
narrow the insurer's liability in a manner consistent with the statute 
are valid.102 
IV. MARYLAND'S REDUCTION UNDERINSURED 
MOTORIST COVERAGE 
In 1981, the Maryland legislature broadened the concept of 
uninsured motorist insurance to include a type of underinsured 
motorist coverage. Before 1981, an uninsured motor vehicle was 
defined as a vehicle carrying no liability insurance.103 This definition 
100. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 730, 436 A.2d 465, 471 
(1981) (quoting with approval Barnett v. Crosby, 612 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 1980». 
101. [d. at 730, 436 A.2d at 471. 
102. Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 98, 585 A.2d 286 
(1991) (finding owned-but-otherwise-insured exclusion valid); c/. Lord v. Mar-
yland Auto. Ins. Fund, 38 Md. App. 375, 381 A.2d 23 (1977) (finding territorial 
limitation on personal injury protection valid). 
103. Before 1981, the statute did not contain a definition of uninsured motor 
vehicle, but the Uninsured Division of MAIF defined an uninsured motor 
vehicle as 
a motor vehicle as to which there is not in force security meeting the 
requirements of Title 17 of the Transportation Article; and a motor 
vehicle as to which there is in force a liability policy meeting the 
requirements of that title where a receiver or conservator has been 
appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction for the insurance 
company issuing said liability policy. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243L(f) (1991). In addition, since 1965, the 
Insurance Code has required that: 
Any endorsement or provision protecting the insured against damage 
caused by an uninsured motor vehicle, contained in any policy of 
insurance issued and delivered in this State, shall be deemed to cover 
damage caused by a motor vehicle of which the liability insurer is or 
becomes insolvent or otherwise unable to pay claims, in like manner 
and to like extent as for damages caused by a motor vehicle as to 
which no liability insurance exists. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 481A (1991) (added by Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 
375, 1965 Md. Laws 546). 
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was changed in 1981 to include any vehicle insured with liability 
coverage less than the amount of uninsured motorist insurance pos-
sessed by the victim. 104 At the same time, the legislature also added 
section 541(c)(3), which provides that "[t]he limit of liability for an 
insurer providing uninsured motorist coverage under this subsection 
is the amount of that coverage less the sum of the limits under the 
liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the 
bodily injury or death of the insured." lOS 
The 1981 amendments, as the court of appeals noted in Hoffman 
v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 106 make mandatory uninsured 
motorist insurance operate as underinsured motorist coverage. I07 The 
statute's definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" as including un-
derinsured motor vehicles, however, has led to substantial confu-
sion. lOs The nature of the semantic confusion created by the definition 
104. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981 Md. Laws 2122 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992». Section 541(c)(l) reads as 
follows: 
"[U]ninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle whose ownership, 
maintenance, or use has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an 
insured, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all 
valid and collectible liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities 
applicable to the bodily injury or death is less than the amount of 
coverage provided to the insured under this subsection. 
For a detailed discussion of the 1981 amendments, see Hoffman v. United 
Services Automobile Ass'n, 309 Md. 167, 178-79, 522 A.2d 1320, 1325-26 
(1987). 
105. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981 Md. Laws 2122 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(3) (1991». 
106. 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 1320 (1987). 
107. [d. at 178-79, 522 A.2d at 1325-26. The court noted that the statutory definition 
includes "what in insurance parlance is referred to as . .. 'underinsured' 
motorist [coverage]." [d. at 174, 522 A.2d at 1323. 
108. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. Uninsured motorist and under-
insured motorist coverages are sometimes treated differently by courts. See 
generally 2 WIDlSS, supra note 19, § 32.2. Since Maryland defines an uninsured 
motor vehicle to be one that is either uninsured or underinsured, it appears 
that Maryland courts would not treat the coverages differently. There are valid 
reasons, however, for treating them differently. The injured insured has three 
alternatives when pursuing a claim involving an uninsured motorist: (1) he may 
sue the tortfeasor in tort, obtain a judgment and then enforce the judgment 
against the uninsured motorist insurer; (2) the injured insured may sue the 
uninsured motorist insurer and, as part of his case, prove that the tortfeasor's 
negligence proximately caused his injuries; and (3) the injured insured may 
combine the tort and contract claims in a single action. Lane v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 170 & n.3, 582 A.2d SOl, 503 & n.3 (1990); 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 736, 436 A.2d 465, 474 
(1981). The right to combine the tort and contract claims when an underinsured 
motor vehicle is involved is questionable, as is the insurer's right to intervene 
when the claimant sues only in tort and an underinsured motor vehicle is 
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of uninsured motor vehicle is best seen in Christensen v. Wausau 
Insurance Co. 109 
Wayne Christensen was injured in an automobile accident with 
a vehicle driven by Herb Herrmann. Herrmann was insured by MAIF 
under a policy that provided liability coverage of $20,000/$40,000. 
Christensen's injuries and damages exceeded $20,000, and MAIF 
tendered its per person policy limit in full settlement of any claims 
Christensen had against Herrmann. Christensen then sued his insur-
ance company, Wausau, to recover under insured motorist benefits. 
Christensen's policy with Wausau provided uninsured motorist cov-
erage of $20,000/$40,000 and underinsured motorist coverage of 
$20,000/$40,000. Christensen paid a separate premium of six dollars 
for the underinsured motorist coverage. The policy, however, did not 
define underinsured motorist coverage yo 
At trial, the court ruled that Christensen was not entitled to 
recover anything from Wausau because he had already collected 
$20,000 from Herrmann and the Wausau policy provided only $20,000 
in underinsured motorist coverage. The trial court equated uninsured 
motorist insurance with underinsured coverage. Christensen appealed, 
and the court of special appeals reversed. The court rejected Wausau's 
argument that uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverage 
were synonymous, stating that "[t]he adoption of [Wausau's] con-
tention would appear to make Wausau's inclusion of both terms in 
the coverages . . . an exercise in futility." III The court then concluded 
that Wausau's "use of the terms uninsured motorist and underinsured 
motorist on the policy without a definition" created an ambiguity 
that should be resolved against the drafter of the policy. JJ2 
Because the Wausau policy did not contain a definition of 
underinsured motorist coverage, the court sought to provide one. 
Noting that "[uninsured motorist] coverage is applicable where the 
involved. The insurer's right to its day in court is outweighed by the prejudice 
caused by the introduction of insurance into the tort action. Compare Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 743, 436 A.2d 465, 478 (1981) 
(holding that an uninsured motorist insurer who, having notice of insured's 
tort action, fails to intervene, is bound by the judgment in the tort suit) with 
Morris v. Weddington, 320 Md. 674, 681, 579 A.2d 762, 765 (1990) (stating 
issue of insurance or lack of insurance should not be introduced at trial). In 
such a case, intervention should be viewed as permissive rather than as of 
right, for the insurer's interests are protected by the tortfeasor's insurance 
defense counsel, who will vigorously defend his client. When a vehicle with no 
insurance is involved, and the plaintiff sues only in tort, then intervention 
should be as of right, for the insurer is left unprotected. 
109. 69 Md. App. 696, 519 A.2d 776 (1987). 
110. Id. at 697-98, 519 A.2d at 777. 
111. Id. at 699, 519 A.2d at 778. 
112. Id. at 699-701, 519 A.2d at 779. 
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vehicle involved in an accident is without insurance or is insured for 
less than the liability limits required by the State law," the court 
stated that under insured motorist coverage "is applicable where the 
tortfeasor carries insurance which comports with the legal limits but 
is inadequate to cover all of the damages incurred. "113 Since Chris-
tensen had paid an extra premium for the underinsured motorist 
coverage, the court held that he could collect the $20,000 from 
Wausau above and beyond the $20,000 he had collected from MAIF.1I4 
The Wausau court's holding is a recognition that, generally, 
uninsured motorist coverage is not synonymous with underinsured 
motorist coverage.1IS Under Maryland's statutory scheme, however, 
an uninsured motor vehicle is synonymous with an underinsured 
motor vehicle. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Souras,1I6 this fact 
led the court of special appeals to reject the definition of underinsured 
motorist coverage contained in the Wausau opinion. ll7 Souras, how-
ever, should not be read as overruling Wausau; rather it overrules 
only the Wausau court's definition of underinsured motorist cover-
age. The decision in Wausau is fundamentally correct,1l8 and its 
definition of underinsured motorist is not completely inconsistent 
with the statute. 
There are two different types of under insured motorist coverage: 
floating and reduction. Floating underinsured motorist coverage, as 
113. [d. at 700,519 A.2d at 778. The court ignored the policy definition of uninsured 
motor vehicle as including a vehicle with insurance that met the financial 
responsibility requirements but whose applicable liability limits were less than 
the uninsured motorist limits provided by the Wausau policy. 
114. The court stated that "[w]hile many states have statutes that specifically define 
UIM coverage ... the State of Maryland does not." [d. (footnote omitted). 
In a footnote, the court recognized that Maryland's uninsured motorist statute 
did address the concept of an underinsured motor vehicle. [d. at 700 n.l, 519 
A.2d at 778 n.l. 
115. The Wausau court rejected Wausau's position that uninsured motorist and 
underinsured motorist had the same meaning under the Maryland law: '''Un-
insured' clearly is not the same as 'underinsured' and '[a] court will not torture 
words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for 
ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or 
laymen contended for different meanings.'" [d. at 699, 519 A.2d at 778 
(citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
116. 78 Md. App. 71, 552 A.2d 908 (1989). 
117. In Souras, the court of special appeals, after adopting the Hoffman court's 
statement that the 1981 amendments made uninsured motorist coverage operate 
as underinsured motorist coverage, stated that the court's "indication to the 
contrary in Christensen v. Wausau Insurance Co., 69 Md. App. 696, 519 A.2d 
776 (1987), decided prior to Hoffman is expressly overruled." Souras, 78 Md. 
App. at 76 n.2, 552 A.2d at 910 n.2. 
118. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 76 Md. App. 709, 716-17, 548 A.2d 
lSI, 154-55 (1988) (explaining Wausau). The facts in Wausau follow a very 
narrow course, and the holding must be viewed accordingly. See infra notes 
121-26 and accompanying text. 
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its name implies, floats on top of any recovery ,from other sources 
up to the total value of the insured's injuries. If an insured's damages 
exceed the tortfeasor's liability limits, then the underinsured motorist 
insurer pays the difference between the injured insured's damages 
and the tortfeasor's liability limits up to the underinsured motorist 
policy limits.119 Floating underinsured motorist coverage focuses on 
the injured insured's damages, not on the tortfeasor's liability lim-
its.120 In contrast, reduction underinsured motorist coverage121 focuses 
on the relationship between the insured's underinsured motorist limits 
and the tortfeasor's liability coverage. 122 In reduction underinsured 
motorist coverage, the tortfeasor's liability coverage acts to reduce 
the limit of underinsured motorist benefits. Unlike floating under-
insured motorist coverage, where the injured insured's damages may 
entitle him to recover the full amount of the policy, the most an 
injured insured is able to recover under a reduction underinsured 
motorist policy is the amount of his underinsured motorist limits 
minus the amount of the tortfeasor's limits.123 
Although reduction underinsured motorist coverage may cause 
hardship in certain cases,l24 it is more prevalent than floating under-
insured motorist coverage. 12S The type of underinsured motorist cov-
erage created by the 1981 and 1983 amendments is reduction 
underinsured motorist coverage. In this light, the Wausau decision 
makes absolute sense, and the Souras court's overruling of the 
119. See Elovich v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 1319 (Wash. 1985); see also 
Christensen v. Wausau Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 696, 698, 519 A.2d 776, 778 
(1987) (citing Elovich, 707 P .2d at 1323). 
120. If the injured insured has $100,000 in floating underinsured motorist coverage 
and incurs damages of $120,000 as a result of the negligence of a motorist 
with liability coverage of $20,000, then the injured insured collects the $20,000 
from the tort feasor and $100,000 from his underinsured motorist insurer. 
121. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.22. Rhodes uses the term "excess" underinsured 
motorist coverage to refer to floating underinsured motorist. [d. The Elovich 
court describes reduction underinsured motorist coverage as "decreasing layer" 
coverage. Elovich, 707 P.2d at 1324. 
122. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Souras, 78 Md. App. 71, 77-78, 552 A.2d 908, 911-
12 (1989). An issue not decided by the Maryland courts is whether the words 
"valid and collectible" in § 541(c)(1) allow an insured to recover uninsured 
motorist benefits when the tortfeasor has liability limits that equal the injured 
insured's uninsured motorist limits, but because there are multiple claimants 
the insured collects less than the tortfeasor's liability limits. See infra Part VI. 
123. If the injured insured has $100,000 in reduction underinsured motorist coverage 
and he incurs damages of $120,000 as a result of the negligence of a motorist 
with liability coverage of $20,000, then the injured insured collects the $20,000 
from the tortfeasor but only $80,000 ($100,000 minus $20,000) from his 
underinsured motorist insurer. 
124. In the example discussed supra note 123, the insured is not compensated fully 
for his loss. 
125. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.22. 
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definition of under insured motorist coverage was unnecessary.126 All 
Wausau stands for is that, since uninsured motorist coverage must 
by statute include reduction underinsured motorist coverage, and 
since Christensen paid the extra premium, he must have purchased 
floating underinsured motorist coverage. 127 The uninsured motorist 
statute, by the 1981 amendment, may operate as reduction underin-
sured motorist coverage, but it does not operate as floating under-
insured motorist coverage. Nor, however, does the statute preclude 
an insurer's offering floating underinsured motorist coverage. 128 
In 1983, the public responsibility theory underlying Maryland's 
insurance scheme was further embedded in Maryland law by the 
addition of section 541(0, which, according to the court of appeals, 
"clearly allows 'excess uninsured' or 'underinsured' motoriSt coverage 
in separate policies issued by the same or another insurer." 129 The 
126. The Wausau court's definition of underinsured motorist coverage is clearly a 
definition of floating underinsured motorist coverage. The Souras court evi-
dently believed that Wausau was engaged in statutory construction, but the 
Wausau court did not interpret the uninsured motorist statute as requiring 
floating underinsured motorist coverage; it merely interpreted the policy as 
providing floating underinsured motorist coverage. See supra note 114. The 
Wausau court's definition of underinsured motorist coverage, then, should not 
have been overruled; however, the Wausau court's definition of uninsured 
motorist coverage in light of the 1981 amendments is obviously wrong. This 
fact may have influenced the Souras court. 
127. The court of appeals has noted that "[olne usually gets in this life only what 
he pays for. Insurance coverage is no exception." C & H Plumbing & Heating, 
Inc. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 264 Md. 510, 517, 287 A.2d 238, 241-42 
(1972) (quoting Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Moskios, 209 Md. 162, 177, 120 A.2d 
678, 685 (1956) (Hammond, J., dissenting». In this regard, the Wausau court 
noted that the trial court's interpreting underinsured motorist coverage in the 
Wausau policy to mean uninsured motorist coverage 
was clearly incorrect sans a specific statutory or policy definition. 
Any other interpretation of underinsurance would mean that the victim 
cannot recover part of the underinsurance limit he has bought and 
paid for, and that portion of the limits also would be illusory. For 
example, if Wayne Christensen were forced to deduct from the un-
derinsurance limits of $20,000, the $20,000 of liability insurance 
received from MAIF, his recovery would be nil and the $20,000 of 
underinsurance that was purchased would be unavailable to him 
notwithstanding damages which he suffered in excess of $20,000. 
Christensen v. Wausau Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 696, 701, 519 A.2d 776, 779 
(1987). As a final note, the court stated that if Wausau had been more careful 
in drafting its policy, the issue could have been avoided. Id. 
128. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(b)(I) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (allowing 
insurer to provide coverage iI). excess of the required minimum). 
129. Hoffman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 309 Md. 167, 179, 522 A.2d 1320, 
1326 (1987). Section 541(0 provides that "[p)olicies of insurance that have as 
their primary purpose to provide coverage in excess of other valid and collectible 
insurance or qualified self insurance may include uninsured motorist coverage 
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court of appeals' notion that section 541(0 provides for "excess 
uninsured" or "underinsured" motorist coverage is somewhat mis-
leading. The use of "underinsured" as a synonym for "excess 
uninsured," and the failure to differentiate between reduction un-
derinsured motorist coverage and floating underinsured motorist cov-
erage, certainly add to the confusion. Section 541(0 must be read in 
conjunction with section 541(h)'s prohibition that the higher amounts 
of uninsured motorist coverage may not "exceed the amounts of the 
motor vehicle liability coverage provided by the policy." 130 The 
court's statement, then, is best understood as a recognition that 
excess liability policies, such as umbrella or catastrophe policies, 131 
may provide post-1981 uninsured motorist insurance, which, by def-
inition, includes reduction underinsured motorist coverage. Section 
541(h), however, precludes the existence of policies that function 
solely as "excess uninsured" motorist insurance policies. Therefore, 
"excess uninsured" coverage can exist only if it is contained in a 
policy providing comparable liability coverage. This comports with 
the legislative design to equate uninsured motorist coverage with 
liability coverage, and to encourage the public to purchase higher 
amounts of liability and uninsured motorist coverage. Notwithstand-
ing the 1981 and 1983 amendments, a person may not turn his 
misfortune into a profit. The statute clearly prevents him from 
recovering on "either a duplicative or supplemental basis."132 
The 1981 and 1983 amendments modified the underlying purpose 
of the uninsured motorist statute. Before the introduction of reduc-
tion underinsured motorist coverage in Maryland, courts uniformly 
stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage was to place 
the insured in the same position as if the uninsured tort feasor 
maintained the minimum amounts of coverage mandated by the 
financial responsibility provisions of the Transportation Code. 133 In 
as provided in subsection (c) of this section." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 
541(0 (1991). Thf' statute does not require the excess policies to contain 
uninsured motorist coverage but, if the policy has a step down provision, then 
it would have to provide the required minimum coverage. 
130. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(h) (Supp. 1992) (added by Act of May 26, 
1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749, 3754). 
131. For a discussion of the coordination of a primary automobile liability policy, 
a secondary automobile liability policy, and a catastrophe policy, see United 
States Fire Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 52 Md. App. 269, 447 
A.2d 896 (1982). 
132. Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 543(a) (1991). For definitions of duplicative and 
supplemental, see Yarmuth v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 286 Md. 
256, 264, 407 A.2d 315, 319 (1979), and Langston v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
40 Md. App. 414, 429-30, 392 A.2d 561, 569-70 (1978). 
133. E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 737, 436 A.2d 465, 
474 (1981) ("[TJhe purpose of uninsured motorist statutes is 'that each insured 
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light of the 1981 and 1983 amendments, the uninsured motorist 
statute is now designed to place the injured insured in the same 
position as if the tortfeasor maintained liability insurance in amounts 
equal to the injured insured's uninsured motorist limits. The financial 
responsibility provisions are no longer the benchmark; rather, the 
injured insured's uninsured motorist limits are the guide. 134 Therefore, 
it is no longer accurate to state that the uninsured motorist statute 
is designed solely to protect victims from financially irresponsible 
uninsured motorists. 135 Under the current statutory definition, a mo-
torist may be financially responsible, yet still, by statutory definition, 
"uninsured" because he is not as financially responsible as the injured 
motorist. 
Providing compensation to persons injured by financially re-
sponsible but inadequately insured motorists reflects the state's desire 
to shift the losses associated with uninsured motorists. Reduction 
under insured motorist insurance assures a full recovery for innocent 
victims of motor vehicle accidents. The recovery, however, is from 
the private sector, not the state, and the state's purpose of shifting 
the burden of carrying victims of motor vehicle accidents on the 
public welfare roles is accomplished by the additional insurance 
benefits flowing to the injured insured. In this sense, both the 
insurance buying public and the state are protected. The insurance 
industry bears the burden, but it is able to spread the risk by adjusting 
premiums. 136 
v. FROM MANDATORY OFFERING OF HIGHER LIMITS 
TO MANDATORY HIGHER LIMITS 
The shift in design from guaranteeing a recovery to providing 
an opportunity to receive a full recovery was furthered in 1989 when 
the legislature placed an affirmative obligation on the insurer to offer 
under such coverage have available the full statutory minimum to exactly the 
same extent as would have been available had the tort feasor complied with the 
minimum requirements of the financial responsibility Law."') (quoting Webb 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1972». 
134. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Souras, 78 Md. App. 71, 76, 552 A.2d 908, 911 
(1989). 
135. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
136. It is interesting to note that underinsured motorist coverage is an insurance 
industry creation. The stacking of uninsured motorist coverage presented an 
underwriting dilemma to the industry. In response, the Insurance Services 
Office introduced the concept of underinsured motorist coverage in the 1977 
Personal Auto Policy because it hoped to "restrict the effect of the court 
decisions which allowed the 'stacking' of uninsured motorists insurance." 1 
WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.1. See infra notes 366, 389 and accompanying text. 
1992] Uninsured Motorist Coverage 197 
its insureds in writing the opportunity to contract for the higher 
uninsured motorist limits.137 The amended statute became law on 
July 1, 1989.138 Before the 1989 amendment, the uninsured motorist 
statute required only that each insurer make higher limits of uninsured 
motorist coverage "available" to its insureds.139 Several weeks before 
the 1989 amendment became law, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland ruled in Libby v. Government Employees Insurance CO.I40 
that the "shall be available" language in the pre-1989 version of 
section 541(c)(2) imposed an affirmative obligation on the insurer to 
notify its insured of the availability of higher uninsured motorist 
limits in "a manner reasonably calculated to get the information into 
the hands of [the insured]." 141 According to the court, the affirmative 
duty is fulfilled when the insurer takes reasonable steps to inform 
its policy holders that the additional coverage is available. 142 
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Libby court rejected 
the insured's argument that the court should adopt a four-part test 
set forth by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,143 and adopted by 
other jurisdictions. l44 The Minnesota test required that the insurer 
137. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 542, 1989 Md. Laws 3428, repealed by Act of May 
26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749. The 1989 version provided that 
"[t]here shall be offered in writing to the insured the opportunity to contract 
for higher amounts than [$20,000 per person/$4O,000 per occurrence] if these 
amounts do not exceed the amounts of the motor vehicle liability coverage 
provided by the policy." Id. (emphasis added). 
138. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 542, 1989 Md. Laws 3428, repealed by Act of May 
26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749. 
139. The pre-1989 version of section 541(c)(2) stated that "[t]here shall be available 
to the insured the opportunity to contract for higher amounts than [$20,000/ 
$40,000] if these amounts do not exceed the amounts of the motor vehicle 
liability coverage provided by the policy." Act of May'19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981 
Md. Laws 2122, 2123, repealed by Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 542, 1989 Md. 
Laws 3428) (emphasis added). 
140. 79 Md. App. 717, 558 A.2d 1236 (1989). 
141. Id. at 726-27, 558 A.2d at 1240. 
142. Id. 
143. The four-part test set forth in Hastings v. 'United Pacific Insurance Co., 318 
N.W.2d 849, 851-53 (Minn. 1982), requires: 
(1) If the offer is made in other than face to face negotiations, the 
notification process must be commercially reasonable; 
(2) The insurer must specify the limits of its option coverages and not 
merely offer them in general terms; 
(3) The insurer must intelligibly advise the insured of the nature of 
the optional coverages; and 
(4) The insured must be advised that optional coverages are available 
for a relatively modest premium. 
144. See generally 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.4. Minnesota subsequently repealed 
the mandatory offering statute when it adopted a no-fault scheme. Widiss 
notes that at the time Minnesota adopted its no-fault scheme, "the Minnesota 
courts had already considered a fairly substantial body of disputes involving 
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make an offer in a commercially reasonable manner .145 Since the pre-
1989 version of section S41(c)(2) did not require the insurer to make 
an offer, the Libby court refused to apply the four-part test l46 or to 
decide whether the four-part test would be applicable to the amended 
version of section 541(c)(2). 
Underlying the Libby court's "reasonable manner" test is the 
tenet that the "insured must be given sufficient information to make 
an intelligent decision about optional coverages. "147 Other states have 
adopted mandatory offering statutes that "require - either explicitly 
or implicitly - an insurer to place the purchaser in a position to 
make an informed rejection of the coverage."I48 Placing the insured 
in a position to make a knowing decision lies at the foundation of 
the insurer-insured relationship.149 
questions related to the adequacy of the offers made by insurers." He argues 
that "[a)lthough these requirements are no longer applicable in Minnesota, the 
doctrines developed in these decisions are certainly relevant to the consideration 
of these questions in states with similar statutory requirements." [d. § 32.4 
n.13. 
145. According to the Libby court, none of the other jurisdictions had defined 
"commercially reasonable." Libby, 79 Md. App. at 726, 558 A.2d at 1240. It 
is obvious that the Libby court's "reasonable manner" requirement considers 
insurance industry practice: 
Enclosing the M-9 form [the availability notice] as a "stuffer" in the 
questionnaire package was a reasonable method (a "commercially 
reasonable" method) of giving notice to the insured of the available 
opportunity to increase his uninsured motorist coverage. We do not 
believe that the inclusion of additional "stuffers" advising the insured 
of the availability of other insurance from GEICO in any way de-
tracted from the reasonableness of the notification. 
[d. at 728, 558 A.2d at 1241. 
146. The Libby court examined § 541(c)(2) closely. Finding that there was "some 
subtle but arguably significant difference between the language of the Maryland 
statute" and uninsured motorist statutes from Minnesota and Tennessee, the 
court concluded that the "made available" language of Minnesota's statute 
and the "shall be provided an opportunity" language of Tennessee's statute 
implied an "obligation to take some affirmative action specifically directed to 
the insured." [d. at 726, 558 A.2d at 1240. In contrast, Maryland's language 
had "a somewhat more passive connotation." [d. Also important to the court 
was the legislative history of section 541(c)(2): 
We find it particularly significant that, as originally introduced in the 
General Assembly during its 1981 legislative session as Senate Bill 17, 
the proposed act contained language to the effect that the insurer be 
obligated to offer the coverage. That language was stricken out and 
the statute, as passed, merely provided that an opportunity to purchase 
be available. 
[d. at 725, 558 A.2d at 1240. 
147. 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.5 n.13. 
148. [d. § 32.5; see also 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.10 (stating that a waiver of 
additional coverage can be made only with "knowledge of such a right and 
an evident purpose to surrender it"). 
149. Cf, Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 414-15, 347 A.2d 842, 
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Several guidelines are discernable from the Libby court's inter-
pretation of the pre-1989 version of section 541(c)(2). Mailing an 
availability notice to the insured is a reasonable manner of getting 
the information to the insured even if the insured receives but does 
not read the notice. ISO The insurer is not obligated to provide a 
separate and independent notice of additional uninsured motorist 
coverage. Rather, it can provide the additional coverage notice along 
with other notices sent out in its ordinary course of business. lSI The 
insurer may not, however, intentionally attempt to obscure the in-
formation by hiding it among various stuffers. While an oral com-
munication could satisfy the affirmative obligation under the pre-
1989 version of section 541 (c)(2) , the July 1, 1989, amendment 
precludes oral offerings. Under the 1989 amendments, an insurer 
cannot refuse to underwrite a person because he desires to contract 
for higher uninsured motorist limits.ls2 
Several issues were left unresolved by the Libby court. The 
court, for example, did not address whether the notice requirement 
was fulfilled if the insurer mailed availability information that was 
not received by the insured. The mere mailing, however, would appear 
to be enough. The court also did not decide whether the insurer had 
the burden of proving that it fulfilled its affirmative obligation. The 
holding suggests that the issue of whether the insurer notified the 
insured in a reasonable manner is almost always a factual one that 
must be considered on a case-by-case basis.ls3 Imposing the burden 
on the insurer furthers the legislative purpose of protecting the 
innocent victims of uninsured motorists. IS4 
854 (1975) (stating that insured has right to be fully informed of insurer's 
conflict of interest over the conduct of the defense of a claim against the 
insured); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 332, 236 
A.2d 269, 273 (1967) (stating that insured has right to be fully informed of 
the possibility of a verdict in excess of his policy limits). 
150. Libby, 79 Md. App. at 726, 558 A.2d at 1240. 
151. But see Tucker v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.E.2d 956, 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1984). In Tucker, the court concluded that the notice provided to the insured 
"was deficient" because it was "obscured" by being part of a letter advising 
the insured of an increase in her premium. [d. at 961. The Tucker court then 
adopted the Minnesota approach. [d. at 960-61. 
152. Effective July I, 1989, personal injury protection can be waived by the named 
insured. Under MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(g)(I) (1991), "[a]n insurer 
may not refuse to underwrite a person because the person refuses to waive the 
[personal injury protection] coverage and benefits described under this section." 
If the insurer fails to underwrite a person who refuses to waive personal injury 
protection, then the insurer is subject to sanctions, including a revocation of 
its certificate of authority or a fine of between one hundred dollars and fifty 
thousand dollars. [d. § 539(g)(2); see id. 48A, §§ 55, 55A (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
153. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.11. 
154. See id. § 24.10. 
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The Libby court also did not decide whether reformation of the 
policy is an appropriate remedy. ISS The trial court had apparently 
treated the issue of whether the plaintiff would have purchased the 
additional insurance as a factual one. IS6 A problem with this approach 
is that it requires the insured to prove that he would have purchased 
the higher insurance limits. This has the effect of replacing the 
insured's right to knowingly choose his coverage limits with "the 
right to have a fact finder later speculate about how the contemplated 
decision making process would have come out."ls7 A better approach 
would be to hold that the additional uninsured motorist coverage is 
included as a matter of law when the insurer fails to make an 
effective offer .158 This approach would follow the general rule; the 
1989 changes to personal injury protection suggest that Maryland 
would follow the general rule and require uninsured motorist limits 
equal to the policy's liability limits.ls9 
155. Libby, 79 Md. App. at 729, 558 A.2d at 1241. 
156. The trial court "expressly found that if Mr. Libby had fully understood his 
right to obtain the additional coverage he would have paid the extra premium 
and obtained $500,000/$1,000,000 uninsured motorist coverage." Id. at 720-
21, 558 A.2d at 1237. As a practical matter, the insured will have little difficulty 
offering evidence that he would have purchased the additional uninsured 
motorist coverage, for in all but the rarest cases the only evidence bearing on 
the issue will be the insured's own testimony, and it is doubtful that an insured 
would testify that he would not have purchased the insurance. A person who 
is not a party to the contract does not have standing to assert that the purchaser 
would have purchased the higher limits. Cj. Compass Ins. Co. v. Woodard, 
489 So. 2d 1157, 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding permissive user 
lacked standing to object to improper procedures surrounding insured's rejec-
tion of uninsured motorist limits equal to liability limit). 
157. O'Hanlon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 522 F. Supp. 332, 336 (D. 
Del. 1981), a/I'd, 681 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Arms v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 360, 363 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (adopting the 
O'Hanlon approach, and "declin[ing] to entertain any inquiry into [the in-
sured's] probable choice had the required offer been tendered. "). The insurer's 
failure to comply with the mandatory offering provision "will keep the offer 
of additional coverage alive, to be elected by the insured at any time, including 
after the accident." Arms, 465 A.2d at 361 (citing D'Hanlon); accord United 
Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Hovanec, No. 90-1377 (Md. ct. Spec. App. May 17, 
1991) (per curiam) (unreported). In Hovanec, the court ruled that reformation 
was not appropriate because of a lack of mutual mistake, fraud or duress. Id. 
slip op. at 10-11. The court did rule that the insured had the right to "purchase 
retroactively the additional UM coverage." Id. slip op. at 11. Because Hovanec 
is unreported, however, it serves neither as precedent nor as persuasive au-
thority. See MD. R. 8-114(a). 
158. 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.5; see 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.11 ("[W]here 
the insurer fails to offer such coverage, additional coverage may be written 
into the policy in amounts equal to the policy's liability limits."). 
159. ct. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(f)(3) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (requiring the 
insurer to provide all minimum personal injury protections and benefits if the 
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In the Libby case, since the named insured failed to exercise his 
right to purchase higher uninsured motorist coverage, the court did 
not have to consider who has the power to reject the additional 
coverage. In general, the rejection must be made by the named 
insured and is then binding on his resident relatives and other users 
of the insured vehicle. l60 Good practice suggests that the insured be 
required to reject the additional coverage in writing,161 thus providing 
the insurer with a verifiable record of the offer and rejection, and 
precluding the insured from later asserting that the rejection was not 
made knowingly. 162 
The insurer is obligated to offer the additional coverage when 
the purchaser applies for the insurance. A broad reading of Libby 
suggests that the insurer is also required to reiterate the offer with 
each renewal package. 163 In addition, material changes in the existing 
coverage during a policy period may also obligate the insurer to 
renew the offer of additional coverage. l64 Subsequent offers of ad-
ditional coverage must be made in a manner consistent with the 
original offer, fully informing the insured of his options. Only then 
is his decision to accept or reject the additional coverage voluntary 
and informed. 
first named insured fails to make an affirmative written waiver of personal 
injury protection). The fact that uninsured motorist insurance is offered in 
varying amounts from the statutory minimum up to the liability limits, however, 
poses a problem not faced in the context of personal injury protection. 
160. See generally 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.10. But c/. MD. ANN. CODE art. 
48A, § 539(f)(1)(iii) (1991) (making waiver of personal injury protection binding 
on named insureds, all listed drivers, and "all members of the first named 
insured's family residing in the first named insured's household who are 16 
years of age or older"). 
161. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(f) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (providing content 
of an "affirmative, written waiver" of personal injury protection). 
162. Even if the insured rejected the additional coverage, that rejection would be 
effective only if made knowingly, a standard for which the insurer generally 
bears the burden of proof. 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.5; see also 3 LONG, 
supra note 29, § 24.10 ("Clearly, the burden of proving that a knowing rejection 
was made, rests on the insurer, with the validity of the rejection being a 
question of fact."); c/. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (1991) (stating that 
rejection of personal injury protection must be affirmative and based on the 
insured's being fully informed of the nature, extent, cost of personal injury 
protection, as well as the consequences of his waiver). 
163. At the very least, the Libby court implicitly rscognized that, even if the statute 
does not require reiterating the offer with each renewal, it would constitute 
good insurance practice to do so. As the facts in Libby demonstrate, GEICO's 
practice of mailing the M-9 form as part of the renewal package was its saving 
grace. See Libby v. Government Employers Ins. Co., 79 Md. App. 717, 727, 
558 A.2d 1236, 1241 (1989) (affirming trial court's finding that GEICO 
corrected any error it may have made when Libby purchased the insurance by 
later including the M-9 availability form in the renewal package). 
164. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.11. 
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Irr 1992, the General Assembly of Maryland answered many of 
the questions left unresolved by Libby when it enacted Senate Bill 
767 as chapter 641 of the laws of that year. 16S Chapter 641 is the 
logical extension of mandatory offering of higher amounts of unin-
sured motorist coverage. Effective October 1, 1992, the uninsured 
motorist statute requires that, with respect to private passenger motor 
vehicles, the uninsured motorist coverage limits must be identical to 
the liability insurance limits unless the insured affirmatively waives 
the higher coverage in writing. 166 An insurer may not refuse, however, 
165. Act of May 26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749. 
166. The following language was added to the statute: 
(g) (1) Unless waived by the first named insured under this 
subsection, the amount of uninsured motorist coverage under a policy 
of private passenger motor vehicle insurance shall be equal to the 
amount of liability coverage provided under the policy. 
(2) Where the liability insurance coverage under a policy or binder 
of private passenger motor vehicle insurance is in excess of that 
required under § 17-103 of the Transportation Article, if the first 
named insured does not wish to obtain uninsured motorist benefits in 
the same amount as the liability insurance coverage, the first named 
insured shall make an affirmative written waiver of having uninsured 
motorist benefits in the same amount as the liability coverage. 
(3) (i) Before a first named insured makes a waiver under this 
subsection, the first named insured must be informed in writing of 
the nature, extent, benefit, and cost of the level of the uninsured 
motorist coverage being waived. 
(ii) A waiver made under this subsection shall be made on a form 
required by the Commissioner. 
(iii) The form may be part of the contract of insurance. 
(iv) The form shall clearly and concisely explain in 10 point 
boldface type: 
1. The nature, extent, benefit, and cost of the level of the 
uninsured motorist coverage that would be provided under the policy 
if not waived by the first named insured; 
2. That a failure of the first named insured to make a waiver 
requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage in an 
amount equal to the amount of the liability coverage, where the 
liability insurance coverage under a policy or binder of private pas-
senger motor vehicle insurance is in excess of that required under § 
17-107 of the Transportation Article; 
3. That an insurer may not refuse to underwrite a person because 
the person refuses to make a waiver of the excess uninsured motorist 
coverage under this subsection; and 
4. That a waiver under this subsection must be an affirmative, 
written waiver. 
(4) Failure of the first named insured to make a[nJ affirmative 
written waiver under this subsection requires an insurer to provide 
uninsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the amount of 
the liability coverage, where the liability insurance coverage under a 
policy or binder of private passenger motor vehicle insurance is in 
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to underwrite a person because he elects not to purchase the reduced 
coverage. 167 
Requiring the insured to elect reduced coverage is more palatable 
than requiring the insured to elect higher coverage. The result of the 
insured's inaction is more protection. This "default setting" recog-
nizes the realities of life and coincides with the legislative aim of 
uninsured motorist insurance of providing a full recovery. 
VI. VALID AND COLLECTIBLE 
An issue not yet decided by the Maryland courts is whether 
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute allows an insured to recover 
uninsured motorist benefits when the tortfeasor has liability limits 
that equal the injured insured's uninsured motorist limits, but the 
insured collects less than the tortfeasor's liability limits because there 
are multiple claimants. An anomalous situation occurs if recovery is 
denied - the claimants . would have been in a better position had 
the tort feasor been truly uninsured. l68 Jurisdictions that have consid-
excess of that required under § 17-103 of the Transportation Article. 
(5) (i) An insurer may not refuse to underwrite a person because 
the person refuses to make a waiver of the excess uninsured motorist 
coverage under this subsection. 
(ii) A violation of this paragraph is subject to the penalties 
provided under §§ 55 and 55A of this Article. 
(6) A waiver made under this subsection by persons continuously 
insured by an insurer or by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund 
shall be construed to be effective until withdrawn in writing. 
(7) Subject to approval by the Commissioner. the waiver made 
under this subsection may be made on the same form as the waiver 
made under § 539(f) of this subtitle. 
Act of May 26. 1992. ch. 641. 1992 Md. Laws 3749 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A. § 541(g) (Supp. 1992». The Act applies "only to motor vehicle 
insurance policies issued or delivered on or after the effective date of this 
Act." which was October 2. 1992. [d. §§ 2. 3. 
167. Act of May 26. 1992. ch. 641. 1992 Md. Laws 3749 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A. § 541(g)(5)(i) (Supp. 1992». An insurer who violates this section 
is subject to the penalties provided under Maryland Annotated Code. article 
48A. sections 55 and 55A. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A. § 541(g)(5)(ii) (Supp. 
1992). 
168. See Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co .• 475 P.2d 258. 263 (Ariz.). 
modified on other grounds. 476 P.2d 155 (Ariz. 1970). See. however. Gorton 
v. Reliance Insurance Co .• 391 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1978). where the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey rejected this very argument: 
[W]e acknowledge the oft-cited anomaly that those in the position of 
these claimants would find themselves in a better position were the 
tortfeasor's vehicle totally uninsured rather than underinsured. How-
ever. the objective of the legislature as we perceive it was to protect 
the public from a noninsured. financially irresponsible motorist. not 
one who is insufficiently insured. The protection intended is against 
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ered the issue are divided. 169 In Maryland, the dispute appears to 
hinge on the interpretation of the terms "valid and collectible" in 
section S41(c)(1)170 and "applicable" in section S41(c)(3).171 Most 
likely, the General Assembly did not consider the issue when it added 
those sections in 1981.172 
The court of appeals recently skirted the "amounts received" 
issue in two cases involving issues similar to this situation, but in 
which the plaintiffs maintained uninsured motorist coverage greater 
than the liability insurance maintained by the tortfeasors. In Waters 
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty CO.,173 John Waters was injured 
while a passenger in a vehicle operated by Edward Schreier and 
insured by Continental Insurance Company. The Schreier vehicle 
crossed the center line and struck a vehicle operated by Shirley 
Dunham, who was also seriously injured. The Continental policy had 
a single combined liability limit of $100,000, which Waters and 
Dunham divided. Dunham received $97,000 and Waters received 
$3,000. Waters then made an uninsured motorist claim against his 
an "uninsured" motorist, not one who is "under insured." The 
legislature required that a minimum level of coverage be available for 
each accident when more than one person was injured. It did not 
undertake to guarantee an irreducible minimum sum available to every 
injured person under every set of circumstance but simply to make 
available a policy offering minimum levels of coverage. 
Id. at 1223-24 (citation omitted). Unlike Maryland's statute, the New Jersey 
statute at the time did not incorporate underinsured motorist coverage. See 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992). The entire purpose 
of underinsured motorist insurance is to provide the insured with the oppor-
tunity for a full recovery. 
169. See 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 8.22; see also Lee R. Russ, Annotation, 
Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Recoverability, Under Unin-
sured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage, of Deficiencies in Compensation 
Afforded Injured Party by Tortfeasor's Liability Coverage, 24 A.L.R.4th 13, 
§§ 6, 7 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (discussing multiple claimants). 
170. Section 541(c)(1) defines "uninsured motor vehicle" as 
a motor vehicle whose ownership, maintenance, or use has resulted 
in the bodily injury or death of an insured, and for which the sum 
of the limits of liability under all valid and collectible liability insurance 
policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or death 
is less than the amount of coverage provided to the insured under 
this subsection. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
171. Section 541(c)(3) provides that the insurer's liability is "the amount of [its 
uninsured motorist] coverage less the sum of the limits under the liability 
insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or 
death of the insured." Id. § 541(c)(3) (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
172. See 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 8.22 (noting that "most of the statutes were 
based on a legislative 'model' that did not specifically contemplate this coverage 
issue"). 
173. 328 Md. 700, 616 A.2d 884 (1992). 
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insurer, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G), which 
provided $100,000/$300,000 uninsured motorist coverage. The trial 
court ruled that the Schreier vehicle was not uninsured, and Waters 
appealed. The court of special appeals affirmed in an unreported 
decision, holding that 
it is only when the tortfeasor's limit of liability is less than 
the limit of liability provided to the insured under his 
uninsured motorist provision that the automobile is consid-
ered to be uninsured. The "limit of liability" is found on 
the declaration page of the insurance policy; it is not cal-
culated by factoring in settlement agreements with other 
injured claimants. 174 
Upon grant of certiorari, the court of appeals examined the 
language and legislative history of Maryland Code Annotated, article 
48A, section 541(c) and its 1981 amendment, and concluded that a 
"tortfeasor is an uninsured motorist . . . whenever the amount of 
uninsured motorist coverage purchased by the insured exceeds the 
amount of liability insurance carried by the tortfeasor."175 Reversing 
the court of special appeals, the court of appeals concluded that, 
because two persons were injured in the accident, the per accident 
limitation - Schreier carried $100,000 per accident coverage while 
Waters carried $300,000 per accident coverage - was critical in 
permitting Waters to "proceed against his uninsured motorist car-
rier ... for the remainder of his damages, up to the per person limit 
of $100,000."176 
The court of appeals followed this same reasoning in Erie 
Insurance Co. v. Thompson. 177 There, Leslie Thompson was injun~d 
in an accident while a passenger in a vehicle operated by Sam Lee. 
Lee was also injured. Two other passengers, Alma Lee and Graham 
Lee, died as a result of injuries they received. The accident was 
caused by the negligence of Bernard Walker, the operator of another 
vehicle, who was insured by MAIF under a policy that provided 
liability coverage of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence. 
Ohio Casualty Company insured Sam Lee under a policy that con-
tained a single combined motorist limit of $100,000. Erie Insurance 
Company insured Thompson under a policy with coverage limits of 
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Thompson, Sam Lee, 
the Estate of Alma Lee, and the Estate of Graham Lee made claims 
174. Waters v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. 153-1699, slip op. at 4 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 21, 1990) (per curiam). 
175. Waters, 328 Md. at 713, 616 A.2d at 891. 
176. [d. at 714-15, 616 A.2d at 891. 
177. 330 Md. 530, 625 A.2d 322 (1993). 
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against Walker, and MAIF paid $10,000 to each claimant. The four 
claimants then sought uninsured motorist coverage from Ohio Ca-
sualty, which paid $30,000 to Thompson and the same amount to 
Sam Lee, thus exhausting its limits. Thompson then turned to Erie, 
contending that since she had received $40,000 ($10,000 from MAIF 
and $30,000 from Ohio Casualty), she should be entitled to $60,000 
of coverage from Erie. The trial court ruled in favor of Erie, and 
Thompson appealed to an en bane panel of circuit court judges. The 
panel reversed, and during the pendency of an appeal to the court 
of special appeals, the court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari. 178 
Finding the principle set forth in Waters to be controlling, the 
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the en bane panel. The 
court noted that, as in Waters, "the per accident limits of the other 
policies applicable to the plaintiff Thompson were less than the per 
accident limit of the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage." 179 
Because the amount available to the plaintiff under the other appli-
cable policies was less than the amount available under her Erie 
uninsured motorist coverage, the court found the plaintiff "entitled 
to recover from Erie the difference, as long as her total recovery 
[did] not exceed her damages or the $100,000 limit."180 
As noted, both Waters and Thompson avoided the more difficult 
issue of whether a vehicle is uninsured when its liability limits are 
identical to the claimant's uninsured motorist limits but the claimant 
receives less than his uninsured motorist limits because of the presence 
of other claimants. As an example, consider the situation in which 
the tortfeasor has a $20,000/$40,000 policy and injures four persons. 
The four claimants divide the $40,000 four ways, each receiving 
$10,000. One of the claimants has an uninsured motorist policy that 
provides $20,000/$40,000 coverage. That claimant demands $10,000 
from his or her uninsured motorist insurer, arguing that since he or 
she received only $10,000 from the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor's vehicle 
is uninsured. The uninsured motorist insurer counters by arguing that 
the tortfeasor's vehicle is not uninsured because the liability limits 
equal the claimant's uninsured motorist limits. Based upon the opi-
nions in Waters and Thompson, it is difficult to predict how the 
court of appeals will rule on this issue. The opinions contain language 
supportive of both sides of the issue. For instance, upon review of 
the history of uninsured motorist coverage in Maryland, the Waters 
court stated the applicable limits-to-limits test four different times. 
First, the court stated: 
178. [d. at 533, 625 A.2d at 323. 
179. [d. at 537, 625 A.2d at 325. 
180. [d. at 538, 625 A.2d at 325. 
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By Ch. 510 of the Acts of 1981, the General Assembly 
amended § 541(c) and, inter alia, defined an uninsured 
motor vehicle. The concept of "uninsured" was broadened 
to include any vehicle insured with liability limits in an 
amount "less than the amount of coverage provided to the 
insured under this subsection. "181 
Later in the opinion, the court reaffirmed the test: "The [1981J 
amendments allow an insured to purchase a higher amount of un-
insured motorist insurance which will become available when the 
insured's uninsured motorist coverage, as well as his damages, exceed 
the liability coverage of the tort feasor. "182 Still later, the court stated: 
"Consequently, a tort feasor is an uninsured motorist, as defined by 
§ 541(c), whenever the amount of uninsured motorist coverage pur-
chased by the insured exceeds the amount of liability insurance carried 
by the tortfeasor." 183 Finally, the court summed up its review of the 
uninsured motorist statute as follows: "Under this scheme, a court 
must compare the amount of liability insurance carried by the tort-
feasor with the amount of uninsured motorist coverage carried by 
the injured party." 184 Since, however, the Waters court was able to 
find coverage by comparing a single combined limit to the per 
occurrence split limit, the repeated references to the limits-to-limits 
test may be treated by future courts as mere dicta. In addition, the 
opinions in Waters and Thompson, particularly the latter, focus 
acutely on the concept of "available coverage," leading to the 
inference that when a per occurrence liability limit is divided among 
several claimants, the "available" limit is what was actually received, 
not that which was theoretically available. 18s 
181. Waters, 328 Md. at 711, 616 A.2d at 889. 
182. [d. at 712, 616 A.2d at 889. 
183. [d. at 713, 616 A.2d at 890. 
184. [d. at 714, 616 A.2d at 890. 
185. The Waters court's view that the type of uninsured motorist coverage mandated 
by § 541(c) is "gap" coverage certainly suggests this conclusion, see id. at 712 
n.5, 616 A.2d at 891 n.5, as does the manner in which it determined that only 
$3,000 was "available" to Waters, see id. at 715 n.6, 720, 616 A.2d at 891 
n.6, 893. The entire opinion in Thompson can be read as sanctioning an 
amounts-received-to-limits approach in order to effectuate the legislative goal 
of the uninsured motorist statute. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 330 Md. 
530, 538, 625 A.2d 322, 325 ("Because what was available under the applicable 
policies, however, was less than what was available under her Erie uninsured 
motorist coverage, the plaintiff under Art. 48A, § 541(c)(3), is entitled to 
recover from Erie the difference, as long as her total recoveries do not exceed 
her damages or the $100,000.00 per person limit. "). 
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Notwithstanding this inference, the remedial nature of the Mary-
land uninsured motorist statute arguably supports recovery when the 
amounts received by the insured are less than his uninsured motorist 
coverage. 186 To the contrary, however, the language of section 
541(c)(I), when read in conjunction with section 541(c)(3), suggests 
that "collectible" refers to liability insurance that the insured was 
entitled to collect - not what he actually collected. Both sections 
refer to the "sum of the limits" of the liability insurance. 187 The 
legislative history of the 1981 amendments to section 541(c) also 
offers some support for the view that the method of determining an 
uninsured motor vehicle is to compare "liability limits" to "uninsured 
motorist limits," as opposed to comparing the "amount collected" 
to "uninsured motorist limits. "188 
186. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra notes 170-71. 
188. In 1981, the Maryland legislature amended section 541(c) by broadening the 
definition of uninsured motor vehicle to include an underinsured motor vehicle, 
thus making section 541(c) function as both uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage. See supra notes 103-0S. These changes were proposed in 
Senate Bill 17. The purpose of the amendments to section 541(c) were discussed 
in an undated report by the Staff of Senate Committee on Economic Affairs: 
When an uninsured motor vehicle is involved in an automobile 
accident causing injury, the injuries shall be compe'nsated by the 
insurance company which insures the person injured, to the limits of 
the UM coverage .... Although some companies offer limits in excess 
of the mandated 20/40 coverage, Senate Bill 17 mandates that all 
companies offer higher limits than 20/40, e.g. 100/300. 
As it stands now, if you sued a person who has insurance in the 
minimal limits of 20/40 and obtained a judgment for say $50,000.00, 
you would collect $20,000.00 from the guilty party and have no source 
to satisfy the balance of your judgment, i.e. $30,000.00. 
S.B. 17 will do this. The $30,000.00 will be paid from the injured 
party's own UM coverage (if the injured party has UM in excess oj 
the guilty party's liability coverage). So that if the guilty party had 
20/40 and the injured party had UM coverage of 20/40 the injured 
party obviously would have no source from which to collect the excess 
verdict in the case mentioned above. 
As it is now, under present law, if the guilty party has liability 
insurance, he can never be considered an uninsured motorist and the 
UM coverage of the injured party can never come into play. 
S.B. 17 will change this and make available the UM coverage oj 
the injured party jor the judgment in excess oj the guilty party's 
liability coverage. 
A case in Florida has already held this. If S.B. 17 is passed the 
injured party in Maryland who finds himself in this situation will not 
have to sue his UM carrier. The legislature will have anticipated such 
a law suit and the UM carrier must pay the difference. 
Committee Report on Senate Bill 17 (1981) (microfilmed on Department of 
Legislative Reference's microfilm file, S.B. 17 (1981» (emphasis added). It is 
not certain which Florida case served as the catalyst or model. Most likely it 
was Williams v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 382 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 
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Additionally, an insured's ability to purchase higher uninsured 
motorist limits weighs against allowing recovery when the tortfeasor's 
liability limits equal the uninsured motorist limits, but the injured 
insured has collected less than the liability limits because of other 
claimants. 189 Nowhere in the public policy of Maryland is recovery 
of a certain amount guaranteed. l90 Rather, each insured is given the 
opportunity for a full recovery. By exercising his right to purchase 
higher limits, the insured assures himself of a recovery. 191 Since the 
insured cannot purchase uninsured motorist limits that exceed his 
liability limits, the legislative aim of protecting the public is fulfilled 
when the insured purchases the higher limits.192 
Still, the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute is a 
strong factor, and "valid and collectible" in section S41(c)(1) and 
"applicable" in section S41(c)(3) are susceptible to different read-
1990), which discussed concepts of "uninsured" and "underinsured" motorist 
coverage. But compare Jones v. Travelers Indem. Co., 368 So. 2d 1289, 1290 
(Fla. 1979) (holding that an insured is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits 
where the tortfeasor's policy liability limit has been partially exhausted by 
payment of claims to persons other than the insured) with Holt v. State Auto. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a 
father, wife, and two daughters who divided the per occurrence limit provided 
by a $15,000/$30,000 liability policy had no right to seek underinsured motorist 
benefits from a policy that provided $15,000/$30,000 uninsured motorist in-
surance). 
189. See Act of May 26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749. 
190. The statutory $20,000/$40,000 split limit, see MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-
103(b) (1992), reflects a legislative understanding that not every victim of a 
motor vehicle accident is entitled to $20,000. When there are more than two 
victims from one occurrence, they will have to divide the $40,000 per occurrence 
limit. Similarly, the Uninsured Division of MAIF does not guarantee every 
person a recovery of $20,000. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243-I(a) (1991) 
(guaranteeing a maximum of $20,000/$40,000). Prior to 1987, the Uninsured 
Division of MAIF guaranteed a recovery to each claimant when multiple 
claimants sought recovery, as section 243-I(a) then provided that "[w]here 
there are three or more qualified claimants, the court or courts shall order 
payments on a pro rata basis." Act of April 26, 1972, ch. 73, 1972 Md. Laws 
281, 302, repealed by Act of June 2, 1987, ch. 638, 1987 Md. Laws 2959, 
2960. 
191. For example, the tortfeasor has a $20,000/$40,000 liability policy. He injures 
four persons in an accident. The four persons divide the $40,000, with each 
receiving $10,000. One of the claimants, who has uninsured motorist coverage 
of $20,000/$40,000, then makes an uninsured motorist claim, seeking the 
difference between the $10,000 he has "collected" from the tort feasor and the 
$20,000 uninsured motorist limit. Another claimant has an uninsured motorist 
policy that provides $50,000/$100,000. While the first claimant may be pre-
cluded from recovery if the test is "liability limit" to "uninsured motorist 
limit," the second claimant under the same test would recover $30,000 from 
his uninsured motorist insurer ($50,000 uninsured motorist coverage minus 
$20,000 liability), thereby netting $40,000 ($30,000 uninsured motorist coverage 
plus $10,000 liability he collected). 
192. See supra notes 133-36. 
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ings. 193 On other occasions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
ignored statutory language in order to effectuate public policy.l94 If 
the concept of a full recovery is to be fulfilled, then a claimant 
should be able to seek uninsured motorist benefits when he receives 
an amount from the tortfeasor's liability insurance that is less than 
the uninsured limit he purchased. His reasonable expectations demand 
this result,195 and the state's desire to shift the loss to the private 
sector would be frustrated if another result were reached. When faced 
with this situation, several states have enacted provisions that define 
an uninsured (or underinsured) motor vehicle as one whose liability 
limit has been reduced by payments to multiple claimants to an 
amount less than the insured's uninsured (or underinsured) limit. l96 
If Maryland's uninsured motorist statute is eventually interpreted as 
precluding recovery when the liability limits have been exhausted by 
payment to multiple claimants, the General Assembly should not 
hesitate to join these states in redefining the concept of an uninsured 
motor vehicle. Another alternative is for the legislature to abandon 
the concept of reduction underinsured motorist coverage and adopt 
floating underinsured motorist coverage, which provides the insured 
with a certain sum regardless of the amount of liability insurance 
available to the insured. l97 Floating underinsured motorist coverage 
is the next logical step in the movement toward guaranteeing a full 
recovery, and the public responsibility theory underlying Maryland's 
comprehensive insurance scheme demands such progression. 
VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The "entitled to recover" language of the uninsured motorist 
statute unquestionably obligates the insurer to indemnify the injured 
193. But cj. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, 569 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Conn. 
1990) (holding that "in ordinary parlance an insurance policy would be 'ap-
plicable' if it covered any portion of a tortfeasor's liability rather than all of 
it," and adding that the policies in question "did not become inapplicable 
simply because the sum of their liability limits was less than was necessary to 
satisfy all of the claims arising out of the accident"). 
194. See Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 80, 517 A.2d 730, 735 
(1986) (holding that allowing a person sitting on a stool in a parking lot 
attendant's booth to recover personal injury protection benefits as a "pedes-
trian" is consistent with the real intention of the personal injury protection 
statute, "even though arguably contrary to the literal meaning of the word"). 
195. See 1 WIDlSS, supra note 19, § 8.22, at 406 ("An insured could reasonably 
anticipate that the uninsured motorist coverage, which is a first-party insurance, 
would apply in the event that injuries were caused by a negligent third party 
and either no indemnification or inadequate indemnification was provided by 
the tortfeasor's insurance. "). 
196. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-4-609(4)(b) (1990); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-
1(2)(b) (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 B. (Michie 1990); W. 
VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b)(ii) (1992). 
197. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
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insured for compensatory damages he is entitled to recover from the 
tortfeasor. l98 Maryland courts have not .decided, however, whether 
an uninsured motorist carrier's liability encompasses punitive damages 
from the uninsured tortfeasor. The statute does not expressly permit 
or prohibit the exclusion of punitive damages. An insured is "en-
titled" to recover punitive damages from the tort feasor if the tort-
feasor demonstrated actual malice. l99 Whether the insurer's 
indemnification duty extends to the punitive damages is another 
matter, and persuasive arguments exist on both sides. Other jurisdic-
tions are split,2°O and the issue is complex. 
Without doubt, several conceptual problems emerge if an insured 
can recover punitive damages as part of his claim against the unin-
sured motorist carrier. In considering punitive damages, for instance, 
a jury is entitled to weigh the tortfeasor's financial ability to pay,20l 
but this traditional measure is absent because the typical uninsured 
is financially irresponsible.202 This is, perhaps, merely an evidentiary 
problem. If carried to its extreme, however, a conceptually more 
difficult matter arises; theoretically, an insured may be able to show 
that he is entitled to recover punitive damages based on the actions 
of the driver of a phantom vehicle. Awarding the insured punitive 
damages in such an instance is, at best, speculative.203 Still, such 
difficulties do not warrant the exclusion of punitive damages. The 
198. Section 541(c)(2)(i) of the Insurance Code requires uninsured motorist coverage 
for damages which the "insured is entitled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries." MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1992). The phrase "because of bodily 
injury," which appears in many liability policies in addition to uninsured 
motorist endorsements, has received little attention in Maryland. See Loewen-
thal v. Security Ins. Co., 50 Md. App. 112, 436 A.2d 493 (1981) (providing 
brief interpretation of "bodily injury" in a liability policy); see also Daley v. 
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 312 Md. 550, 541 A.2d 632 (1988) (discussing 
bodily injury in conjunction with a per person/per occurrence dispute). 
199. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992) 
(discussing actual malice). 
200. See generally Eric Hollowell, Annotation, Punitive Damages as Within Coverage 
of Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Insurance, 54 A.L.R.4th 1186 (1987 & 
Supp. 1991). 
201. See Carl M. Freeman Assoc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 427-28, 306 A.2d 
548, 554, cert. denied., 269 Md. 756 (1973); see a/so MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 10-913 (1989) (providing for exclusion of evidence of financial 
worth of defendant until "there has been a finding of liability and that punitive 
damages are supportable under the facts"). 
202. Braley V. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359 (Me. 1982); see a/so State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. CO. V. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048, 1052 (Miss. 1985) 
("Imagine therefore the quantity of an award from an uninsured financial 
derelict with little, if any net worth. "). 
203. See, e.g., Mullins V. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tenn. 1984) (Drowota, J., 
dissenting). 
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exclusion, if it exists, must be found in the purpose of the uninsured 
motorist statute. 
Indeed, the ultimate resolution of the punitive damages issue 
may depend on what the court of special appeals has called "the 
elusive creature known as 'legislative intent."'204 The primary source 
of legislative intent is the language of the statute,20S but the language 
of the uninsured motorist statute is hardly conclusive. "Damages" 
seemingly encompasses all damages.206 The phrase "because of bodily 
injury" is arguably more restrictive, and other courts have construed 
it as covering only compensatory damages. In Braley v. Berkshire 
Mutual Insurance Co., 207 for instance, the Supreme Court of Maine 
held that the phrase excluded coverage for punitive damages, reason-
ing that punitive damages are not awarded as compensation because 
of bodily injury even though proof of some injury is generally a 
prerequisite for an award of punitive damages.2os According to the 
court, punitive damages were awarded "'for the protection of society 
and societal order' ... and to deter similar misconduct by the 
defendant and others."209 
The Braley court's reasoning is consistent with Maryland's view 
of punitive damages.21o If "because of" means "as a result of," then 
204. McMichael v. Robertson, 77 Md. App. 208,209,549 A.2d 1157, 1158 (1988). 
205. See, e.g., Insurance Comm'r v. Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 313 Md. 
458, 463, 546 A.2d 458, 463 (1988) (citing Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 
309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987». A court, however, is "not limited to the 
words of the statute but may consider other external manifestations or persua-
sive evidence, including related statutes, pertinent legislative history and other 
material, that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or 
goal." [d. 
206. The court of appeals has noted that "[u]nfortunately terms like 'injury,' 'actual 
injury,' 'damage' and 'harm' are used in different decisions, and often within 
the same decision, to represent different concepts." Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 
297 Md. 112, 118, 466 A.2d 486, 489 (1983). 
207. 440 A.2d 359 (Me. 1982). 
208. [d. at 361. Maine's uninsured motorist statute required insurers to cover 
"damages for bodily injury." The policy in question covered "damages ... 
because of bodily injury." The court did not discuss whether there was any 
difference between the statute's use of jor and the policy's use of because, but 
the former seems more restrictive than the latter. 
209. [d. at 361 (quoting Kaklegian v. Zakarian, 123 A. 900 (Me. 1924». 
210. The court of special appeals has explained that: 
Punitive damages are inherently different from compensatory damages 
and the reasons for the award of each differ sharply. The award of 
compensatory damages is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole again 
by monetary compensation. In contrast, the award of punitive damages 
does not attempt to compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered by 
him but rather is exemplary in nature and is over and above any 
award of compensatory damages. The fundamental purpose of a 
punitive damage award is to punish the wrongdoer for misconduct 
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punitive damages result, not from the bodily injuries, but from the' 
conduct of the tort feasor. 211 Nevertheless, the exclusion of punitive 
damages under Maryland's uninsured motorist statute is not a fait 
accompli. At best, the phrase "damages ... because of bodily 
injury" is susceptible to more than one interpretation, and there is 
some indication that Maryland courts would construe it to cover 
punitive damages.212 Reading the uninsured motorist statute as a 
whole suggests that punitive damages are covered. The act allows 
recovery even if the tortfeasor acted intentionally. 213 Also, the absence 
and to deter future egregious conduct by others. 
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 125, 137, 516 A.2d 990, 997 (1986). 
Furthermore, "punitive damages may not be awarded absent compensatory 
damages." Id. at 138, 516 A.2d at 997. 
211. In his dissent in Mullins v. Miller, Justice Drowota wrote: 
It would appear that the language of the [Tennessee] statute, "damages 
... because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, 
resulting therefrom," more properly describes compensatory than 
punitive damages since "because of" means "by reason of' or "on 
account of." Punitive damages are not strictly speaking damages 
awarded "because of bodily injury" but because of intentional, willful 
or grossly negligent acts of the tort feasor . 
Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669,673 (Tenn. 1984) (Drowota, J., dissenting). 
212. In First National Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 
232, 389 A.2d 359, 362 (1978), the court cited with favor Southern Farm 
Bureau Casualty Insurance v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582 (Ark. 1969). In Daniel, 
the court stated: 
When we consider that under our law, one cannot become legally 
obligated to pay punitive damages unless actual damages have been 
sustained and assessed, we find that punitive damages constitute a 
sum which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of bodily injuries sustained. 
Daniel, 440 S.W.2d at 584 (citing Carroway v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908 (S.C. 
1965». 
213. The definition of "accident" under MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538(a) (1991), 
indicates that the uninsured motorist statute requires coverage for injuries 
received by an insured as a result of an assault and battery arising out of the 
use, operation or maintenance of an automobile: an accident "means any 
occurrence involving a motor vehicle, other than an occurrence caused inten-
tionally by or at the direction of the insured, from which damage to any 
property or injury to any person results." Id. Clearly, when an insured is 
assaulted, and a motor vehicle is used as the instrument of the assault, the 
insured's injuries are covered. A non-vehicular assault is another matter, 
however, one wherein the insured must show a close connection between the 
uninsured vehicle and the intentional tort. See Elliot v. Jamestown Mut. Ins. 
Co., 27 Md. App. 566, 342 A.2d 319 (1975). The majority of cases involving 
intentional injuries are outside coverage because the injuries do not arise out 
of the use of the motor vehicle. But cj. Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim & 
Judgment Bd., 262 Md. 115, 277 A.2d 57 (1971) (finding that injuries sustained 
by mother and child when unidentified person in another automobile threw a 
firecracker into their car arose in the "ownership, operation or use" of 
unidentified motor vehicle). 
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of a clear statutory exclusion should not be ignored.214 If the legis-
lature had wanted to exclude punitive damages, it could have ex-
pressly done SO.215 
The structure of Maryland's comprehensive insurance scheme 
manifests a clear legislative intent that all damages that can legally 
be recovered under a liability policy should also be recoverable under 
an uninsured motorist policy.216 Most automobile liability policies do 
not exclude coverage for punitive damages.217 An anomalous situation 
arises when the liability portion covers punitive damages, but the 
uninsured motorist portion does not. The insured would have been 
better off had he been injured by an insured motorist. 218 The opposite 
214. In St. Mary's, the court noted that "when the General Assembly has desired 
to forbid protection by insurance from the equivalent of exemplary damages, 
it has done so explicitly." 283 Md. at 239, 389 A.2d at 365. But see Laird v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co., 134 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1964), wherein the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina held that the intent of the South Carolina uninsured motorist 
statute was to cover only compensatory damages: 
There is no provision in the Uninsured Motorist Statutes which, either 
expressly or by implication, requires that the uninsured motorist 
endorsement must insure against any and all liability. There is nothing 
said or implied that the insurer would be liable for punitive or 
exemplary damages. If such damages had been in contemplation of 
the Legislature, it could have easily provided therefor in said statutes. 
[d. at 210. The South Carolina legislature later amended the uninsured motorist 
statute to require coverage for punitive damages. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-
77-30(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (defining damages to include both actual and 
punitive damages). 
215. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.2(a)(I) (Supp. 1992) (providing 
specifically that immunity of State not waived with regard to punitive damages); 
see a/so MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104(b) (1989 & Supp. 1992) 
(same). 
216. Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 709-10, 589 A.2d 944, 954 
(1991) (finding uninsured motorist statute to be designed to place the injured 
insured in the same position he would have been in had the tortfeasor 
maintained liability insurance); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 
721, 737, 436 A.2d 465, 474-75 (1981); cj. Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669, 
670 (Tenn. 1984) (finding that the Tennessee legislature intended for uninsured 
motorist coverage to mirror liability coverage). 
217. Liability coverage for punitive damages is not addressed by either the financial 
responsibility provisions or the motor vehicle casualty insurance provisions. 
The Insurance Services Office does not produce any specific form excluding 
punitive damages from the liability portion of the policy, thus leaving the 
decision to each insurer. See·Letter, supra note 39. 
218. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained: 
It seems illogical to us, for example, that an insured motorist could 
recover $10,000 in compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive 
damages if he were struck by an insured drunken driver with $50,000 
limits, but that he could only recover $10,000 if he were struck by 
an uninsured drunken driver, even though the insured's own policy 
provides limits of $50,000 for damages caused by an uninsured mo-
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is true if uninsured motorist coverage covers punitive damages, but 
liability coverage does not.219 Logic and the reasonable expectations 
of the insured dictate a consistency between the two coverages, and 
public policy suggests punitive damages should be covered under both 
liability and uninsured motorist coverages. 
Many of the courts that have rejected the availability of punitive 
damages in uninsured motorist coverage have relied on public policy 
considerations. The Braley court, for instance, justified its decision 
by reasoning that not only was the purpose of the uninsured motorist 
statute to compensate, but also that the purposes of punitive damages 
(to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others) were not accomplished 
if recovery does not come from the wrongdoer. 220 Other courts have 
expressed similar reasoning.221 Most of these jurisdictions also pro-
hibit coverage of punitive damages under a liability policy on similar 
grounds. 222 Maryland, however, has rejected the "lack-of-deterrence" 
reasoning in regard to whether punitive damages are covered by a 
liability policy. In First National Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co.,m the court of appeals considered whether a compre-
hensive liability policy issued to a bank covered punitive damages. 
The policy provided coverage for all damages "because of injury. "224 
torist. We do not believe that this result was envisioned or intended 
by the General Assembly in requiring underwriters to offer increased 
limits equivalent to those carried in liability insurance policies. 
Mullins, 683 S.W.2d at 670. 
219. See California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Carter, 210 Cal. Rptr. 
140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding punitive damages not allowed under unin-
sured motorist coverage because such damages were excluded under liability 
coverage: allowing them in uninsured motorist coverage would place the insured 
in a better position under uninsured motorist coverage). Virginia evidently 
allows this situation, which one commentator has called "bizarre." See Gary 
T. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist 
Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 428 (1987). 
220. Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 362 (Me. 1982). 
221. E.g., Burns v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 61 (Wis. 1984). 
222. Mississippi is an exception, holding that punitive damages are covered by a 
liability policy but are excluded by the uninsured motorist statute. See State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048 (Miss. 1985). 
223. 283 Md. 228, 232, 389 A.2d 359, 361-62 (1978). For a detailed discussion of 
St. Mary's, see Mark C. Treanor, Mischief with Malice: A Review of Liability 
for Punitive Damages and the Insured's Right to Indemnity Against an Ex-
emplary A ward, 8 U. BALT. L. REv. 222 (1979). 
224. The court did not address the language of the liability policy because of a 
procedural matter, but did state that "[i]n this instance we have examined the 
policy provision in question and conclude that if the matter were properly 
before us we would hold that the trial judge did not err in determining that 
its provisions embraced an award for exemplary damages." St. Mary's, 283 
Md. at 231, 389 A.2d at 361. Because the term "damages" was not defined 
by the policy, and no specific provision excluded punitive damages, the court 
216 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
In holding that insurance coverage for punitive damages was not 
against public policy, the court concluded that even though an insurer 
may ultimately be responsible for paying the punitive damages, the 
punitive damages award still retained its deterrent function because 
the insured would pay higher premiums and would have difficulty 
obtaining insurance. 225 
There are, admittedly, substantial underwriting differences be-
tween liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. Some com-
mentators argue that the deterrent effect of higher premiums on the 
tort feasor is not present in the uninsured motorist context because 
the victim, not the tort feasor , ultimately bears the cost of the higher 
premiums.226 It is true that charging higher uninsured motorist prem-
iums to cover the risk of punitive damages does not deter uninsured 
tortfeasors, and, essentially, punishes the insurance buying public as 
a whole.227 It is equally true, however, that the uninsured motorist 
held that the policy covered punitive damages. The court stated as follows: 
[l]nsurance companies have not shown a reluctance in the past to 
write into their policies such restrictions as they deem to be in their 
best interest, yet no restriction relative to the issue at bar appears in 
the policy issued by [the insurer.] Surely ... these companies have 
been cognizant of the fact that they might be called upon to pay an 
award [of punitive damages] such as that at issue in this case. As a 
consequence, they probably have considered such a possibility in 
establishing rates. 
Id. at 242-43, 389 A.2d at 367. Even if punitive damages could be excluded 
from coverage, see supra note 215, St. Mary's suggests that punitive damages 
must be specifically excluded. See supra note 223. 
225. According to the court, 
[i]t cannot properly be said that permitting payment of exemplary 
damages by an insurance company eliminates deterrence, notwithstand-
ing the fact the loss is thus spread across a number of policy holders 
through the payment of premiums. This is so because those who are 
demonstrated by experience to be poor risks encounter substantial 
difficulty in obtaining insurance, a fact such persons know. 
St. Mary's, 283 Md. at 242, 389 A.2d at 366. 
226. See, e.g., David Leitner, Punitive Damages and First Party Automobile Liability 
Insurance Coverages, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 112, 119 (1987). Leitner argues that 
the insurer's underwriting function is totally absent from the uninsured motorist 
situation because the insurer cannot, by reference to the uninsured motorist, 
decide the risk of loss. In the liability context, the insurer is able to judge the 
risk of the insured's exposure to punitive damages by reference to the insured 
and can underwrite the policy accordingly. The uninsured motorist, in contrast, 
is clearly beyond the reach of the insurer's underwriting function. Neither the 
insured nor the insurer control his actions, and the insurer cannot project the 
risk of loss and assess higher premiums in the same manner that it would 
under a liability policy. The insurer, therefore, must spread the risk of loss by 
raising uninsured motorist premiums. 
227. Leitner, supra note 226, at 119. 
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insurer's ability to pursue the tort feasor via its subrogation right has 
significant deterrent potential. 228 
Several courts have suggested that the deterrent effect from the 
insurer's pursuing its subrogation rights against the uninsured tort-
feasor is negligible because the subrogation claim is more theoretical 
than real.229 Such criticism is unfounded, for the insurer's ability to 
recover via subrogation is more real than what might be expected. 230 
If anything, the presence of punitive damages increases the insurer's 
ability to recover because the grossly negligent uninsured motorist 
will not be able to extinguish the judgment through bankruptcy. 231 
He is, therefore, not as collection proof as might be imagined. 
Furthermore, every judgment against an uninsured motorist in Mar-
yland has some deterrent effect.232 Finally, the stigma attached to 
228. E.g., Hutchinson v. J. C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co., 478 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1985). 
The subrogation right certainly has more potential to achieve the desired 
deterrence than raising the tortfeasor's premiums in the context of a liability 
policy. After all, the uninsured motorist will be saddled with the judgment, 
which will be significantly more than a relatively small premium hike. In his 
dissent in St. Mary's, Judge Levine wrote: 
It is probably true that poor risks will be required to pay higher 
premiums to acquire the desired coverage and that this ostensibly will 
have a slight deterrent effect. But the impact of a hike in insurance 
premiums payable over the course of several months and probably 
deductible for income tax purposes, plainly will be far less than that 
caused by a lump sum judgment for which the defendant is solely 
responsible. It is precisely the threat of sudden and severe economic 
loss which lends credibility to the deterrence theory of punitive dam-
ages. 
St. Mary's, 283 Md. at 249, 389 A.2d at 370 (Levine, J., dissenting). 
229. E.g., Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 363 (Me. 1982); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048 (Miss. 1985). 
230. In a 1955 letter to insurance companies, the New York Superintendent of 
Insurance indicated that the New York Department of Motor Vehicles had 
estimated that "33 1/3 percent recovery could be had from culpable uninsured 
motorists." Calvin M. George, Answering Inquires Caused by Uninsured 
Motorist, 1956 INS. L.J. 715, 718. Other courts indicate that insurance com-
panies overrate the value of subrogation. See, e.g., Sahloff v. Western Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 171 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. 1969). 
231. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988) (providing that an individual debtor is not 
discharged from any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to 
another entity or to the property of another entity"); see also id. § 523(a)(9) 
(1988 & Supp. 1991) (providing that debtor cannot extinguish a judgment 
arising out of his operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated). Under 
the bankruptcy code, an entity includes a person. Id. § 101(15) (Supp. 1991). 
In Maryland, punitive damages can no longer be based on driving while 
intoxicated absent a showing of actual malice. See Komornik v. Sparks, 331 
Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993). 
232. If the insurer obtains a judgment against the tort feasor , the insurer, the motor 
vehicle administration, upon proper application by the insurer, may suspend 
the tortfeasor's driver's license and vehicle registration. MD. CODE ANN., 
TRANsP. § 17-204 (1992). 
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punitive damages has some deterrent value. Thus, there is no over-
riding public policy in Maryland that suggests that uninsured motorist 
benefits be limited to compensatory damages;233 rather there is a 
stronger public policy to cover punitive damages under both liability 
and uninsured motorist coverages than to exclude them.234 
Although the punitive damage issue awaits judicial resolution, 
recent changes in the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
bring the issue to center stage. Until January 1988, the Maryland 
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement did not expressly exclude punitive 
damages. The earlier versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist 
Endorsement mirrored the statute's provision that the insured was 
legally entitled to recover "damages ... because of bodily injury."23s 
The 1966 Standard Form likewise did not expressly limit the insurer's 
indemnification duty.236 Beginning in January 1988, however, punitive 
damages under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement were 
excluded by a separate amendatory endorsement. 237 This exclusion 
was incorporated into the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsement,238 which also limits the insured's recovery to "compen-
satory damages" in the granting clause.239 The 1989 Maryland 
233. ct. Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) 
("There is no public policy against an insurance company's promise to pay an 
insured the amount which the insured party has become entitled to recover 
because of the recklessness of some [uninsured] third party. The plaintiffs in 
this case have been adjudged to be legally entitled to recover exemplary damages 
from the operator of the uninsured automobile and it is the insurer's contractual 
obligation to pay those exemplary damages. "). 
234. In St. Mary's, the court suggested that public policy demanded coverage of 
punitive damages, noting that the community as a whole "would be outraged 
and have substantial difficulty in comprehending reasons for a holding to the 
contrary." First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 
228, 241, 389 A.2d 359, 366 (1978). 
235. The earlier versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement stated 
that the insurer would pay "damages which a covered person is legally entitled 
to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because 
of ... [b]odily injury." ISO Form PP 04 59 02 82, I. Part C - Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage. 
236. The 1966 Standard Form states that the insurer will "pay all sums which the 
insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages . . . because of 
bodily injury ... sustained by the insured." Arguably, the 1966 Standard 
Form's use of "all sums" is broader than the pre-1988 versions of the Maryland 
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement's use of "damages." The 1989 Commercial 
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement also uses the phrase "all sums." 
237. Letter, supra note 39. This endorsement bears a PP 04 05 1 88 identification. 
238. The endorsement states that the insurer does "not provide Uninsured Motorists 
Coverage for punitive or exemplary damages." 
239. The granting clause in the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
provides that: 
We will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" is legally 
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Uninsured Motorist Endorsement's attempt to limit the insurer's 
liability to compensatory damages is its most significant provision, 
but it remains to be seen whether the 1989 Maryland Uninsured 
Motorist Endorsement is consistent with the statute. 240 
VIII. INSUREDS 
The uninsured motorist statute requires coverage for damages 
which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle" because of 
1. "Bodily injury" sustained by an "insured" and caused by 
an accident; 
2. "Property damage" caused by an accident. Only sections 
I., 2., 4., and 5., of the definition of "uninsured motor 
vehicle" apply to "property damage." 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the "un-
insured motor vehicle." We will pay under this coverage only 
after the limits of liability under any applicable liability bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or 
settlements. 
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Insuring 
Agreement (emphasis added). 
240. A policy inconsistent with the statute is void. E.g., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 (1980); see also supra 
note II and accompanying text. Assuming that the statute does not require 
coverage for punitive damages, then the specific exclusion of punitive damages 
in the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement is proper and enforce-
able. See supra note 239. A judicial finding that the statutory phrase "damages 
... because of bodily injury" is susceptible to more than one interpretation, 
however, could perhaps result in the inclusion of punitive damages if the p,olicy 
fails to contain a specific exclusion. For example, despite an insurer's use of 
the identical statutory language in the policy, a court may arrive at a different 
result in interpreting the contract language because of the doctrine of contra 
proferentum. Although the rules of statutory and contract construction are 
virtually identical, the court may, under certain circumstances, construe am-
biguous language in a contract against the insurer, which drafted the policy. 
Thus, the identical language may result in a finding that the statute requires 
coverage only for compensatory damages but that the policy provides coverage 
for punitive damages because it fails to exclude them in clear and unmistakable 
terms. In Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1984), for example, the 
court stated: 
Again, if the uninsured motorist statutes themselves should be con-
strued as not to require coverage for punitive damages as a matter of 
law, it would be a very simple matter for insurance carriers to so 
write their policies as to limit insurance coverage to compensatory 
damages only, if permitted by the Commissioner. The present policy 
contains no such limitations but obligates the insurance carrier to pay 
all sums which the insured is legally entitled to recover from an 
uninsured motorist. In our opinion this coverage includes awards of 
punitive damages up to the policy limits. 
[d. at 671; see supra note 219. 
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of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries. 241 The 
uninsured motorist statute also requires coverage for damages that 
the insured's surviving relatives are entitled to recover under Mary-
land's Wrongful Death Act. 242 The statute does not define "insured," 
but does define "named insured. "243 The differentiation is significant, 
revealing the intent to extend uninsured motorist coverage to the 
named insured's resident relatives and permissive users of the insured 
vehicle. Certainly, the interplay between the uninsured motorist stat-
ute and the Transportation Article's financial responsibility provisions 
demands that omnibus insureds under the liability provisions of the 
policy be covered under the uninsured motorist endorsement. 244 At 
least one opinion supports this conclusion. 245 The uninsured motorist 
statute, however, clearly broadens the group of persons protected 
beyond omnibus insureds by requiring coverage for non-relative 
passengers, not just non-relative operators.246 The statute also im-
241. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
242. [d. § 541 (c)(2)(ii). 
243. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538(c) (1991) (defining "named insured" as "the 
person denominated in the declarations in a policy of motor vehicle liability 
insurance"). Section 539 uses "first named insured," but does not define that 
term. [d. § 539 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
244. There is no express statutory requirement that an automobile liability policy 
contain an omnibus provision protecting those persons operating the vehicle 
with the express or implied permission of the named insured. National Grange 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 284 Md. 694, 704, 399 A.2d 877, 882 (1979). The 
requirement of an omnibus provision flows naturally, however, from the 
financial responsibility provisions. Moreover, the insurance commissioner will 
not approve any policy without an omnibus clause. Maryland Indem. Ins. Co. 
v. Komke, 21 Md. App. 178, 180 n.3, 319 A.2d 603, 605 n.3 (1974) (citing 
Mt. Beacon Ins. Co. v. Williams, 296 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Md. 1969». 
245. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 43 Md. App. 413, 421 
n.3, 405 A.2d 779, 785 n.3 (1979) (quoting with approval State Farm Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1974», a/I'd, 288 Md. 151,416 A.2d 
734 (1980). In Reaves, the court stated "[w]hile we do not read the statute as 
requiring every automobile liability insurance policy to include an 'omnibus 
clause,' nevertheless once an automobile liability policy is issued extending 
coverage to a certain class of insureds under such a clause, uninsured motorist 
coverage must be offered to cover the same class of insureds." Reaves, 292 
So. 2d at 99; accord Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 58 Md. App. 690, 
474 A.2d 224 (1984) (declining on procedural grounds to decide whether 
someone listed as an occasional young driver on his mother's policy was 
afforded uninsured motorist protection while occupying another vehicle). 
246. The uninsured motorist statute does not expressly require coverage for passen-
gers. This, however, is clearly the intent. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 
541(c)(v)(I)-(2) (Supp. 1992) (providing that passengers may be excluded under 
certain circumstances, suggesting that occupants must be covered under all 
other circumstances); see also id. § 543(c) (1991) (providing that a passenger's 
uninsured motorist policy will apply as primary coverage when that person is 
occupying a vehicle not covered by uninsured motorist insurance). 
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plicitly requires coverage for persons who have derivative claims for 
consequential damages as a result of bodily injuries.247 Consistent 
with the statute, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
specifically establishes three classes of persons' ability to recover 
under the policy. 248 This classification also accounts for the surviving 
247. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 54l(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1992), states that the uninsured 
motorist insurance must cover damages ''It]he insured is entitled to recover 
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or 
use of such uninsured motor vehicle." It does not state that uninsured motorist 
insurance covers only "damages which the insured is entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries 
sustained [by that insured] in an accident." The intentional ambiguity (i.e., 
"sustained" by whom?) is significant, revealing an intent to extend uninsured 
motorist insurance to derivative claims. C/. Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. 
Co., 322 Md. 689, 709-10, 589 A.2d 944, 948 (1991) (stating that the uninsured 
motorist statute is designed to place the injured insured in the same position 
he would have been in had the tort feasor maintained liability insurance). The 
Maryland Endorsement granting clause is consistent with this interpretation. It 
states that: 
[The insurer] will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" 
is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
"uninsured motor vehicle" because of: 
(I) "Bodily injury" sustained by an "insured" and caused by an 
accident .... 
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist's Coverage, Insuring 
Agreement (emphasis added). The coverage of the 1966 Standard Form granting 
clause is narrower: 
The company will pay all sums which the insur~d or his legal 
representative shall be legally entitled to recover ~ damages from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily 
injury sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway 
vehicle .... 
1966 Standard Form, 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, app. A, at 25 (emphasis added). 
Several modified versions of the 1966 Standard Form eliminated the preposi-
tional phrase "by the insured." 
248. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has noted that "[i]nsurance policies, 
like the regulations of the Internal Revenue Service, are often not the easiest 
things to read and understand. Definitions tend to chase each other." Erie 
Ins. Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 63 Md. App. 612, 616, 493 A.2d 405, 407 
(1985). The definition of "insured" under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist 
Endorsement is a prime example. It reads as follows: 
"Insured" as used in this endorsement means: 
l. You or any "family member." 
2. Any other person "occupying your covered auto." 
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover 
because of "bodily injury" to which this coverage applies 
sustained by a person described in l. or 2. above. 
ISO Form PP 04 59 1289, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorists Coverage, Insuring 
Agreement. The definitions section of the Personal Auto Policy defines "you" 
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relatives entitled to recover when an insured is killed by an uninsured 
motor vehicle. 
A. Clause 1 Insureds 
The first class of insureds, called "clause 1 insureds," consists 
of the named insured, the named insured's spouse, and members of 
the named insured's household.249 Many of the terms used in defining 
the boundaries of clause 1 - spouse, resident, family, household -
have been the subject of litigation in Maryland. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland has said that the phrase "resident of the same house-
hold" is not ambiguous. "The words themselves are clear, simple 
and in general use. Put together they express a simple, homely, 
familiar concept. "250 The court of appeals has also defined "house-
hold" to mean "all dwellers in a house under the common control 
of one person."251 In the court of appeals' view, "family" has been 
viewed as synonymous with "household. "252 
The coverage granted to clause 1 insureds is personal and com-
prehensive: it does not run with the insured vehicle. Rather, the 
policy covers clause 1 insureds in a variety of situations: when they 
are occupying a vehicle insured under the policy, when they are 
occupying most other vehicles, when they are riding bicycles, and 
when they are pedestrians. 2S3 The two exclusions expressly authorized 
as the named insured and the named insured's spouse "if a resident of the 
same household." ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, Definitions. "Family member" 
is defined as "a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is 
a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child." [d. 
"Occupying" is defined as "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off." [d. These 
definitions are applicable to the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. 
249. The 1966 Standard Forni used three clauses, (a), (b), and (c) to delineate the 
categories of insureds. Commentators generally follow these classifications. The 
1956 Standard Form used 1, 2, and 3. In the 2/82 and 6/83 versions of the 
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, the term "insured" was replaced 
by "covered person." The 6/80 version of the Personal Auto Policy also used 
the phrase "covered person" in Part C. 
250. Peninsula Ins. Co. v. Knight, 254 Md. 462, 477, 255 A.2d 55, 63 (1969). 
251. Rydstrom v. Queen Ins. Co. of Am., 137 Md. 349, 353, 112 A. 586, 587 
(1921). 
252. Pearre v. Smith, 110 Md. 531, 534, 73 A. 141, 142 (1909) ("The word 
'family' ... has a variety of meanings according to the connection in which 
it is used, and it should be so construed in each case as to give it the 
significance appropriate to its use .... The words 'family' and 'household' 
are often interchangeably used. "). But see Hicks v. Hatem, 265 Md. 260, 267, 
289 A.2d 325, 328 (1972) ("[T]he use of both of the words 'family' and 
'household' in the [household] exclusionary clause leads us to believe that they 
were not intended to be used in a synonymous fashion."). 
253. See generally 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 4.2. 
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by section S41(c)(2) limit the comprehensive coverage extended to 
clause 1 insureds. 254 
B. Clause 2 Insureds 
Under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, "clause 
2 insureds" are all persons "occupying" an insured motor vehicle.2SS 
This includes both non-resident relative operators and non-relative 
resident passengers.256 Whether a person is occupying a vehicle is 
important not only in determining coverage, but also in deciding 
priority of coverage.257 The judicial treatment of occupancy, more 
than any other issue, with the exception of stacking of coverages,258 
demonstrates the remedial nature of uninsured motorist coverage. 
Courts have endeavored to provide uninsured motorist benefits to an 
innocent victim, either by contorting the concept of "occupancy," 
or by employing the doctrine of contra proferentum. 
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute does not define "occu-
pying. "259 The Personal Auto Policy defines "occupying" as "in, 
upon, getting in, on, out or off" an automobile.260 The definition 
has not received much judicial treatment. The 1966 Standard Form 
definition - "in or upon, entering into or alighting from" - did, 
however, receive attention from the courts. 261 In particular, the words 
"in or upon, entering into or alighting from" are not synonymous; 
each is meant to broaden the ambit of coverage in some respect. 
Some courts have found the 1966 Standard Form definition ambig-
254. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(v)(I), (2) (Supp. 1992). 
255. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text. Persons claiming as clause 2 
insureds must be occupying an insured vehicle under the policy. See Erie Ins. 
Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 63 Md. App. 612, 616, 493 A.2d 405, 407 (1985) 
(finding passenger in vehicle operated by non permissive user not occupying an 
insured vehicle). 
256. Resident relative operators and passengers would qualify under clause I. 
257. See infra notes 431, 436 and accompanying text. 
258. See infra notes 365-66 and accompanying text. 
259. See Dejarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 475 A.2d 454 (1984). 
In Dejarnette, the court noted that 
neither occupy [n]or use is contained in the definition section of the 
[uninsured motorist] statute. Neither are they defined in the Trans-
portation Article section II-WI, et seq. "We have repeatedly stated 
that where the legislature has chosen not to define a term used in a 
statute, that term should, .. . be given its ordinary and natural 
meaning." By not defining these words in the statute, there is nothing 
to indicate the legislature "intended to express a technical meaning." 
Id. at 717, 475 A.2d at 458-59 (citations omitted). Some state statutes do define 
occupying, but the definitions usually mirror the 1966 Standard Form definition. 
See 2 No-Fault and Uninsured Automobile Insurance § 24.10(3)(b)(i) (1993). 
260. ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, Definitions. 
261. See I WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.2. 
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uous. More precisely, the word "upon" is usually the most trouble-
some part of the definition.262 Neither the Personal Auto Policy 
definition, nor the 1966 Standard Form definition has been given a 
specific construction by the Maryland courts;263 nor is it certain 
whether the Maryland courts would deem it ambiguous.264 Courts in 
other jurisdictions have approached the issue of occupancy in various 
ways. The most definite test requires physical contact between the 
victim and the insured vehicle. 265 It is an imperfect, often capricious 
guide, and has thus been implicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland.266 
In Goodwin v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 267 Raymond 
Goodwin drove his wife, Mildred, and five passengers - Effie and 
Webster Cooper, Marie and Earl Kronau, and Virginia Blum - to 
a wedding reception in his vehicle.268 Mr. Goodwin parked his vehicle 
262. In Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. Combs, 446 N.E.2d. 1001 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1983), the court held that the meaning of "upon" a vehicle was to be 
liberally construed. As such, the court found that Michael Combs, who was 
helping his brother, Cannon, fIx Cannon's car, which Cannon had parked on 
the side of the road, was "occupying" Cannon's vehicle when he was working 
on the distributor of the motor and only his knees rested on the bumper. In 
so holding, the court rested its decision on the policy of contra proferentum, 
finding that the phrase "upon" a vehicle was ambiguous. The Combs court 
specifically rejected the "physical contact" rule, and adopted the "reasonable 
relationship" test, stating that it is the claimant's relationship with the insured 
automobile that determines whether the claimant was "upon" the automobile 
so as to have been "occupying" it for purposes of coverage. Id. at 1006. 
Similarly, in Manning v. Summit Home Insurance Co., 623 P.2d 1235 (Ariz. 
Ct. Ap·p. 1980), the court held that a person standing fIve feet from the rear 
of the insured vehicle, but helping the insured put snow chains on the tires, 
was "upon" the vehicle, and, therefore, an insured under the uninsured 
motorist provision of the policy. The Manning court, like the Combs court, 
found that the term "upon" was ambiguous and construed the policy against 
the drafter. Id. at 1238. 
263. But see infra notes 267-81 and accompanying text. 
264. Maryland courts have consistently held that language in insurance contracts 
must be given its customary and normal meaning. Dejarnette v. Federal Kemper 
Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 717, 475 A.2d 454, 460-61 (1984). Moreover, when the 
language in an insurance policy is plain and unambiguous, there is no room 
for construction. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 545, 365 A.2d 
1000, 1003 (1976). 
265. 2 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUToMoBnE INSURANCE § 24.10(3)(b)(i) 
(1993). 
266. Cf. Contrisciane v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 459 A.2d 358, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983) ("The decedent was 'using' the motor vehicle when he left his passenger 
in the vehicle to go and exchange information with [the other driver] and the 
police offIcer and must, therefore, be found to have been 'occupying' the 
vehicle at that time. Any other interpretation of the term 'occupying' would 
be in derogation of and repugnant to the Uninsured Motorist Act. "). 
267. 199 Md. 121, 85 A.2d 759 (1952). 
268. Id. at 123, 85 A.2d at 760. 
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on a one way street with the driver's side to the curb.269 After the 
reception, the seven individuals started to return to the parked vehicle, 
but Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Cooper and Mr. Kronau were detained. 270 
Mr. Goodwin gave the keys to Mrs. Blum, who returned to the 
vehicle with the other women.271 Mrs. Blum unlocked the right front 
door and was reaching inside the car to unlock the back door, when 
another automobile sideswiped the Goodwin vehicle and struck all 
four women.272 At the time of impact, Mrs. Goodwin was standing 
behind Mrs. Blum, holding the right front door open.273 Mrs. Cooper 
had her hand on the handle of the right rear door, waiting for Mrs. 
Blum to unlock it, and Mrs. Kronau was standing behind Mrs. 
Goodwin.274 
The women made claims under the medical payment provision 
of Mr. Goodwin's automobile policy,275 which provided coverage for 
bodily injury caused "'while in or upon, entering or alighting from'" 
the insured automobile.276 Goodwin's insurer, Lumbermen's, denied 
coverage, arguing that the women were not occupying the vehicle at 
the time of the accident. 277 The trial court held in favor of the 
insurer,278 but the court of appeals reversed,279 ruling that all four 
women were occupying the vehicle at the time of the accident. 280 
After conceding that the women were neither "in" nor "alighting 
from" the vehicle, the court wrestled with the meanings of "upon" 
and "entering." The court stated that: 
A technical approach to the problem necessarily leads to difficulty. 
Viewed in such a light, a person might have to be actually partly in, 
or upon, the car before he could be considered to be entering it. But 
he is covered not only when "in" or "upon", but also while 
"entering." The terms are not synonymous, although sometimes two 
of them may cover the same situation. A person getting in might be 
completely inside the car. In that case, he would be both "entering" 
and "in." On the other hand, he might be partly in and partly out, 
in which case he would be covered by the word "upon", and also 
269. [d. at 124, 85 A.2d at 760. 
270. [d. 
271. [d. 
272. [d. at 125, 85 A.2d at 760. 
273. [d. at 124, 85 A.2d at 760. 
274. [d. at 125, 85 A.2d at 760. 
275. [d. at 122, 85 A.2d at 760. 
276. [d. (quoting policy). 
277. [d. at 127, 85 A.2d at 762. 
278. [d. at 123, 85 A.2d at 760. 
279. [d. at 132, 85 A.2d at 764. 
280. [d. at 125, 85 A.2d at 761. 
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might be covered by the word "entering," or by the word "alight-
ing," depending on which way he was going. 281 The court then ruled 
that Mrs. Blum, who had unlocked the front door with the key and 
was reaching in to unlock the rear door catch, was "upon" as well 
as "entering into" the car. The other women, the court held, were 
all "entering into" the car. 282 
It is clear that the Goodwin court did not consider actual physical 
contact to be determinative.283 Mrs. Kronau, for example, was not 
touching the vehicle at the time of the accident, yet she was still 
covered under the policy. The opinion makes clear that two factors 
are necessary for a person to qualify as an occupant. First, the 
person must be in close proximity to the vehicle. Second, the person 
must intend to use the vehicle as a passenger or a driver. 
The Goodwin approach is consistent with the majority of states 
that have considered the issue. The Goodwin two-factor test is, 
however, essentially a restatement of the "intended use" test em-
ployed by other courtS.284 The "intended use" test, unfortunately, 
can be as inflexible as the "physical contact" test. 28S Since the 
281. [d. at 131, 85 A.2d at 763-64. The court's treatment of "upon" as meaning 
"actually partly in" suggests that the word has a narrow meaning. But see 
infra note 284. 
282. According to the court, the women "had all completed their approach to the 
car, they were not coming up to it with the purpose of entering it, they had 
reached it, and they were actually engaged in the process of getting in." 
Goodwin, 199 Md. at 131, 85 A.2d at 763-64. 
283. In his concurring opinion, Judge Henderson wrote "I accept the court's rather 
broad interpretation of the word 'entering,' as used in the policy, to cover the 
case of Mrs. Kronau, who was certainly not touching the parked automobile 
but had finished her approach to it." [d. at 133-34, 85 A.2d at 765 (Henderson, 
J., concurring). 
284. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bristow, 150 S.E.2d 125 
(Va. 1966). In Bristow, the court held that the plaintiff, who was struck by 
an uninsured vehicle while assisting another driver whose car had stalled, was 
not "occupying" the stalled vehicle because he did not intend to use the stalled 
vehicle as a passenger or driver. At the time of the impact, the plaintiff was 
standing in front of the open hood of the stalled car and had his hands on 
the engine wiring. According to the court, the word "upon" in an occupancy 
provision must be read in relation to the word it defines ("occupying") and 
to the other words in ·the provision ("in," "entering into," and "alighting 
from") in which it is found. As the court stated: 
Within the purposes contemplated here, a person may be said to be 
"upon" a vehicle when he is in a status where he is not actually "in" 
or is not in the act of "entering into or alighting from," the vehicle, 
but whose connection therewith immediately relates to his "occupying" 
it. 
[d. at 128. 
285. See Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 475 A.2d 76,79 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1984) (Petrella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
rev'd, 506 A.2d 728,731 (N.J. 1986) (adopting the dissenting opinion of Judge 
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Goodwin decision nearly forty years ago, a third approach has gained 
considerable acceptance. This approach is broader than the "physical 
contact" and "intended use" tests, and requires only a reasonable 
connection between the putative insured and the vehicle.286 
Courts embracing the "reasonable connection" standard examine 
a variety of factors. The requirement of actual physical contact and 
intended use are the two most important factors, but are not by 
themselves conclusive. Rather, the courts balance the totality of 
circumstances and decide the issue of occupancy on a case-by-case 
basis.287 Given the remedial nature of Maryland's uninsured motorist 
statute, the Maryland courts should not hesitate to adopt the more 
liberal "reasonable connection" test. 288 
C. Clause 3 Insureds 
The third class of insureds under the Maryland Uninsured Mo-
torist Endorsement includes any person who is entitled to recover 
damages because of "bodily injury" to a clause 1 or 2 insured.289 
Clause 3 is specifically designed to bring under coverage those per-
sons, such as a parent or a spouse, who have derivative claims 
because of injuries received by a person who qualified as an insured 
under clause 1 or 2.290 Maryland courts have not had the opportunity 
to consider the scope of clause 3, and there is substantial difference 
over its interpretation in other jurisdictions.291 There is general agree-
ment, however, that clause 3 provides a right of recovery under the 
policy to parents who suffer economic damages because of bodily 
injuries sustained by their minor children, or to a spouse who suffers 
Petrella). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Petrella concluded that the test for 
occupancy should not require "immediate use": 
Many situations could arise where a person might be "upon" the 
vehicle lawfully, although not "immediately" using it or intending to 
use it for transportation, for example, repairing it, lashing baggage 
to the top of the vehicle even though it was not intended to be used 
that particular day or perhaps by that person as means of transpor-
tation. 
Id. at 82. 
286. See 2 No-Fault and Uninsured Automobile Insurance § 24.10(3)(b)(i) (1993). 
287. See id. (noting that courts have also employed several other tests, including 
the reasonable proximity test and the highway-or-vehicle oriented test). 
288. But see Breard v. Haynes, 394 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (La. Ct. App.) ("While the 
public policy is to extend uninsured motorist coverage so far as reasonable, 
nevertheless, we believe that the insurer has the right to require at least a 
'physical relationship' with the insured vehicle. "), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 598 
(La. 1981). 
289. See ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorists Coverage, 
Insuring Agreement. 
290. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.32. 
291. See id. 
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economic damages because of bodily injuries sustained by the other 
spouse. A historical basis exists for this interpretation. The 1956 
Standard Form (predecessor to the 1966 Standard Form) defined 
insured to include "any person, with respect to damages he is entitled 
to recover jor care or loss oj services because of bodily injury to 
which the endorsement applies. "292 
Several courts have extended the scope of clause 3 beyond the 
1956 Standard Form's "care and loss of services" language to include 
non-economic losses. Indeed, one commentator argues that persons 
such as "parents, guardians, executors, and administrators" as well 
as "persons who pay the medical bills of an injured person, or suffer 
damages that result from a wrongful death, are entitled to indem-
nification as 'clause 3' insureds."293 In Maryland, the breadth of 
clause 3 is limited considerably by substantive legal rights. The first 
question that must be addressed in evaluating clause 3 claims is 
whether the clause 3 putative insured is legally entitled to recover 
those damages under the law. 
Under current Maryland law, for instance, a parent is entitled 
to compensation for medical expenses and loss of services incurred 
as a result of injuries sustained by the parent's minor child.294 Such 
a claim falls squarely within clause 3. A loss of consortium claim is 
another claim that would be covered under clause 3. 295 Several 
292. I WIDISS, supra note 19, § 6.1 n.2 (emphasis added). The terms of the 1966 
Standard Form are not as explicit, but should be read in light of the 1956 
Standard Form. [d. n.l. Widiss adds that" [i]n light of both the literal meaning 
of the present 'clause (c)' and the terms of its precursor, it seems clear that 
'clause (c)' means persons such as a parent or spouse are entitled to recover 
for consequential damages including medical expenses or loss of services under 
the uninsured motorist coverage." [d. 
293. [d. § 6.1. 
294. See Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961) (finding infant's 
cause of action for his own personal injuries to be separate and distinct from 
his parent's cause of action for medical expenses and lost services). The 
pecuniary value of these services in modern society is questionable. Cf. Gaver 
v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 32, 557 A.2d 210, 218 (l989) (noting that a minor 
child is entitled to solatium damages under the wrongful death act because 
"the 'pecuniary loss' rule, if strictly applied, could result in no recovery at all 
if the victim was an unproductive member of society, very old or young, or 
disabled"). 
295. A loss of consortium claim is clearly a "derivative" claim in the sense that it 
derives from bodily injury to one spouse. In most jurisdictions, a consortium 
claim falls within the ambit of clause 3. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.20. 
Maryland's theoretical view of a loss of consortium claim as a joint claim 
brought by husband and wife presents a semantic hurdle to coverage. See 
Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 114, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967). The 
joint nature of a loss of consortium claim seemingly excludes the non-physically 
injured spouse from coverage under a strict reading of clause 3 because the 
non-physically injured spouse cannot bring the loss of consortium claim by 
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derivative claims which would come under clause 3 in other jurisdic-
tions, however, are not recognized in Maryland at the present time. 
In Maryland, a minor child would not be able to recover for 
loss of parental society and affection because of non-fatal injuries 
to a parent;296 nor would a parent be able to recover for loss of filial 
relations because of non-fatal injuries to a minor child.297 Arguably, 
a spouse may be entitled to recover for the loss of services resulting 
from bodily injury to a physically injured partner, as well as for the 
value of nursing services that the spouse renders to the physically 
injured partner.298 The law is somewhat uncertain as to whether "loss 
of services" and "nursing service" claims are separate and distinct 
from a loss of consortium claim.299 If such a claim exists separate 
herself. That is, the non-injured spouse is not a person entitled to consortium 
damages because of bodily injuries to her spouse. Nevertheless, a more appro-
priate reading is to allow the consortium claim. The intent of the statute is to 
extend coverage in this manner, and Maryland's view of a loss of consortium 
claim indicates that, even though the claim is a joint action for damage to the 
marital entity, its underlying purpose "is to compensate the individual persons 
who form that relationship for the personal injury which they both sustain." 
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 355, 363 A.2d 955, 965 (1976). 
In contrast, a non-married cohabitant would not be a person entitled to recover 
under a loss of consortium claim. See Gillespie-Linton v. Miles, 58 Md. App. 
484, 495, 473 A.2d 947, 953 (1984). The "per person" limit would apply to 
the physically injured spouse's claim and to the joint loss of consortium claim 
because there is only one bodily injury. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cornelsen, 
272 Md. 48, 51, 321 A.2d 149, 150 (1974); Daley v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 
312 Md. 550, 559, 541 A.2d 632, 636 (1988); see also Pacific Indem. Co. v. 
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 403 n.3, 488 A.2d 486, 496 n.3 
(1985) (discussing single liability limit to bodily injury of child and derivative 
claim of parent). 
296. Gaver, 316 Md. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218 (refusing to recognize the child's right 
to a parental consortium claim, leaving it to the legislature to recognize the 
claim). 
297. See Schatz v. York Steak House, 51 Md. App. 494, 500,444 A.2d 1045, 1048 
(1982). 
298. See Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955) (holding 
that wife could not recover for loss of services, but whether husband could 
recover was not decided). 
299. But see Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133, 165-70, 573 A.2d 853, 868-
71 (1990) (concluding, after lengthy disC\1ssion, that "in this day and age 
'consortium' includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary components which can 
be the subject of loss"), afl'd, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (without 
discussing the consortium issue); see also Note, Maryland Prescribes Joint 
Action for Negligently Caused Loss 0/ Consortium, 27 MD. L. REV. 403, 415 
(1967) ("[TJhe loss of services of a wife or an unemployed husband to the 
marital entity are still recoverable. Damage to the 'service' element of consor-
tium is somewhat easier to quantify than the other elements, since specific 
evidence of the replacement value of the spouse's services can frequently be 
submitted to the court or jury. "). 
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from the loss of consortium, then it falls within clause 3.300 Regardless 
of where the claim falls, the per person, not the per occurrence, 
limit applies. This is true of all clause 3 claims; they are derivative 
claims involving a single bodily injury. 
A more troublesome clause 3 issue is whether a bystander 
recovery action would also give rise to a derivative action under 
clause 3 or to a separate action. The significance is important because 
of the limit of liability clause. In Maryland, a person can recover 
for emotional distress and shock caused by witnessing the injury or 
death of a close relative, if the person seeking recovery is in the zone 
of danger.301 Arguably, a bystander recovery claim is not derivative; 
it is a direct and separate claim for bodily injuries, which would 
invoke the "per occurrence" limits under the policy.302 If this is the 
case, then the bystander bringing a claim must qualify as an insured 
under either clause 1 or clause 2.303 Conceptually, the better view is 
300. A better view is that the loss of services and the value of the nursing care are 
part of the physically injured spouse's claim. See, e.g., Plank v. Summers, 203 
Md. 552, 562, 102 A.2d 262, 267 (1954) (allowing injured party to recover 
value of medical and hospital services furnished gratuitously to the injured 
party); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. f (1977). If the 
loss of services and value of nursing care claims fall within the injured spouse's 
claim, then the deprived spouse is not a person who. is legally entitled to 
recover those damages under Clause 3. 
301. Compare Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933) (allowing 
recovery to father who was in zone of danger) with Resavage v. Davies, 199 
Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (denying recovery to mother who witnessed death 
of her two children from a place of safety). 
302. In Daley v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 312 Md. 550, 559, 541 A.2d 
632, 636 (1988), the court of appeals applied the "per person" limit to parents' 
solatium damage claim arising from the death of their child. The court refused 
to adopt the parents' argument that the "per occurrence" limit should apply 
based on Employers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Foust, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1972) because 
[t]he theory of [bystander] liability upon which Foust is based was 
not alleged against Dyer by the Daleys. Instead, the Daleys pleaded 
a statutorily created claim for solatium damages based on the theory 
that Dyer's negligence had caused the death of their son. The Daleys 
never asserted that Dyer, by his negligence, had breached a duty owed 
to each of the Daleys which proximately caused them emotional 
distress and resulting physical injuries. 
Daley, 312 Md. at 559, 541 A.2d at 636. It is unlikely, however, that the 
bystander suffered a "bodily injury" within the meaning of the policy. The 
emotional trauma, though it may manifest itself in a tangible way, was not a 
bodily injury. But see Loewenthal v. Security Ins. Co., 50 Md. App. 1I2, 436 
A.2d 493 (1981) (holding that a general liability insurance policy with coverage 
for "bodily injury" gave rise to a duty to defend a claim for pain, suffering, 
and mental anguish). 
303. The problem does not arise if the person injured as the direct result of physical 
impact is a clause I insured and the bystander is also a clause I insured (e.g., 
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that a bystander recovery action falls under clause 3 to which the 
"per person" limit would apply. 304 
One of the most difficult clause 3 issues was addressed indirectly 
by the court of appeals in 1991. In Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual 
Insurance Co., 30S the court ruled that the uninsured motorist statute 
required coverage for wrongful death claims. Forbes was a monu-
mental decision because, in 1988, the court of special appeals had 
ruled in Globe American Casualty Co. v. Chung306 that wrongful 
death claims were not covered by the uninsured motorist statute. 
Chung caused considerable unrest in the legal community, and from 
it sprang Forbes and the 1991 amendments to section 541(c)(2).307 
In Chung, Bo Hyun Chung was killed on July 11, 1983, as a 
result of the negligence of Barbara Ann Orejuela, an uninsured 
motorist. At the time of the accident, Chung was insured by Globe 
American Casualty Company. The policy had a $20,000/$40,000 
uninsured motorist bodily injury limit. Chung was survived by his 
wife, four adult children, and one minor child. Chung's widow and 
minor child308 brought a wrongful death action against Orejuela. 
Judgment was entered on June 21, 1984, against Orejuela and in 
favor of Chung's widow and minor child. 309 Chung's widow was 
awarded $250,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 punitive dam-
ages. In addition, Chung's minor child was awarded $100,000 com-
pensatory damages, plus $100,000 punitive damages. 310 Chung'S widow 
and minor child then sought satisfaction of the judgment under the 
uninsured motorist provision of the Globe policy. Globe paid the per 
members of the same household). If, however, the person injured as the direct 
result of physical impact is a clause 2 insured, then the bystander would be 
able to recover only under his own policy, if at all. 
304. The Daley court stated that "[slolatium injuries, as any other consequential 
injuries, are subject to the each person limit." Daley, 312 Md. at 560, 541 
A.2d at 636 (emphasis added). 
305. 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991). 
306. 76 Md. App. 524, 547 A.2d 654 (1988), vacated, 322 Md. 713, 589 A.2d 956 
(1991). 
307. Following the court of special appeals decision in Chung, the court of appeals 
granted certiorari in that case and also granted certiorari in Forbes, and another 
case, Ray v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 322 Md. 751, 589 
A.2d 975 (1991). The court of appeals issued its opinion in Chung on May 
10, 1991, the same day it issued the Forbes opinion. Four days later, the court 
issued the Ray opinion. 
308. The adult children probably had no compensable damages under Maryland's 
Wrongful Death Act. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904(d) 
(1989) (providing that a minor child is entitled to both pecuniary losses and 
solatium damages as a result of the death of a parent). 
309. The opinion lists June 21, 1985, as the date of the judgment, but the chronology 
of events suggests that June 24, 1984, is the correct date. 
310. Chung, 76 Md. App. at 528, 547 A.2d at 655. The award of punitive damages 
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person liability limit under the policy ($20,000), and, on August 21, 
1984, Chung's widow executed a release. 
On April 29, 1985, Chung's adult son, acting as the personal 
representative of Chung's estate, instituted a survival action against 
Globe under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy. Globe 
denied liability on the ground that it had fulfilled its contractual 
obligations by paying the $20,000, and, in fact, had been released 
from any further obligations under the policy. Chung's estate and 
Globe filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 13, 1987, 
the trial court denied Globe's motion for summary judgment and 
granted the estate's motion, ruling that the estate had a valid survival 
claim under the policy. The parties entered into a consent judgment, 
and an appeal was taken. 311 
On appeal, the court of special appeals first considered the scope 
of the language "because of bodily injury," contained in section 
S41(c)(2). It then considered the breadth of the Globe policy's grant-
ing clause.312 Focusing on the policy language that required Globe to 
pay "all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be 
legally entitled to recover as damages," the court considered the 
differences between survival and wrongful death actions.3J3 Posing 
the question as "which type of claim, if not both, is referred to by 
the statutorily required Uninsured Motorist provision of liability 
policies in Maryland,"314 the court decided that 
in the wrongful death action was improper. See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe 
Co., 267 Md. 149, 159-60, 297 A.2d 721, 727. (1972) (overruled on other 
grounds by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992». 
311. Chung, 76 Md. App. at 530-31, 546 A.2d at 657. The parties entered into the 
consent judgment with the understanding that the appeal would follow. [d. 
After the decision by the court of special appeals, the court of appeals granted 
certiorari, then vacated the decision on the ground that an appeal from a 
consent judgment was not appropriate. Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 322 
Md. 713, 716-17, 589 A.2d 956, 957 (1991). 
312. The granting clause required the insurance company 
[t]o pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall 
be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator 
of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily injury or property 
damage, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle .... 
Chung, 76 Md. App. at 532, 547 A.2d at 657 (quoting policy). The court 
however, ignored the definition of bodily injury. See infra note 315 and 
accompanying text. 
313. [d. at 532-41, 547 A.2d at 658-62. The court also rejected the estate's claim 
that the "per occurrence" limits applied to the survival action, citing Daley v. 
United Services Automobile Assoc., 312 Md. 550, 541 A.2d 632 (1988), for 
the proposition that "solatium damages in a wrongful death action ... were 
not bodily injuries independent of the injury to the child." Chung, 76 Md. 
App. at 541, 547 A.2d at 657. 
314. Chung, 76 Md. App. at 541, 547 A.2d at 662. 
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[t]here can be no question but that the reference is to the 
survival claim and not the wrongful death claim. The policy 
provision itself refers to "the insured or his legal represen-
tative." The thing that "the insured or legal representatives" 
is entitled to recover is "damages ... because of bodily 
injury." As the case law has made indisputably clear, sur-
viving relatives in a wrongful death action have no claim 
for the bodily injury of the insured. Theirs is a new action 
based exclusively on death.31S 
The court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding "the clear 
terms of both the controlling statute and the Uninsured Motorist 
provision of the policy itself to limit the coverage to 'the insured or 
his legal representative' for the bodily injuries suffered by the in-
sured. "316 The Chung court's holding, that the uninsured motorist 
statute did not require coverage for wrongful death claims, seriously 
misconstrued the language and intent of the uninsured motorist 
statute. Read as a whole, the uninsured motorist statute indicated 
very clearly an intent to extend coverage to claims arising because 
of the death of an insured.3I7 
The holding in Chung was unfortunate for another reason. In 
considering the breadth of coverage under the Globe policy, the court 
of special appeals failed to consider the entire policy. The policy, a 
modified version of the 1966 Standard Form, used three clauses, (a), 
(b), and (c), to designate the classes of insureds. 318 A clause (c) 
insured was defined as "any person, with respect to damages ... 
entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this insurance 
315. Id. The court found support for its holding in the uninsured motorist statute: 
Any conceivable doubt in this regard is dissipated by reference to 
[section 541], which mandates the Uninsured Motorist coverage. There 
the reference is only to "the insured . . . because of bodily injuries 
sustained." There is no mention made of either legal representatives 
or surviVing relatives. The inclusion of the term "or legal represen-
tatives" in the Uninsured Motorist endorsement itself is nothing more 
than a recognition that a survival action would be available on behalf 
of the injured "insured" provided for by § 541. 
Id. The court also justified its holding by noting the purpose of the uninsured 
motorist statute was to compensate injured motorists, "not to provide a fund 
for the benefit of any person not party to the contract who might have some 
alleged cause of action against an uninsured motorist." Id. (quoting In re 
Estate of Reeck, 488 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ohio 1986) (Holmes, J., dissenting». 
But see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
316. Chung, 76 Md. App. at 532, 547 A.2d at 657. 
317. See Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991) 
(holding that the legislature's intent was for uninsured motorist coverage to be 
broad, and thus include wrongful death claims). 
318. Record Extract at 57, Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 547 
A.2d 654 (1987) (No. 87-1581). 
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applies sustained by an insured under (a) or (b) above."319 Under 
the additional definitions section of the Globe policy, "bodily injury" 
was defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, 
sustained by an insured under (a) or (b) of the Persons Insured 
provision. "320 Under this definition, the claimants in the wrongful 
death action certainly qualified as clause (c) insureds because they 
were persons entitled to recover damages in case of bodily injury, 
which by policy definition included death as sustained by Bo Hyun 
Chung, who was a clause (a) insured.321 
In short, the Chung court not only misread the statute, but it 
misread the policy as well. The court of appeals also fell partially 
into this trap in Forbes when it ignored the language of the policy, 
and concentrated instead on the statute. The Harleysville insurance 
policy defined "covered person" as: 
1. You [the named insured] or any family member. 
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto. 
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to 
recover because of bodily injury to which. this coverage 
applies sustained by a person described in 1 or 2 above. 322 
As in Chung, the wrongful death claimants were clause 3 insureds 
persons legally entitled to recover damages because of bodily 
injury (which by definition included death) to a clause 1 or 2 insured. 
Therefore, the Forbes court could have reached its decision without 
ever considering the statutory requirements. The policy clearly ex-
tended coverage to the wrongful death claimants. Perhaps the Forbes 
court ignored the policy language in order to settle the issue. A 
ruling based solely on the policy language would have generated 
future litigation based on the statutory language. 
The Forbes court also focused on the statute because the attor-
neys for Harleysville argued that the deceased did not qualify as a 
clause 1 or 2 insured. The deceased, Carol Forbes, separated from 
her husband, Robin, on August 4, 1984, and moved into an apart-
ment with Delbert Dean. Three weeks later, on August 27, 1984, 
Robin and Carol Forbes's two minor children, George and Connie, 
319. [d. 
320. [d. (emphasis added). 
321. Similarly, wrongful death claims would be covered by the 1989 Maryland 
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. The 12189 version of the Personal Auto 
Policy defines "bodily injury" in the general definitions' section as "bodily 
injury, sickness or disease, including death." ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, 
Definitions. This definition is applicable to Part C-Uninsured Motorists Cov-
erage and to the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, which supersedes 
Part C. 
322. Forbes, 322 Md. at 703, 589 A.2d at 951. 
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moved into the apartment. On September 22, 1984, Carol Forbes 
was killed and George and Connie were injured in a motor vehicle 
accident while passengers in a vehicle owned and operated by Dean. 
The accident was Dean's fault. He was uninsured. Robin Forbes, 
individually and as parent and next friend of George and Connie, 
sued Dean and Harleysville. The complaint contained five counts. 
The first two counts sought compensatory damages for George and 
Connie for the injuries they sustained. Counts three, four and five 
were wrongful death claims brought by Robin, George and Connie. 
The trial court held that the wrongful death claimants could not 
recover under the Harleysville policy because Carol Forbes was not 
an "insured" under the policy. Robin Forbes, individually and on 
behalf of his children, appealed to the court of special appeals. While 
the appeal was pending, the court of special appeals issued its decision 
in Chung. Robin Forbes petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which 
the court of appeals granted. 
After deciding that the uninsured motorist statute required cov-
erage for wrongful death claims, the court of appeals turned its 
attention to the issue of Carol Forbes's insured status under the 
Harleysville policy. The court noted in passing that a "strong argu-
ment could be made that Carol Forbes was a 'named insured' for 
the purposes of uninsured motorist coverage regardless of the defi-
nitions in the insurance policy. "323 Assuming that she was not a 
"named insured," the court ruled that she qualified as Robin Forbes's 
resident spouse. 324 As an alternative holding, the court ruled that the 
minor children's wrongful death claims were within the mandatory 
uninsured motorist coverage, regardless of Carol Forbes's status as 
an insured under the policy. According to the court 
[i]t is true that certain language in Art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) 
and (3), refers to "death of the insured." . . . [T]his lan-
guage merely reflects the General Assembly's contemplation 
that wrongful death claims are covered by the uninsured 
motorists provisions and that, when an insured is killed in 
a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured tortfeasor, the 
statutory beneficiaries are entitled to wrongful death benefits 
under the mandatory uninsured motorist coverage. We do 
not believe, however, that the language of § 541(c)(l) and 
(3) means that the deceased must always be an "insured" 
under the particular language of the insurance policy. 
The basic coverage language of § 541 (c) is set forth in 
paragraph (2) and requires coverage "for damages which 
the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator 
323. Id. at 702, 589 A.2d at 950. 
324. See id. at 703-08, 589 A.2d at 951-53 (discussing definitions of family). 
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of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries 
[including death] sustained in an accident arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor 
vehicle." The Forbes children's wrongful death claims 
squarely fall within this statutory language even if their 
mother at the time of the accident was not an "insured" 
under the language of Harleysville's policy. The children 
are "insureds" under the Harleysville policy. Under Mary-
land's wrongful death statute, the children are legally enti-
tled to damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle because of the death of their mother sustained 
in an accident arising out of the operation of the uninsured 
vehicle. In fact, a judgment against the owner and operator 
of the uninsured vehicle has been recovered on their behalf. 
The claims of the insured children clearly are embraced by 
the critical coverage language of § S41(c)(2). 
Moreover, the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute 
supports coverage of the children's wrongful death claims 
without regard to Carol Forbes's status under the language 
of the insurance policy .... [T]he purpose of the statutorily 
mandated uninsured motorist coverage is to put the insured 
(including the insured children) in the same position as they 
would have been if the tort feasor had maintained liability 
insurance. If the tort feasor in this case had maintained 
liability insurance, the children's wrongful death claims would 
have been paid up to the limits of that liability coverage. 
Since the tortfeasor failed to have liability insurance, and 
since the children did have uninsured motorist coverage, 
their claims should similarly be covered up to the limits of 
the uninsured motorist insurance.32S 
The Forbes holding that the uninsured motorist statute requires 
coverage for wrongful death claims is unquestionably correct. The 
public responsibility theory underlying Maryland's insurance scheme 
demands coverage for wrongful death claims. The state has a signif-
icant interest in protecting not only those individuals injured by 
uninsured motorists, but also their dependents. 326 The intent of the 
uninsured motorist statute is to provide uninsured motorist benefits 
to all persons who could have recovered tort damages had the 
tortfeasor maintained liability insurance.327 The court's decision that 
325. [d. at 708-10, 589 A.2d at 953-54 (citations omitted). 
326. See supra note 13. 
327. Widiss notes: 
Even if the uninsured motorist statute is not phrased in terms of 
requiring coverage for "bodily injury ... including death resulting 
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Carol Forbes was a resident of Robin Forbes's household is debat-
able, but hardly shocking given the nature of the separation. How-
ever, the court's "alternative holding," that the uninsured motorist 
insurance had to cover the wrongful death claims even if Carol 
Forbes was not an insured under the policy, is questionable in many 
respects. 
In one sense, probing the depths of the "alternative holding" 
of Forbes is unnecessary in light of the amendments to section 
541 (c)(2). In the 1991 legislative session, while Forbes was pending 
before the court of appeals, House Bill 1112 was proposed to amend 
section 541(c)(2). That bill was eventually enacted as Chapter 625 of 
the Laws of 1991, and it became law on July 1, 1991.328 Section 
541(c)(2), as amended, reads: 
In addition to any other coverage required by this 
subtitle, every policy of motor vehicle liability insurance 
issued, sold or delivered in this State after July 1, 1975, 
shall contain coverage in at least the amounts required under 
Title 17 of the Transportation Article, for damages, subject 
to policy limits, which: 
(l) -The insured is entitled to recover from the owner 
or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor vehicle; 
and 
(2) The surviving relatives, as defined in § 3-904 of the 
Courts Article, of the insured are entitled to recover from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because 
of the death of the insured as the result of an accident 
arising out the ownership, maintenance or use of the unin-
sured motor vehicle.329 
therefrQm," recovery should be available to the insured or a legal 
representative if there is a right in that state to recover for wrongful 
death. 
1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 6.2 n.1; see also 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.21 
("Today, the vast weight of authority supports wrongful death recoveries. The 
prevailing theory being that the intent, whether contractual or statutory, is to 
provide insurance which would place the innocent victim and his dependents 
in the same position which they would have been in had the adverse vehicle 
been covered by liability insurance. "). 
328. Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 625, 1991 Md. Laws 3421. 
329. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). 
A wrongful death claim is, nevertheless, subject to the single per person limit, 
not the per occurrence limits, see Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 322 Md. 
713, 717 n.2, 589 A.2d 956, 958 n.2 (1991), and, as a practical matter, many 
survival actions will exhaust the per person policy limit, "leaving little, if any, 
funds available for a derivative claim, such as loss of consortium or wrongful 
death," 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.21. 
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In dear and unmistakable terms, the uninsured motorist statute 
requires coverage for wrongful death claims. In equally clear terms, 
it requires that the deceased be insured under the policy. To this 
extent, then, Chapter 625 invalidates the Forbes "alternative holding" 
as of July 1, 1991. 
Because the Forbes court was construing the pre-1991 version of 
the uninsured motorist statute, however, the "alternative holding" is 
arguably valid in a pre-1991 setting. Whether the court of appeals 
will re-examine its "alternative holding" in light of Chapter 625 
remains to be seen. The legislative history of House Bill 1112 reveals 
the difficult issue the court would face in such a situation. As 
proposed, House Bill 1112 was designed "[f]or the purpose of 
requiring a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance to provide 
coverage for damages which the surviving relatives of the insured are 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle because of the death of the insured. "330 After the first reading, 
the House Committee on Economic Matters changed the purpose 
paragraph to reflect that the bill was "clarifying" that motor vehicle 
policies had to contain such coverage.331 This version was then sent 
to the Senate, which,' earlier in the legislative session, had passed 
Senate Bill 626.332 Similar to House Bill 1112, Senate Bill 626 was 
designed to amend section 541(c) to require coverage for wrongful 
death claims. 
After reviewing House Bill 1112, the Senate Finance Committee 
made two amendments to the bill to conform it to Senate Bill 626. 333 
The first amendment rejected "clarifying" and reinstated "requir-
ing." The second amendment made changes to the wording of the 
bill itself.334 The senate version was then sent to the House, but the 
House refused to accept the amendments. 335 The Senate refused to 
330. MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess. 801-02 (reprinting the purpose clause of H.B. 1112 
and noting the first reading of H.B. 1112 in the House of Delegates on 
February 14, 1991). • 
331. Id. at 1500 (reprinting amendments to H.B. 1112, as adopted by the House of 
Delegates on March 19, 1991). 
332. See MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess., 1469 (noting S.B. 626 read for the third time 
and passed by Senate on March 20, 1991). 
333. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1991 
(1991) (noting that the amendments make H.B. 1112 identical to S.B. 626). 
334. MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess., 1900-01 (reprinting amendments to H.B. 1112 as 
adopted by Senate on March 30, 1991). 
335. MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess., 2288-89 (reprinting Senate amendments to H.B. 
1112 and noting that on April 1, 1991, House of Delegates adopted motion 
not to concur in the Senate Amendments); see also MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess., 
2452-53 (reprinting message from House of Delegates notifying Senate that 
House of Delegates refused to concur in Senate amendments to H.B. 1112, 
and noting the appointment of certain House of Delegates members to con-
ference committee if the Senate elects to form same). 
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recede from its proposal, and the dispute was sent to a conference 
committee. 336 What resulted from the committee was an obvious 
compromise: the Senate's first amendment (to the purpose paragraph) 
was adopted; its second amendment was rejected. 337 House Bill 1112 
was then enacted into law as Chapter 625. The Governor vetoed 
Senate Bill 626 because it became redundant once House Bill 1112 
was signed into law. 338 
Without question, the difference between "clarifying" and "re-
quiring" is significant. If Chapter 625 clarified the original intent of 
the legislators, then the Forbes "alternative holding" is not valid in 
a pre-1991 setting. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the 
Forbes "alternative holding" is valid in a pre-1991 setting, because 
the "requiring" version of the purpose paragraph was adopted. 
House Bill 1112 was proposed because of the decision reached by 
the court of special appeals in Chung. 339 The conflict over "clarify-
ing" or "requiring" occurred before the decision in Forbes. The 
General Assembly focused on the larger issue of mandating uninsured 
motorist insurance to cover wrongful death claims, not on the smaller 
issue of whether the deceased had to be an insured under the policy. 
But, in deciding that the uninsured motorist statute should cover 
wrongful death claims, the General Assembly required that the de-
ceased had to be an insured under the policy. Both the Senate and 
the House agreed on this important point, which should not go 
unnoticed. It is also important to note that the 1991 amendments, 
when read into section 541(c)(2), require every policy of motor vehicle 
liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in Maryland after July 
1, 1975, to contain coverage for wrongful death claims. This is not 
a retroactive piece of legislation, and it could not be.340 Rather it is 
336. See MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess., 2626-28 (reprinting conference committee report 
on H.B. 1112); MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess., 2603-05 (same). 
337. See MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess., 2626-28 (indicating House of Delegates adopted 
conference committee report on H.B. 1112 on April 4, 1991); MD. SENATE J., 
1991 Sess., 2603-05 (indicating Senate adopted conference committee report on 
H.B. 1112 on April 7, 1991). 
338. See 1991 Md. Laws 3903-04 (Governor's veto message for S.B. 626). 
339. See undated Floor Report for House Bill 1112, maintained by the Department 
of Legislative Reference, Annapolis, Maryland. 
340. Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively, see, e.g., Washington Suburban 
Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 560, 
520 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1987), but there is no absolute bar to retrospective 
application. See, e.g., Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607, 471 A.2d 730, 733 
(1984). The presumption for prospective application can be rebutted by a clear 
expression to the contrary in the statute, see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 582, 219 A.2d 820, 824 (1966). Although the 1991 
amendments to section 541(c)(2) can be viewed as containing such a clear 
expression of retroactivity, a retroactive application would probably be uncon-
stitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any ... 
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a clear sign that the General Assembly's 1991 amendment was de-
signed to clarify the original intent, notwithstanding the use of 
"requiring" in the purpose paragraph. This may explain the willing-
ness of the house to compromise: it obviously felt that the debate 
over "clarifying" or "requiring" in the purpose paragraph was 
inconsequential in light of the clear message in the amendment itself. 
IX. PERMITTED EXCLUSIONS 
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute explicitly permits only two 
exclusions from coverage: the "owned-but-uninsured" exclusion and 
the "named-driver" exclusion. 341 No other exclusions are expressly 
permitted. The court of appeals has repeatedly stated that "where 
the Legislature has required specified coverages in a particular cate-
gory of insurance, and has provided for certain exceptions or exclu-
sions to the required coverages, additional exclusions are generally 
not permitted. "342 Despite this principle, the court of special appeals 
has upheld the validity of a third exclusion - the "owned-but-
otherwise-insured" exclusion. 343 
A. The Owned-Bul-Uninsured Exclusion 
Section 541(c)(2)(v)(I) allows insurers to exclude from coverage 
the named insured and his resident relatives "when occupying, or 
struck as a pedestrian by ,an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned 
by the named insured or a member of his immediate family residing 
in his household. "344 From the insurer's standpoint, the exclusion 
limits its potential exposure by preventing the extension of uninsured 
motorist coverage to a second or third vehicle when the insured has 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "); c/. Dryfoos v. Hostetter, 
268 Md. 396, 404, 302 A.2d 28, 32-33 (1973) ("[W]hatever a sovereign power 
may authorize in prospect, it may adopt and validate in retrospect, so long as 
there is no interference with vested rights or contractual obligations .... to); 
accord Hearn, 242 Md. at 582-83, 219 A.2d at 824 (stating statute cannot 
apply retroactively to affect insurer's substantive contractual rights). 
341. See Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987); see also infra parts 
IX. A. (discussing the "owned-but-uninsured" exclusion) and IX. B. (discussing 
the "named driver" exclusion). 
342. Gable v. Colonial Ins. Co., 313 Md. 701, 704, 548 A.2d 135, 137 (1988); see 
also Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 622, 552 A.2d 889, 891 
(1989) (quoting Gable, 313 Md. at 704, 548 A.2d at 137); Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 Md. 131, 141, 550 A.2d 
69, 74 (1988) (quoting Gable, 313 Md. at 704, 548 A.2d at 137). 
343. See infra part IX. C. 
344. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 54l(c)(2)(v)(1) (Supp. 1992); see Provident Gen. 
Ins. v. McBride, 69 Md. App. 497, 518 A.2d 468 (1986) (discussing the owned-
but-uninsured exclusion), cert. denied, 309 Md. 326, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987). 
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paid a premium based on his owning only one vehicle.345 More 
importantly, the exclusion furthers Maryland's comprehensive insur-
ance scheme by encouraging "the owner of an uninsured motor 
vehicle to become insured by imposing upon him the penalty of 
exclusion from coverage for failure to obtain insurance. "346 
Bringing resident relatives within the exclusion is a fairly recent 
legislative invention. Originally, the uninsured motorist statute did 
not contain an express owned-but-uninsured exclusion.347 The section 
merely provided that the coverage could not be less than that afforded 
a qualified person under section 243H. Section 243H(a)(1)(i) provided 
a specific exclusion only when the injured insured was occupying a 
vehicle he owned. This exclusion did not extend to resident relatives 
occupying the uninsured vehicle because the purpose of encouraging 
financial responsibility was "not furthered by penalizing other insured 
persons who cannot obtain insurance for uninsured motor vehicles 
which they do not own. "348 The owned-but-uninsured exclusion in 
section S41(c)(2) was broadened by the legislature in 1982 to include 
resident relatives. 349 Extending the ambit of the owned~but-uninsured 
exclusion to resident relatives recognizes that the insurer has a sig-
nificant interest in being able to assess risks and determine premiums 
in accordance with the risks. In this sense, the -exclusion balances 
the public policy that victims should be entitled to recover uninsured 
motorist benefits with the interests of the insurer. 350 
345. See Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 98, 107, 585 
A.2d 286, 290 (1991); see also 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 4.42(1). 
346. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154, 416 
A.2d 734, 736 (1980). See Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund v. Hamilton, 
256 Md. 56, 60, 259 A.2d 303, 305 (1969), wherein the court stated as follows: 
[d. 
The legislature apparently concluded that if this irresponsible group 
were excluded from coverage, its members and future potential mem-
bers might be induced to become insured so that they might qualify 
for coverage. If this legislative optimism proved sound, the number 
of uninsured vehicles - the evil that produced the statute - would be 
lessened. 
347. See generally Gartelman, 288 Md. at 151, 416 A.2d at 734 (discussing the 
owned-but-uninsured exclusion without the resident relative extension). 
348. [d. at 154, 416 A.2d at 739. 
349. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 573, 1981 Md. Laws 2321. 
350. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement incorporates the owned-but-
uninsured exclusion in two ways. First, it specifically states that the insurer 
does not provide uninsured motorist coverage for any clause 1 insured while 
"while 'occupying' or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by such person 
which is not insured for this coverage under this policy." ISO Form PP 04 59 
12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Exclusions A. 1. Second, the 
endorsement's definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" states that an uninsured 
motor vehicle does not include "any vehicle or equipment owned by or 
furnished or available for regular use of the named insured or a member of 
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B. The Named Driver Exclusion 
Section S41(c)(2)(v)(2) allows insurers to exclude coverage for 
"[t]he named insured, members of his family residing in the house-
hold, and all other persons having other applicable automobile in-
surance and occupying, or struck as a pedestrian by, the insured 
motor vehicle operated or used by a person excluded from coverage 
under section 240C-l of this article."351 Section 240C-l(a)(1) allows 
an insurer to exclude nearly all coverage when a vehicle is operated 
by a named excluded driver. 352 Under this section, the named driver 
is excluded from liability, collision, personal injury protection and 
uninsured motorist coverage. Additionally, the owner of the vehicle, 
the owner's family members, and the named excluded driver's family 
members are also excluded from that same coverage when a covered 
vehicle is operated by a named excluded driver. Non-resident relative 
passengers, however, are excluded from personal injury protection 
and uninsured motorist coverage only if such coverage is available 
under another motor vehicle insurance policy. 353 The named driver 
exclusion, like the owned-but-uninsured exclusion, balances the in-
surer's interests with the public policy of affording uninsured motorist 
benefits to those injured by the negligence of others.354 Making 
his household." [d. The validity of excluding coverage when the insured is 
operating a vehicle furnished or available for his regular use is questionable. 
In Provident General Insurance Co. v. McBride, 69 Md. App. 497, 518 A.2d 
468 (1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 326, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987), the court of 
special appeals upheld the "owned by a named insured" portion of the 
provision, but did not address whether the insured who is using an uninsured 
motor vehicle "furnished or available for ... regular use" but not owned by 
him or a family member may be excluded from coverage. [d. at 504, 518 A.2d 
at 472. 
351. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(v)(2) (1991). 
352. [d. § 240C-l(a)(I) (1991). 
353. The Maryland Insurance Code, § 240C-l(a)(l) states as follows: 
The policy may be endorsed to specifically exclude all coverage for 
any of the following when the named excluded driver is operating the 
motor vehicle(s) covered under the policy whether or not that operation 
or use was with the express or implied permission of a person insured 
under the policy: 
(i) The excluded operator or user; 
(ii) The vehicle owner; 
(iii) Family members residing in the household of the excluded operator 
or user or vehicle owner; and 
(iv) Any other person, except for the coverage required by sections 
539 and 541(c)(2) of this article if such coverage is not available under 
any other automobile policy. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 240C-l(a)(1) (1991). 
354. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 305 Md. 614, 505 A.2d 1338 (1986). 
For a recent case treating the named driver exclusion, see Sykes v. Nationwide 
Insurance Co., 327 Md. 261, 608 A.2d 1242 (1992). 
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uninsured motorist benefits available to certain passengers who lack 
personal uninsured motorist coverage comports with the statute's 
purpose of protecting persons from economic harm caused by un-
insured motorists and concomitantly recognizes the insurer's under-
writing concerns. 3SS 
C. The Owned-But-Otherwise-Insured Exclusion 
The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement contains an 
express "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion.3s6 Other policies 
contain an implicit "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion: the 
definitions in the policy, when read together with the coverage grant, 
act as an exclusion.3S7 The "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion 
should not be confused with the "owned-but-uninsured" exclusion.3S8 
The "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion excludes coverage when 
an insured is injured while an operator or passenger in a vehicle that 
is owned by him or a family member but insured by another motor 
vehicle insurer. 
In Powell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,m 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld an express "owned-
but-otherwise-insured" exclusion. Kenneth Powell was injured by an 
uninsured motorist while driving his wife's car, a Nissan insured by 
State Farm. The State Farm policy covering the Nissan had $20,0001 
$40,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. At the same time, State 
Farm insured a motor vehicle owned by Kenneth Powell under a 
355. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 305 Md. 614, 505 A.2d 1338 (1986). 
356. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement states that the insurer does 
not provide uninsured motorist coverage for any clause 1 insured "while 
'occupying' or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by such person which 
is not insured for this coverage under this policy." ISO Form PP 04 59 12 
89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Exclusions A. 1. 
357. One policy currently used in Maryland incorporates the "owned-but-otherwise-
insured" exclusion through the definition of "bodily injury" and "insured 
auto." The coverage grant provides: "We will pay damages for bodily injury 
and property damage caused by an accident which the insured is legally entitled 
to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that vehicle." GEICO, Family 
Automobile Insurance Policy, Section IV - LOSSES WE PAY at 32. "Bodily 
injury" is defined as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, 
sustained by you, your relatives or any other person occupying an insured auto 
with your consent." [d. Section IV-DEFINITIONS 4(c) at 30. An insured 
vehicle includes an auto operated by the named insured, see id., but excludes 
"an auto owned by or furnished for the regular use of an insured." [d. Section 
IV -DEFINITIONS 4(c)(iii) at 30. 
358. See generally supra part IX. A. (discussing the "owned-but-uninsured" exclu-
sion). 
359. 86 Md. App. 98, 585 A.2d 286 (1991). 
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different policy.360 The State Farm policy covering Kenneth Powell's 
automobile had $100,000/$300,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. 
That policy contained the following exclusion: 
"THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 
2. FOR BODILY INJURY TO YOU . .. WHILE OCCU-
PYING ... A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, 
YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE, and which is not 
insured under the liability coverage of this policy.' '361 
Powell sought uninsured motorist benefits from both the State Farm 
policy covering the Nissan and the State Farm policy covering his 
vehicle. The trial court held that he was limited to the $20,0001 
$40,000 limit under the policy covering the Nissan. 
The court of special appeals affirmed. First, the court found 
that the exclusion was consistent with the uninsured motorist statute. 
"To permit such an exclusion will encourage families to obtain 
coverage for all of their vehicles and thus maximize compliance with 
the purpose of the statute. "362 In contrast, the court found that 
Powell's position would lead to an absurd (and undesirable) result: 
To hold as appellant also urges, i.e., that his wife's vehicle 
was not uninsured because it was covered under another 
policy, would be to permit an owner to buy excess coverage 
under one policy for one vehicle at a relatively small pre-
mium and coverage under a separate policy for his other 
vehicles at a lesser cost, and have the excess coverage of 
the first policy apply to the vehicles covered under the 
subsequent policies. 363 . 
As an alternative holding, the court reasoned that even if the exclu-
sion was invalid, the result would not change: "If the policy exclusion 
at issue were to be determined to be in conflict with the statute, it 
would only be in conflict as to the minimum required coverage, i.e., 
$20,000/$40,000. As to any excess coverage it would be a valid 
exclusion. "364 
360. Evidently. the Powells were newlyweds and had not coordinated the insurance 
on the two vehicles. [d. at 109, 585 A.2d at 291. 
361. [d. at 100, 585 A.2d at 287 (quoting policy) (alterations in Powell). 
362. [d. at 108, 585 A.2d at 291. 
363. [d. at 110, 585 A.2d at 291 (footnote omitted). 
364. [d. at 113, 585 A.2d at 293. Powell is questionable on several grounds. 
Numerous states, perhaps the majority, have ruled that the "owned-but-other-
insured" exclusion is invalid unless the applicable uninsured motorist statute 
expressly permits it. See, e.g., Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 697 P .2d 684 (Ariz. 
1985); Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., 449 A.2d 157 (Conn. 1982). Maryland's 
uninsured motorist statute does not expressly permit the exclusion. 
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x. STACKING 
Of all the uninsured motorist issues that have been addressed 
by Maryland courts, the issue of "stacking" of coverage has gener-
ated perhaps the most confusion. 365 Stacking in essence enables a 
claimant to recover a higher amount for one vehicle when it is 
insured on a policy covering multiple vehicles so as to obtain maxi-
mum amount payable for all vehicles. Certain judicial habits in the 
drafting of opinions have contributed to the confusion. 366 The dif-
ference between intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking,367 and the fact 
that several of the stacking cases have involved both intra policy and 
interpolicy issues, has compounded the problem. Finally, section 
541(c)(l)'s definition of uninsured motor vehicle as including an 
under insured motor vehicle has certainly fueled the controversy by 
indicating that underinsured vehicles are the same as uninsured 
vehicles.368 
Reconciling the Maryland stacking cases is difficult, if not im-
possible. 369 While many of the cases can be understood only in 
365. Section 543(a) of the Maryland Insurance Code prevents a person from recov-
ering uninsured motorist or personal injury protection benefits "from more 
than one motor vehicle liability policy or insurer on either a duplicative or 
supplemental basis." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(a) (1991); see Travelers 
Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976) (discussing stacking 
of personal injury protection benefits). 
366. Opinions that lack reference to the pertinent statutory and policy provisions 
are certainly troublesome guides. Moreover, courts sometimes view the stacking 
issue as being only a matter of statutory construction and have not considered 
the insurance contract provisions. Other courts have taken the opposite ap-
proach, and still others have mixed the two inquiries (what does the statute 
require and what does the policy provide) into one inquiry. 
367. Intrapolicy stacking involves aggregating the coverages within a single policy. 
Interpolicy stacking involves aggregating the coverages from two or more 
policies. 
368. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
369. In Hoffman v. United Services Automobile' Assoc., 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 
1320 (1987), the court of appeals struggled to reconcile Travelers Insurance· 
Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976), Yarmuth v. Government 
Employees Insurance Co., 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979), and Rafferty v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., 303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290 (1985), and admitted that 
"[w]hile there is language in those opinions which may seem to support USAA's 
position [that interpolicy stacking is prohibited], it was written in a different 
context." Hoffman, 309 Md. at 177, 522 A.2d at 1324-25. The court then 
explained that "the language of § 543(a) supports a construction of the section 
whereby an additional recovery under the required minimum uninsured motorist 
coverage of a second policy is precluded, but a recovery under the optional 
excess underinsured motorist coverage of a second policy is not precluded." 
[d. (emphasis added). 
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relationship to the statute in effect at the time of the accident, or 
because of particular policy language, a few of them cannot be 
reconciled on either basis. Reconciliation is also not possible merely 
on the basis that the 1981 amendments changed the nature of 
uninsured motorist coverage. If the cases are to be reconciled at all, 
it must be done on the basis that the courts' treatment of the issue 
of stacking evolved in conjunction with the shift in public policy 
brought about by the 1981 amendments. 
The issue of stacking uninsured motorist coverages first appeared 
in dicta in a case concerning the stacking of liability coverages. In 
Oarr v. Government Employees Insurance Co. ,370 Charlene Daugherty 
was involved in an accident with Judith Oarr. Daugherty was insured 
by Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) under a 
policy that provided $20,000/$40,000 liability coverage. Two vehicles 
were listed on the policy. Daugherty was driving one of them. Oarr 
sued Daugherty, and a consent judgment of $40,000 was entered 
against Daugherty. GEICO paid $20,000 to Oarr, but then Oarr filed 
a declaratory judgment action against GEICO, alleging that GEICO 
was liable for the other $20,000 because of an ambiguity in the 
policy.371 Oarr also contended that since Daugherty had paid two 
separate premiums for the two vehicles, the liability coverages should 
stack. 
The court quickly disposed of Oarr's second argument, noting 
that Maryland law did not require stacking. Without such a require-
ment, the court held that the terms of the policy would control, and 
that stacking would be allowed only if "the policy provides for it, 
not because the law requires it."372 The court then turned its attention 
to the GEICO policy language. 373 
370. 39 Md. App. 122, 383 A.2d 1112 (1978). 
371. [d. at 124, 383 A.2d at 1113. Two issues were presented to the court: whether 
the policy was ambiguous, and whether stacking should be allowed because 
the insured had paid separate premiums for two separate vehicles. In response 
to the second question, the court noted that 
[tlhe second issue, as framed, may be disposed of rather quickly. We 
are aware of no provision of Maryland law, nor any regulation of 
the Insurance Commissioner, that would require a policy insuring 
more than one vehicle to provide for the "stacking" of liability 
coverage. In the absence of such a supervening requirement, therefore, 
the terms of the policy will control. Thus, if there is to be "stacking", 
it will be because the policy provides for it, not because the law 
requires it. 
[d. at 124, 383 A.2d at 1113-14 (footnote omitted). 
372. [d. at 124, 383 A.2d at 1114. 
373. The court stated that "[tlo determine whether Ms. Oarr is entitled to recover 
the other $20,000 from GEICO, we must therefore look solely to the insurance 
policy to see what limit of liability has been expressed therein. Consequently, 
the second issue will be treated as part of the first." [d. at 124, 383 A.2d at 
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Relying on cases that permitted stacking of uninsured motorist 
benefits, Oarr contended that the GEl CO policy was ambiguous 
because there was a contradiction between the limit of liability 
provision and the policy's separability clause. 374 Although the limit 
of liability provision clearly indicated that the insurer's liability was 
limited to $20,000 per person,375 the separability clause arguably 
allowed the stacking of the $20,000 per person liability coverage for 
each insured automobile, giving a total protection of $40,000 per 
person.376 In Oarr's view, this created an ambiguity that should have 
been construed against the insurer. The court disagreed, and distin-
guished the uninsured motorist stacking cases relied on by Oarr: 
It is not necessary for us to determine whether we would 
follow this line of reasoning with respect to the "stacking" 
of medical payment and uninsured motorist coverages, and 
we expressly decline to make such a determination. That 
issue is not before us in this case. Suffice it to say that 
there is a clear and decisive distinction between [medical 
payment and uninsured motorist] coverages, on the one 
hand, and the liability coverage at issue here, on the other, 
which makes the rationale underlying the "stacking" of the 
former, even if we were to adopt it, inapplicable to the 
latter. 377 
In the court's view, liability coverage was automobile based. In 
contrast, uninsured motorist coverage was person based. 378 The court 
1114. The Oa" court's statement that the "second issue shall be treated as 
part of the first" may have created confusion over the analytical approach a 
court must take in determining the stacking issue in an uninsured motorist 
context. What the Oarr court meant was that the second issue would be 
answered by a review of the policy because there was no statute permitting or 
prohibiting stacking. 
374. [d. at 125-26, 383 A.2d at 1114. 
375. The provision stated as follows: 
Regardless of the number of automobiles or trailers to which this 
policy applies, the limit of bodily injury liability stated in the decla-
rations as applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the company's 
liability for all damages, including damages for care and loss of 
services, arising out of the bodily injury sustained by one person as 
the result of anyone occurrence. 
[d. at 126, 383 A.2d at 1114 (quoting policy). 
376. The separability clause stated that "[w)hen two or more automobiles are insured 
hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each." [d. (quoting 
policy). Garr argued that this provision provided Daugherty with $40,0001 
$80,000 worth of liability coverage, not $20,000/$40,000. [d. at 126-27, 383 
A.2d at 1115. 
377. [d. at 129, 383 A.2d at 1116. 
378. The court noted that 
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therefore held that the separability clause did not allow stacking of 
liability coverage. Moreover, since the insurer had clearly indicated 
that its liability was limited to the amount in the declaration regardless 
of the number of automobiles to which the policy applied, the court 
held that the policy was not ambiguous.379 
Seven months after Oarr, the court of special appeals once again 
had the opportunity to consider stacking of uninsured motorist 
coverage in Langston v. Allstate Insurance CO. 380 The Langston court 
was obviously influenced by the Oarr court's treatment of intrapolicy 
stacking.381 In Langston, Lawrence Langston was injured as a result 
of the collision between an uninsured motorist and a motorcycle on 
which he was a passenger. The motorcycle was insured by a Universal 
Underwriters Insurance Company policy that provided $15,000 in 
uninsured motorist insurance.382 Langston recovered the $15,000, then 
[u]nlike the medical payment and uninsured motorist coverages, this 
undertaking [liability coverage for owned vehicles] is directly related 
to and requires the involvement of, one of the vehicles specifically 
mentioned in the policy ... for which a specific premium is charged. 
Both the coverage and the premiums charged for it are therefore 
attributable to those described vehicles. This coverage is automobile, 
rather than person, based. It is clearly insurance on the vehicle and 
is not in the nature of a personal accident policy. 
[d. at 130, 383 A.2d at 1117. 
379. The court noted the following: 
In this policy ... the insurer has made a special effort to make clear 
that the limit of its liability is as stated in the declarations. The "limit 
of liability" clause states that regardless of the number of automobiles 
to which the policy applies, the limit is as so stated. No clearer 
expression of intent is needed. 
[d. at 130, 383 A.2d at 1118 (footnote omitted). 
380. 40 Md. App. 414, 392 A.2d 561 (1978). 
381. The Langston court noted that 
Judge Wilner, writing for this Court in Oarr v. Government Employees 
Ins. Co., "expressly" declined to consider the issue put to us in this 
appeal. Judge Wilner did, however, refer in [note] 9 to a number of 
cases, including those cited in the present opinion, that permitted 
"stacking. " 
[d. at 428 n.8, 392 A.2d at 569 n.8 (citation omitted). 
382. The procedural history of the case is complicated. Lawrence Langston, a 
Maryland resident, was injured in the accident while attending school in Florida. 
Langston recovered the $15,000, then brought an arbitration proceeding against 
Allstate in Florida pursuant to the terms of the policy. Meanwhile, Allstate 
brought a declaratory judgment action in Maryland. Allstate then sought to 
stay the arbitration proceeding by filing a complaint for injunction and a 
motion of temporary stay. Langston filed a counterclaim, and opposed the 
motion to stay. The court denied the motion to stay and the arbitration hearing 
was held. The arbiters made an award of $40,000 subject to a judicial 
determination of the amount of the applicable policy limits. 
Langston contended that he was entitled to $40,000; Allstate contended 
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sought to recover under a policy issued by Allstate to his mother. 
The Allstate policy insured two vehicles, with an uninsured motorist 
limit for each vehicle of $20,000 per person, $40,000 per accident. 
The mother's policy also contained a limit of liability clause. 
On appeal, Allstate argued that section 543(a) prohibited inter-
policy "stacking or pyramiding" of coverages.383 The court avoided 
the question, however, stating, "£w]e shall not answer that question 
because as we see it neither 'stacking nor pyramiding' is involved. "384 
In refusing to address the principal question, the court first noted 
that section 543(a) did not apply to intrapolicy stacking, only to 
interpolicy stacking.38s Second, the court observed that in actuality 
Langston was neither seeking to stack nor to pyramid his recovery, 
defining both of those terms as "the recovering by a claimant 'several 
times over for his injuries. "386 Noting that section 543(a) forbids 
"duplication of benefits" or recovery on a "supplemental basis," 
the court defined duplication of benefits as "payment in full twice 
or more for the same claim" and recovery on a supplemental basis 
as "securing remuneration over and above the recovery from an 
uninsured motorist of all that the claimant is legally entitled to 
recover. "381 
Recognizing that Langston's personal injuries and damages far 
exceeded the $40,000 he maintained Allstate owed him under the 
policy, the court concluded that he was neither trying to duplicate 
nor supplement his recovery. Rather, he was trying only to recover 
that he was entitled to $5,000 - the difference between the $15,000_ received 
from Universal Underwriters and the $20,000 per person liability limit of the 
Allstate policy. Langston then moved for summary judgment in Florida. At 
the same time, Allsiate moved for summary judgment in Maryland. The Florida 
court granted Langston's motion, and Allstate _appealed. The Maryland court 
granted Allstate's motion and Langston appealed. The Florida appellate court 
reversed the trial court's decision, deciding that Allstate's filing the declaratory 
judgment action in Maryland divested Florida of jurisdiction to determine the 
issue. Id. at 419-20, 392 A.2d at 562-65; see also Allstate v. Langston, 358 
So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1978) (discussing the Florida appeal). 
383. Langston, 40 Md. App. at 428, 392 A.2d at 569. 
384. Id. 
385. The court noted the following: 
Id. 
Allstate fails to note that this section only applies when there is "more 
than one motor vehicle liability policy or insurer .... " (Emphasis 
supplied.) Since there is only one motor vehicle liability policy covering 
the Langston vehicles and since Allstate is the only insurer from whom 
recovery is sought under section 541 of Article 48A, Section 543(a) 
of that article is not apposite to the present case. 
386. Id. at 429, 392 A.2d at 569 (citing WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST 
COVERAGE (1969». 
387. Id. at 429-30, 392 A.2d at 569-70. 
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his full loss and was not trying to make a profit by recovering more 
than the total loss. 
Having decided that section 543(a) did not prevent Langston 
from aggregating coverages within the policy. the court concluded 
that "in Maryland the payment of a premium for uninsured motorist 
insurance on each of two or more separate motor vehicles permits 
recovery on each. but only to the extent of one full recovery for any 
loss sustained by the insured." 388 The court based its decision largely 
on the insured's reasonable expectations. In the court's view. the 
insured paid a double premium for the uninsured motorist coverage 
and reasonably expected that he would obtain double coverage.389 
Given the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute and the 
extent of Langston's injuries. the court felt compelled to allow 
Langston to recover from Allstate. 
The court also ruled that Langston was entitled to recover the 
full $40.000 from Allstate. and that Allstate was not entitled to offset 
the $40.000 with the $15.000 paid by Universal Underwriters. 390 In 
so doing. the court specifically rejected the application of Allstate's 
"other insurance" clause.391 resting its decision on McKoy v. Aetna 
388. [d. at 436, 392 A.2d at 573. 
389. The Langston court quoted at length from Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance 
Co., 457 P.2d 34 (Kan. 1969). In Sturdy, the insured paid a separate premium 
on each of his two cars. While operating one vehicle, he sustained injuries as 
a result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist. The policy provided 
$10,000/$20,000 for each vehicle and contained a separability provision identical 
to the one in the Allstate policy insuring Langston. The Sturdy court noted 
that if the insurer had intended 
to restrict the limit of liability to $10,000 in one policy where more 
than one automobile is covered, this could have been very easily 
accomplished in plain, unmistakable language .... We are accus-
tomed to purchasing insurance which follows the person in units or 
multiples, with the premium fIxed by the insurer accordingly .... 
When we pay a double premium we expect double coverage. This is 
certainly not unreasonable but, to the contrary, is in accord with 
general principles oj indemnity that amounts oj premiums are based 
on amounts oj liability. 
Langston, 40 Md. App. at 433-34, 392 A.2d at 571-72 (quoting Sturdy, 457 
P.2d at 41-42) (emphasis added in Langston). 
390. Langston, 40 Md. App. at 425, 392 A.2d at 567. 
391. The Allstate policy's "other insurance" clause provided as follows: 
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an 
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under this 
coverage shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar 
insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile 
as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the 
amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the 
applicable limit of liability of such other insurance. 
[d. at 426, 392 A.2d at 568 (quoting policy). 
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Casualty & Surety CO.392 In McKoy, because of an ambiguity between 
the limit of liability provision and the granting clause in the injured 
insured's policy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland allowed an 
injured insured to collect $20,000 in uninsured motorist coverage 
when the tort feasor had $10,000 in liability coverage. McKoy, like 
Langston, was an attempt by the court to provide a full recovery to 
a seriously injured insured. The Langston court went further than 
the McKoy court, however, by implying that public policy supported 
a full recovery by Langston. 393 
The Langston court's interpretation of section S43(a) was quickly 
disapproved by the court of appeals in Yarmuth v. Government 
Employees Insurance CO. 394 Yarmuth did not overrule Langston . 
. Indeed, although Langston has been disapproved by the court of 
appeals on at least three occasions,39S it has not been expressly 
overruled. 396 The dissatisfaction arising from Langston comes not 
from its decision that intrapolicy stacking is allowed,397 but from 
dicta that has been used by others to support the premise that 
interpolicy stacking of minimum required coverage is allowed. 
The dispute in Yarmuth arose out of a collision between a 
tractor trailer operated by Fred Kile, an uninsured motorist, and an 
automobile driven by Albert Starr. The collision resulted in the deaths 
of Starr, his wife, and their son. A daughter, Hillary, survived. The 
392. 281 Md. 26, 374 A.2d 1170 (1977). 
393. The Langston court stated as follows: 
Some courts have held that the "other insurance" clause of motor 
vehicle liability policies was generally valid and not repugnant to the 
statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage. They have taken the 
view that "the statute was not designed to provide the insured with 
greater insurance protection than would have been available had the 
insured been injured by a person having a policy containing the 
minimum required statutory limits." The decisions adopting the "other 
insurance" clause reasoning are in conflict with [McKoy v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 281 Md. 26, 374 A.2d 1170 (1977)], wherein 
the court of appeals implicitly rejected that approach and refused to 
follow the view that the "other insurance" clause limited the insured's 
right of recovery to the amount he could obtain from the uninsured 
motorist. 
Langston, 40 Md. App. at 431, 392 A.2d at 570 (citations omitted). 
394. 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979). 
395. Howell v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 305 Md. 435, 438-39, 505 A.2d 109, 111 
(1986); Rafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 303 Md. 63, 72, 492 A.2d 290, 295 (1985); 
Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256,265 n.3, 407 A.2d 
315, 319 n.3 (1979). 
396. The Rafferty court expressly declined to overrule Langston. Rafferty, 303 Md. 
at 72, 492 A.2d at 295. 
397. But see Hoffman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 309 Md. 167, 183, 522 A.2d 
1320, 1327-28 (1987) (rejecting the "pay double premiums, expect double 
coverage" reasoning in Langston). 
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automobile operated by Starr was owned and insured by his employer, 
Motorola, Inc. Zurich Group Insurance Companies issued a policy 
covering this vehicle which provided uninsured motorist benefits of 
$20,000/$40,000. At the time of the accident, Starr owned a Mary-
land-registered 1971 Dodge automobile which was insured under a 
policy issued by GEICO. This policy also provided uninsured motorist 
benefits of $20,000/$40,000.398 
Zurich paid its $40,000 to the claimants,399 who then sought an 
additional $40,000 in uninsured motorist benefits under the GEICO 
policy insuring Starr's 1971 Dodge. GEICO argued that section 543(a) 
barred recovery. The claimants, in turn, contended that the prohi-
bition against duplicative or supplemental recovery of uninsured 
motorist benefits in section 543(a) did not bar their interpolicy claim 
and should allow them to recover under the GEICO policy since they 
did not seek more than full indemnification for their injuries. They 
relied on the Langston court's interpretation of "supplemental."400 
The Yarmuth court disagreed with both the claimants' argument 
and the Langston definition of "supplemental." After defining sup-
plemental as an attempt "to fill the deficiencies in the uninsured 
motorist coverage of the primary policy by claiming under a second 
policy, "401 the court then addressed the claimants' interpretation of 
section 543(a). The court concluded that 
[this interpretation] would result in an unwarranted judicial 
enactment of an amount of uninsured motorist coverage 
that is greater than the minimum statutory limits as specified 
by the General Assembly. This would give a victim of an 
uninsured motorist greater insurance protection than would 
be available if he had been injured by an insured motorist 
having only the minimum required liability insurance.402 
In a footnote, the court of appeals stated that its conclusion "makes 
evident our disagreement with a contrary construction placed upon 
section 543(a) in dicta by the court of special appeals in [Langs-
ton]."403 
398. Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 258-59, 407 A.2d at 316. 
399. The claimants consisted of the personal representatives of the decedents' estates 
and the guardians of Hillary Starr. 
400. See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text. 
401. Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 264, 407 A.2d at 319. The Yarmuth court agreed with 
the Langston court's definition of "duplicative." [d. 
402. [d. at 265, 407 A.2d at 319 (footnote omitted). 
403. [d. at 265 n.3, 407 A.2d at 319 n.3. The Yarmuth court also indicated that 
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976), was 
apparently not brought to the attention of the Langston court. Yarmuth, 286 
Md. at 265 n.3, 407 A.2d at 319 n.3. 
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In rejecting the claimants' position, the Yarmuth court gave 
effect to GEICO's "other insurance" provision, which was· similar 
to the excess provision in the Allstate policy that insured Langston.404 
Relying on a case that had interpreted section S43(a) in connection 
with a personal injury protection claim,40s the court held that GEI-
CO's "other insurance" provision was consistent with the uninsured 
motorist statute.406 In the court's view, "other insurance" clauses in 
the uninsured motorist context were valid as long as they neither 
reduced the injured insured's total recovery below the statutory 
minimum nor violated the public policy established by section S43(a).407 
Yarmuth's treatment of stacking should be understood in light 
of the uninsured motorist statute then in effect. At that time, the 
statute did not allow for underinsured motorist coverage. The court's 
holding that interpolicy stacking of uninsured motorist benefits was 
404. The provision stated as follows: 
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a motor 
vehicle not owned by the named insured, the insurance under this 
amendment shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar 
insurance available to such automobile as primary insurance, and this 
insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of 
liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability for 
such other insurance. 
Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 260, 407 A.2d at 317. 
405. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976). 
406. Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 264-65, 407 A.2d at 319. 
407. [d. at 265,407 A.2d at 319. There are three general types of "other insurance" 
clauses: (I) the escape clause; (2) the excess clause; and (3) the pro-rata clause. 
See Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Ins. Co. of Pa., 244 Md. 392, 223 
A.2d 594 (1966). For a general discussion of coordination of "other insurance" 
clauses in liability policies, see Continental Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 71 Md. App. 148, 524 A.2d HO, cert. denied, 310 
Md. 491, 530 A.2d 273 (1987). The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
contains an anti-stacking provision, an excess-escape clause, and a pro-rata 
clause: 
If there is other applicable similar insurance available under more 
than one policy or provision of coverage: 
l. Any recovery for damages for "bodily injury" sustained by 
an "insured" may equal but not exceed the higher of the 
applicable limit for anyone vehicle under this insurance or 
any other insurance. 
2. Any insurance we prOVide with resp~ct to a vehicle you do 
not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance 
but only to the extent that the limit of liability under this 
policy exceeds the limit of such other collectible insurance. 
3. We will pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the 
. proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits. 
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Other 
Insurance. 
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not allowed if the insured had collected the statutory minimum was 
consistent with the statutory purpose of placing the injured insured 
in the same position as if the uninsured tort feasor maintained the 
minimum amounts of coverage mandated by the financial responsi-
bility provisions section of the transportation code.408 Under the pre-
1981 statute, if the policy which provided secondary coverage had 
the same limits as the policy which provided primary coverage, then 
the injured insured was prohibited by section 543(a) from recovering 
under the secondary policy. If the primary policy's uninsured motorist 
limits were less than the required minimum, then the injured insured 
was able to look to a second policy providing the required minimum 
to make up the difference between the first policy's limits and the 
second policy's limits.409 The insured, however, was not able to 
recover more than the statutory minimum even if the secondary 
policy provi<;led additional coverage.410 This situation was rectified by 
the 1981 amendments. However, the change in the statute's basic 
design resulting from the 1981 amendments was ignored in the next 
stacking case. 
. In Rafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,411 Maureen Rafferty and 
two other women were killed in a January 9, 1982, automobile 
accident with an uninsured motorist. Rafferty was a passenger in an 
automobile driven by Laura Berg and insured by State Farm under 
a policy that provided uninsured motorist insurance of $50,0001 
$100,000. At the time, Rafferty was insured by Allstate with unin-
sured motorist benefits of $20,000/$40,000. The Allstate policy in-
sured three vehicles. State Farm divided its per occurrence limit of 
$100,000 equally among the estates of Rafferty and the two other 
women.412 Rafferty's estate then sought uninsured motorist benefits 
408. See supra notes 56, 62 and accompanying text. 
409. In Rafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290 (1985), the 
court noted that 
[tlhe estate contends that § 543(a) is "not a per se prohibition against 
recoveries under more than one policy." With this we agree, but we 
believe the instances in which more than one policy may be utilized 
are limited to those in which the primary insurer's uninsured motorist 
coverage is less than the statutory minimum. For example, given the 
facts of this appeal, had the primary insured been from out of state 
and purchased coverage for less than the Maryland statutory mini-
mums, then Ms. Rafferty's estate could have recovered from Allstate 
up to the $20,000 minimum. 
Id. at 72, 492 A.2d at 295; see also Parsons v. Erie Ins. Group, 569 F. Supp. 
572, 581 (D. Md. 1983) (stating that under § 543(a), the combined recovery 
under two policies cannot be greater than the $20,000 statutory minimum). 
41'0. But see McKoy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 281 Md. 26, 374 A.2d 1170 (1977); 
Langston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 40 Md. App. 414, 392 A.2d 561 (1978); see also 
infra notes 392-93 and accompanying text (discussing Langston). 
411. 303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290' (1985). 
412. Each estate received $33,333.33. The opinion is not clear whether Berg was 
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from Allstate, contending that the $20,000 per person limit should 
be stacked, entitling it to insurance totalling $60,000. The estate then 
demanded $26,666.67 from Allstate - the difference between 
$33,333.33 recovered from State Farm and the $60,000 total aggre-
gated coverage under the Allstate policy.4J3 Allstate denied coverage, 
and the trial court ruled that the estate was not entitled to recovery 
under the Allstate policy. The estate filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari and Allstate filed a cross-petition. The court of appeals 
granted both petitions. On appeal, the court decided that the estate 
could not recover under the Allstate policy, holding that when the 
primary policy contains uninsured motorist benefits in an amount 
equal to or greater than the required $20,0001$40,000 minimum, then 
the injured insured may not collect under a second policy. 414 
Rafferty may be one of those cases that reached the correct 
result for the wrong reason. If Rafferty is understood as a rejection 
of intrapolicy stacking, then the decision makes sense on interpolicy 
stacking grounds.41S The court, however, expressly declined to rule 
on the intrapolicy issue and based its decision on the prohibition of 
interpolicy stacking under section S43(a).416 Rafferty also cannot be 
understood as resting on specific contractual provisions. The opinion 
did not refer to any provision in the Allstate policy that prohibited 
stacking, nor, in fact, did the court refer to any provision of the 
Allstate policy at all.417 In many ways, Rafferty is simply atavistic, 
reflecting pre-1981 thinking in a post-1981 context.4I8 
one of the women killed in the collision. The facts suggest that she was. The 
other woman is not identified. 
413. Rafferty, 303 Md. at 66, 492 A.2d at 292. 
414. [d. at 71-72, 492 A.2d at 294. Since State Farm had provided coverage in 
excess of the statutory $20,000/$40,000 minimum, the estate could not recover 
under the Allstate policy. See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 
365 A.2d 1000 (1976) (stacking of required minimum personal injury protection 
benefits not allowed). 
415. If the court had rejected intrapolicy stacking, then the second uninsured 
motorist policy provided only $20,000 per person, or less than the $33,333.33 
collected by the insured under the first uninsured motorist policy. Interpolicy 
stacking of the required minimum coverage under the second policy is not 
allowed under either the pre- or post-1981 uninsured motorist statute. See 
supra note 402 and accompanying text. Hoffman v. United Services Automobile 
Assoc., 309 Md. 167, 183, 522 A.2d 1320, 1328 (1987), implies that Rafferty 
must be understood as a rejection of intrapolicy stacking. See infra note 429 
and accompanying text. 
416. Rafferty, 303 Md. at 67, 492 A.2d at 292-93. The court, however, seemed 
receptive to intrapolicy stacking: 
While we comprehend the estate's theory that it is entitled to $60,000 
coverage because Mr. Rafferty paid premiums for $20,000 coverage 
on each of his three cars, we believe § 543(a) requires us to hold that 
when more than one insurance policy is at issue, as is clearly the case 
here, recovery must be limited to the statutory minimum. 
[d. at 71, 492 A.2d at 294. 
417. In a footnote, the court mentioned that the other insurance clause in the 
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Because the Yarmuth and Rafferty decisions did not address 
intrapolicy stacking, the Langston notion of intrapolicy stacking 
survived. In Howell v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. ,419 however, 
the court of appeals held that intrapolicy stacking of uninsured 
motorist benefits in a commercial fleet policy was not allowed in 
Maryland. Howell involved a commercial fleet policy that covered 
nineteen vehicles and had a limit of liability of $50,000 for anyone 
accident. Howell was severely injured in a November 13, 1982, 
collision with an uninsured motor vehicle. At the time, Howell was 
driving one of nineteen vehicles owned by his employer. Howell 
argued that since his employer paid separate premiums for each of 
the nineteen vehicles, he was entitled to a total coverage of $950,000 
in uninsured motorist benefits ($50,000 x 19). The court rejected this 
argument, noting that the limit of liability clause provided the fol-
lowing: '''Regardless of the number of covered autos, insureds, claims 
made or vehicles involved in the accident, the most [the insurer] will 
pay for all damages resulting from anyone accident is the limit of 
UNINSURED MOTORISTS INSURANCE shown in the declara-
tions. "'420 Based on the clear terms in the limit of liability clause, 
the court held that the most that Howell could recover was $50,000. 
The facts in Howell were so peculiar that the court rested its 
decision partly on the concept that absurd results should be avoided.421 
Nevertheless, Howell signalled the end of the judicial infatuation 
with intrapolicy stacking.422 
Allstate policy made the State Farm policy primary because Rafferty was 
occupying a non-owned vehicle. [d. at 66 n.2, 492 A.2d at 292 n.2. The court 
did not, however, mention that the other insurance clause provided that the 
Allstate policy afforded excess coverage to a policy on any non-owned vehicle. 
If Rafferty is understood as a rejection of intrapolicy stacking, then the other 
insurance clause in the Allstate policy would have prevented Rafferty from 
recovering under the Allstate policy. See supra note 407. 
418. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
419. '305 Md. 435, 505 A.2d 109 (1986). 
420. [d. at 443, 505 A.2d at 113 (quoting policy). 
421. [d. at 442-43, 505 A.2d at 113. After finding no ambiguity in the contract, 
the court indicated that "[i]f, however, there were an ambiguity, the doctrine 
of absurd results would prevail." [d. at 443, 505 A.2d at 113. 
422. Arguably, intrapolicy stacking is still viable today. Howell and Hoffman do 
not stand for the proposition that intrapolicy stacking of uninsured motorist 
benefits is not allowed under any circumstances in Maryland. Rather, they 
stand for the proposition that intrapolicy stacking was not allowed given the 
language of the policies in question. If Langston is understood as allowing 
intrapolicy stacking under the particular policy in question, then intrapolicy 
stacking is still viable. The 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
seeks to prevent intrapolicy stacking in several ways. First, the endorsement 
specifically limits the insurer's liability to the amount shown on the declaration 
sheet. Second, the endorsement provides that the insurer's limit of liability is 
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Seventeen days before the decision in Howell was filed, the court 
of special appeals in Gunn v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 423 ruled 
that intrapolicy stacking was still viable. Judge Wilner, the author 
of the Oarr opinion, wrote the opinion in Gunn. In 1982, James 
Gunn, his wife, and his sister-in-law were severally injured in an 
accident with an uninsured motor vehicle. Gunn was insured by 
Aetna under a policy that provided a combined single limit of $50,000 
per accident. Three vehicles were insured under the policy. Gunn and 
the two other claimants demanded $150,000 from Aetna. The trial 
court ruled in favor of the insurer, and the claimants appealed.424 
Guided by the fact that Langston had been disapproved but never 
overruled, the Gunn court held that the claimants were entitled to 
the $150,000.425 After the Howell opinion was filed, the court of 
special appeals withdrew the Gunn opinion, and, on April 15, 1986, 
filed a short per curiam decision, reversing its earlier decision and 
ruling that the claimants were not able to stack the limits.426 The 
claimants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the court of 
appeals denied.427 
One year later, the court of appeals completed the rejection of 
intrapolicy stacking as a means of providing a deeper pocket of 
recovery for a seriously injured insured. In Hoffman v. United 
Services Automobile Ass'n,428 the court held that intrapolicy stacking 
in a family automobile policy was not allowed. Oddly enough, the 
the most the insurer will pay regardless of the number of insureds, claims 
made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations, or vehicles involved in 
the accident. . 
423. No. 85-718 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 15, 1986), cert. denied, 307 Md. 83, 
512 A.2d 377 (1986). .' 
424. Lynn Mathias, Recovery Under Multi-Auto Policy Is Not "Stacking," DAILY 
RIle., Feb. 27, 1986, at 4. 
425. Id. 
426. The opinion, in its entirety, read as follows: 
On February 11, 1986, we filed an Opinion in this case in which we 
concluded that our earlier decision in Langston v. Allstate Ins. Co. 
remained valid and that the Circuit Court for Prince George's County 
had erred in declining to act in accordance with it. Seventeen days 
later, in an unrelated case, Howell v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 
the Court of Appeals made clear that Langston was not the law, and 
indeed adopted a view completely opposite to that expressed in Langs-
ton. We thereupon recalled our February 11, Opinion. It follows that 
our earlier decision in this case cannot stand. For the reasons set 
forth in Howell, we conclude that the judgment below should be 
affirmed. 
Gunn, No. 85-718, slip op. at 1 (citations omitted). 
427. Gunn v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 307 Md. 83, 512 A.2d 377 (1986). 
428. 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 1320 (1987). The question of stacking was certified to 
the court of appeals by the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut. See infra note 431. 
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Hoffman court did not even address Langston. As in Howell, the 
Hoffman court relied on the limit of liability clause in the policy in 
deciding that intrapolicy stacking was forbidden. The court went one 
step further, however, rejecting the "pay double premiums, expect 
double coverage" reasoning in Langston. Concluding that the double 
premium was justified because the added vehicle increased the insur-
er's risk, the Hoffman court noted that the insurer, "by insuring 
two vehicles, had greater passenger and mileage exposure than if it 
had insured only one. The premium on the second vehicle, therefore, 
was not illusory but paid for the increased risk of added passengers 
and miles. "429 
While completing the rejection of intrapolicy stacking, Hoffman 
embraced the concept of interpolicy stacking by ruling that section 
543(a) did not apply to underinsured motorist coverage. 430 Hoffman 
was decided after Rafferty, but the facts giving rise to the coverage 
issue occurred before the facts giving rise to the dispute in Rafferty. 
In this respect, Hoffman is the opposite of Rafferty, representing 
post-1981 thinking in a pre-1981 context. The accident giving rise to 
the coverage dispute in Hoffman occurred in July 1980. Kenneth 
Hoffman and his wife, Sandra, were seriously injured in an auto-
mobile accident while they were passengers in an automobile driven 
by Richard Whelan. Sandra Hoffman died as a result of her injuries. 
The driver of the other vehicle was Richard Nowakowski. At the 
time of the accident, the Hoffmans were insured by United Services 
Automobile Association (USAA), under a policy which provided 
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage of $300,000 per per-
son/$500,000 per accident. Whelan was insured by Hanover Insurance 
Company under a policy containing uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage of $50,000/$100,000. Nowakowski was insured by 
Travelers Insurance Company with liability coverage of $20,000/ 
$40,000. 
Kenneth Hoffman, individually and as personal representative 
of his wife's estate, sued Nowakowski. Whelan also brought suit 
against Nowakowski. An agreement was reached among the parties, 
and the insurance limits from the policies were apportioned among 
the claimants. The estate of Sandra Hoffman received $20,000 from 
Nowakowski's liability coverage and $30,000 from Whelan's under-
insured motorist coverage ($50,000 per person limit minus the $20,000 
paid by Travelers). Kenneth Hoffman received $5,398 from Travelers 
and $8,389 from Hanover. Hoffman, again acting individually and 
as personal representative of his wife's estate, then sued USAA to 
obtain underinsured motorist benefits under the policy. USAA argued 
429. Hoffman, 309 Md. at 182-83, 522 A.2d at 1327-28. 
430. [d. at 177, 522 A.2d at 1325. 
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that section 543(a) prevented Hoffman from stacking the USAA 
policy on top of what he had received from Travelers and Hanover. 
The court rejected USAA's position, ruling that Hoffman could 
collect from USAA because it was underinsured motorist coverage.431 
Although the accident in Hoffman occurred before Maryland's 
uninsured motorist statute was amended to include, by the definition 
of uninsured motor vehicle, reduction of underinsured motorist cov-
erage,432 Hoffman clearly indicates that interpolicy stacking is allowed 
in Maryland, but that normal rules involving interpretation of policies 
and coordination of "other insurance" clauses apply. In this regard, 
the stacking of policies in an underinsured motorist context is really 
not a true stacking (a mere aggregation of the coverage limits of 
each policy), but, rather, a coordination of the coverage limits in 
which the injured insured is entitled to coordinate the coverage limits 
up to the highest limit provided by the policies.433 The Hoffman 
court's treatment of interpolicy stacking results in the fundamental 
concept that the injured insured's total potential recovery is the 
amount of the highest underinsured motorist coverage of the policies 
involved.434 
431. The Hoffman opinion did not address the manner in which the USAA coverage 
would be stacked. Since Hoffman and his wife had both received bodily 
injuries, the $500,000 per occurrence limit would have applied. Had all the 
policies been issued in accordance with Maryland law, then the estate would 
have recovered in this fashion: It had already collected $20,000 from Travelers 
(the per person liability coverage) and $30,000 from Hanover (the difference 
between Hanover's $50,000 underinsured motorist coverage per person limit 
and the $20,000 per person liability limit in the Travelers policy). Assuming 
the estate could prove damages of at least $300,000, then it would have been 
entitled to $250,000 from USAA ($300,000 per person underinsured motorist 
limit minus $50,000 received from Travelers and Hanover). This provided the 
estate with a total potential recovery of $300,000 - the highest limit provided 
by the policies. Because the Hanover policy had been issued in accordance 
with Connecticut law, the coordination of the policies was slightly different. 
After the Court of Appeals of Maryland answered the certified question 
presented by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, 
the district court in Connecticut considered the coordination of the Travelers, 
Hanover, and USAA policies with respect to Mr. Hoffman's individual claim. 
Because Connecticut law required intrapolicy stacking, the court found that 
the Hanover policy, which insured two vehicles, actually provided $100,000 per 
person, not $50,000. Hoffman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 
922, 925 (D. Conn. 1987). 
432. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
433. The estate's total potential recovery was the amount of the highest coverage 
limit provided by the three policies (the $300,000 provided. by USAA). See 
infra note 436. The estate was not entitled to merely add up the coverages 
($20,000 plus $50,000 plus $300,(00) because of the "other insurance" clauses. 
See supra note 407. This assumes that the polices offered reduction underinsured 
motorist insurance, not floating underinsured motorist insurance. 
434. If, for example, the USAA policy in Hoffman had provided only a $50,000 
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In many ways, the decision in Hoffman shifted the focus from 
whether policies can be coordinated to how the policies should be 
coordinated. 43s Because an insured is often protected by several layers 
of insurance at the same time, the dispute over which policy provides 
the primary coverage is significant. 436 
Confusion over the coordination of policies remains, however. 
Recently, the court of special appeals, in Schuler v. Erie Insurance 
Exchange,437 erroneously noted that when a person is covered by two 
automobile policies providing uninsured motorist coverage, he may 
choose which policy he wants to cover him, because, under Rafferty, 
he is precluded from recovering under two policies. In Schuler, 
Thomas Schuler was injured when he was struck by an uninsured 
motorist. At the time of the accident, Schuler was standing beside 
his 1983 Camaro, which was insured by a MAIF personal liability 
policy with uninsured motorist limits of $20,000/$40,000. Schuler's 
wife, Lena, owned a 1980 BMW, which was insured by an Erie 
commercial liability policy with uninsured motorist limits of $100,000/ 
$300,000. Lena Schuler was the general manager of Rainbow Hair 
Designers, a Maryland corporation. The Erie policy was purchased 
by Sylvan Nahamani, who the court describes as the "owner" of 
per person underinsured motorist coverage limit rather than a $300,000 limit, 
then the estate would not have been able to collect anything from USAA 
because the "other insurance" clause would have prevented such a recovery: 
The estate had already received $50,000 ($20,000 from Travelers and $30,000 
from Hanover), which was the limit of the USAA policy. Simply put, the 
estate's total potential coverage in this scenario would have been $50,000, the 
highest coverage limit of the three policies involved. Again, this assumes that 
the polices offered reduction underinsured motorist insurance, not floating 
underinsured motorist insurance. 
435. For a discussion of one such coordination, see Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 
v. Bragg, 76 Md. App. 709, 716-17, 548 A.2d 151, 154-55 (1988). 
436. In Hoffman, the Travelers policy provided primary liability coverage; the 
Hanover policy provided primary underinsured motorist coverage because the 
Hoffmans were passengers in the vehicle insured by Hanover; and the USAA 
policy provided secondary underinsured motorist coverage. If the USAA policy 
had provided primary underinsured motorist coverage (e.g., the Hoffmans were 
occupying their own vehicle at the time of the accident), then Hanover would 
not have had to contribute anything because the USAA policy would have 
exhausted the Hoffmans' potential coverage. The uninsured motorist statute 
does not expressly contain any provision for priority of coverages, but MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(c) (1991) provides that a passenger's uninsured 
motorist policy will apply as primary coverage when that person is occupying 
a vehicle not covered by uninsured motorist insurance, suggesting that a 
passenger's policy ordinarily applies as a secondary layer of coverage. The 
"other insurance" provision in the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement 
is consistent with this implication. See supra note 407. 
437. 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990). 
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Rainbow Hair Designers.438 Rainbow Hair Designers was the named 
insured under the policy. 439 The BMW was listed on the Erie policy, 
and Rainbow Hair Designers paid the premiums. Evidently, this was 
one of the benefits of Lena Schuler's employment.440 
Thomas Schuler made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits 
under the Erie policy because it provided higher limits than his 
policy. The court noted that this election would have been proper 
had Schuler been covered by both the MAIF and Erie policies.441 
Fortunately, the court correctly held that Schuler was not covered 
by the Erie policy. Thus, the court was prevented from allowing 
Shuler to practice what it had erroneously preached.442 The court's 
438. Rainbow Hair Designers was actually a corporation. Id. at 509 n.6, 568 A.2d 
at 878 n.6. 
439. The Erie policy obligated Erie to pay "damages that the law entitles you or 
your legal representative to recover from the driver or owner of an uninsured 
motor vehicle." Id. at 506, 568 A.2d at 875 (quoting policy). The policy 
defined "you," "your," and "named insured" as the subscriber, the subscri-
ber's resident spouse, and others named in item 1 of the declarations. "Sub-
scriber" was defined as the person who signed the application for the policy. 
The policy listed Rainbow Hair Designers as the named insured. The policy 
also extended uninsured motorist protection by a provision entitled "Others 
We Protect": 
(1) Any Relative, and 
(2) Anyone else, while occupying any auto we insure ... 
(3) Anyone else who is entitled to recover damages because of bodily 
injury to any person protected by this coverage. 
Record Extract at 16, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d 
873 (1990) (No. 89-451); see also Schuler, 81 Md. App. at 507, 568 A.2d at 875. 
440. Schuler, 81 Md. App. at 501 n.2, 568 A.2d at 874 n.2. 
441. The court stated as follows: "That [Schuler] may make this election between 
the two carriers is supported by the holding in Rafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290 (1985). By statute, a recovery from one carrier 
precludes a recovery against the other." Schuler, 81 Md. App. at 501, 568 
A.2d at 875; see supra notes 411-14 and accompanying text (discussing Raf-
ferty). 
442. In holding that Thomas Schuler was not covered by the Erie policy, the court 
arrived at the correct result. The court stated as follows: 
If Rainbow Hair Designers had intended to include the owners of the 
five cars as named insureds it could have done so simply by including 
the named individuals under the named insured portion of the dec-
laration sheet in the policy. Having failed to do so, we conclude that 
Rainbow did not intend to extend this additional protection to the 
owners of the insured cars. As we see it, to hold otherwise would 
require us to rewrite the Erie policy. 
Schuler, 81 Md. App; at 508, 568 A.2d at 878. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Lena Schuler owned the BMW but Erie insured it under a policy where Lena 
Schuler was not listed as a named insured, coupled with a misunderstanding 
of the concept of "occupying," caused notable confusion. Erie contended that 
Lena Schuler and her husband were covered by the policy only when they were 
occupying the BMW or one of the other listed automobiles. The court rejected 
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view that an insured may make an election when covered by two 
policies ignores the "other insurance" clauses in the policies, and 
misunderstands the concept of "occupying." Had Schuler been cov-
ered by both the MAIF and Erie policies,443 then the "other insur-
Erie's position: 
We find no support for the proposition that one must be either a 
driver or a passenger in the BMW for coverage to apply. Pedestrian 
injuries are covered [under the policy) since the only exclusion from 
UM coverage is where the uninsured vehicle is owned by the insured 
or by a relative. 
Assuming that [Lena Schuler) had been struck as a pedestrian in 
the course of her travels in the BMW, coverage would apply. This is 
so because she obviously uses her car with the knowledge and consent 
of her employer. This does not mean, however, that had she, rather 
than [her husband], been struck while standing beside [her husband's] 
Camaro that the Erie policy would provide UM coverage to her. 
[d. at 507, 568 A.2d at 877. If the court had considered the definition of 
"occupying" in the Erie policy, then it would have realized that the uninsured 
motorist coverage would have applied to Thomas Schuler and Lena Schuler 
only if they had been "occupying" the BMW. The Erie policy defined "oc-
cupying" as "in or upon, getting into or getting out of." Record Extract at 
8, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-
451). If the Schulers were not "occupying" the BMW, then the uninsured 
motorist coverage would not apply to them because they did not qualify as 
clause 1 insureds, despite the fact that Lena Schuler owned the vehicle. 
Under the clear terms of the policy, Thomas Schuler did not qualify as the 
named insured (Rainbow Hair Designers), the subscriber (Nahamani), the 
subscriber's resident spouse or relative, or a person named in the declarations. 
He therefore, did not qualify as a clause 1 insured; nor did he qualify as a 
clause 2 insured because he was not occupying the BMW (or another insured 
vehicle under the policy) at the time of the accident. Moreover, contrary to 
what the court noted, Lena Schuler would not necessarily have qualified for 
uninsured motorist benefits under the Erie policy had she been struck "as a 
pedestrian in the course of her travels with the BMW." As a pedestrian, she 
. would have qualified as a clause 2 insured only if she been "occupying" the 
BMW within the definition of that phrase. That is, she would have been 
entitled to coverage only if she had been "in or upon, getting into or getting 
out of" the BMW (or, for that matter, any of the other insured vehicles under 
the policy). In this regard, the court misunderstands that the status of being a 
pedestrian overlaps with the definition of "occupying." That is, a person can 
be a pedestrian (a person on foot) but still be "occupying" a·vehicle within 
the definition of that term under a[n) uninsured motorist policy (e.g., a person 
who has just stepped out of a vehicle and is standing next to it with the door 
open is a pedestrian but is still occupying the vehicle). See supra notes 259-88 
(discussing the concept of "occupying"). For a discussion of the concept of 
being a "pedestrian" for purposes of personal injury protection, see Tucker 
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 517 A.2d 730 (1986). 
443. Thomas Schuler, as the named insured under the MAIF policy, clearly qualified 
as a clause 1 insured. Lena Schuler was also named as a named insured. 
Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 39, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 
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ance" provIsions in the policies would determine the priority of 
coverage. If Schuler was not "occupying" the Camaro within the 
definition of that term in the MAIF policy444 at the time of the 
accident, then the MAIl<' and Erie policies would have provided pro-
rata coverage. On the other hand, if Schuler had been "occupying" 
the Camaro, then the MAIF policy would have provided primary 
coverage and the Erie policy would have provided excess coverage.44' 
The notion that Schuler would be able to recover from only one 
policy, and that he could choose which policy based on the limits of 
liability, defeats the underwriting basis of the "other insurance" 
clause. 
499,568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-451). As clause 1 insureds, they were protected 
under the MAIF policy even if they were not "occupying" the Camaro. See 
infra note 444. 
444. The opinion states that Schuler was standing next to his Camaro. It does not 
discuss whether he was "occupying" the Camaro within the definition of that 
term in the MAIF policy. The MAIF policy defined "occupying" as "in or 
upon or entering into or alighting from." Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 39, 
Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-
451). 
445. The MAIF policy contained the following "oth!!r insurance" provision: 
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a highway 
vehicle not owned by such insured, this insurance shall apply only as 
excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such 
insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary insurance, and this 
insurance shall then only apply in the amount by which the limit of 
liability of this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of 
such other insurance. 
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has 
other similar insurance available to him as applicable to the accident, 
the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable 
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the 
company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to 
which this insurance applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears 
to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and 
such other insurance. 
Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 40, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 
499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-451). The Erie policy contained the following 
"other insurance" provision: 
Bodily Injury-if anyone we protect has other similar insurance that 
applies to the accident, we will pay our share of the loss. Our share 
will be the proportion the limit of protection of this insurance bears 
to the total limit of liability of all applicable insurance. Recovery will 
not exceed the highest limit available among the applicable policies. 
For bodily injury to anyone we protect while occupying a motor 
vehicle you do not own, we will pay the amount of the loss up to 
the applicable limit(s) shown on the Declarations for one auto, less 
the amount paid or payable by other insurance. 
Record Extract at 2, 17, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568 
A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-451). 
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Hoffman, unlike Schuler, clearly indicates a greater appreciation 
of the functions of insurance underwriting. The rejection of intra-
policy stacking is a tacit admission that intra policy stacking assails 
the foundation of the insurance industry.446 In contrast, interpolicy 
stacking (i.e., interpolicy coordination of policies through their "other 
insurance" provisions) comports with the underwriting function. 
Indeed, the insurance industry introduced the concept of underinsured 
motorist coverage to forestall intrapolicy stacking.447 More impor-
tantly, Hoffman reflects an awareness that the insurance-buying 
public benefits by interpolicy stacking. In this regard, Hoffman 
embraced the end sought by the Langston court - a full recovery 
by the insured - but rejected the Langston court's means - intra-
policy stacking. 
XI. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET 
The public policy of providing a full recovery to an injured 
insured is also evident in the workers' compensation offset provision 
contained in the uninsured motorist statute. Section 543(d) enables 
the insurer to offset its liability by deducting workers' compensation 
benefits actually received by the insured seeking uninsured motorist 
benefits. It provides as follows: "Benefits payable under [personal 
injury protection and uninsured motorist coverage] shall be reduced 
to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under workers' 
compensation laws of any state or the federal government."448 
446. See Maag, supra note 14, at 331 ("To allow intra-policy stacking is unfair to 
the insurance company because liability would be increased and the company 
would be unable to clearly assess the risk so as to reflect it in the price of the 
premium. "). 
447. See supra note 136. 
448. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(d) (1991 & Supp. 1992). When a person is 
eligible for both personal injury protection and uninsured motorist coverage, 
the workers' compensation recovery is deducted from the aggregate of personal 
injury protection and uninsured motorist coverages. See Revis v. Maryland 
Auto. Ins. Fund, 322 Md. 683, 688, 589.A.2d 483, 485 (1991). In Revis, the 
insured had $2,500 in personal injury protection and $25,000 in uninsured 
motorist coverage. He collected $11,061.71 in workers' compensation benefits, 
then made a claim for uninsured motorist and personal injury protection 
benefits. MAIF agreed to pay $13,938.29 (the difference between the $25,000 
uninsured motorist and the workers' compensation award). MAIF refused to 
pay any personal injury protection, claiming, in essence, that it could deduct 
the workers' compensation recovery twice - once from the uninsured motorist 
and once from the personal injury protection. The court ruled that MAIF's 
refusal was invalid and that Revis was entitled to the $2,500 in personal injury 
protection: 
Under the express terms of §§ 539(a) and 541 Revis was entitled to 
$27,500 in PIP and UM payments had he not filed a workers' 
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Section 543(d), like section 543(a), is designed to prevent double 
recovery.449 As section 543(d) clearly states, the workers' compensa-
tion offset applies only if the insured has recovered the compensation 
benefits .. The court of appeals has construed "has recovered" to 
mean actual receipt. 450 Accordingly, if the insured is entitled to 
workers' compensation benefits but does not make a claim, the 
uninsured motorist insurer is not entitled to offset the compensation 
that the insured would have received or is likely to receive in the 
future. The "has received" standard is much different than the 
comparable standard in Subtitle 16A for required reductions from 
claims against the Uninsured Division of MAIF.451 
Maryland courts have not decided whether an employee is barred 
by the exclusivity provision of Maryland Workers' Compensation 
Act from making an uninsured motorist claim against his employer's 
automobile insurer.452 Logically, the employer's immunity does not 
extend to the uninsured motorist insurer. 453 A conceptually more 
compensation claim. 
Considering the language of § 543(d), the statutory scheme in which 
it appears, and the purpose of the General Assembly in enacting that 
comprehensive statutory scheme, we hold that the § 543(d) reduction 
of PIP and UM benefits by any workers' compensation recovery is 
to be applied to the total benefits due the insured under the PIP and 
UM coverages provided in the policy. Where the workers' compen-
sation recovered by the insured is less than the total of the amounts 
due the insured under the PIP and UM coverages, the insured is 
entitled to the difference. Thus, the circuit court erred in permitting 
MAIF to deduct the workers' compensation recovery twice, first from 
the UM benefit and then from the amount due Revis under his PIP 
coverage. 
[d. at 688, 589 A.2d at 485. 
449. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 283 Md. 663, 674-
75, 392 A.2d 1114, 1120 (1978). For other cases involving the workers' 
compensation deduction, see Revis, 322 Md. at 675, 589 A.2d at 483; Gable 
v. Colonial Insurance Co., 313 Md. 701, 548 A.2d 135 (1988); Hines v. 
Potomac Electric Power Co., 305 Md. 369, 504 A.2d 632 (1986); Smelser v. 
Criterion Insurance Co., 293 Md. 384, 444 A.2d 1024 (1982). 
450. Gable, 313 Md. at 704, 548 A.2d at 136-39 ("The language of § 543(d) shows 
a legislative intent to provide offsets only from workmen's compensation 
benefits actually received and not for future benefits. "). 
451. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243-I(b)(5) (1991 & Supp. 1992) ("has received 
or is likely to receive"). 
452. The situation often arises when the employee is injured by an uninsured motorist 
while the employee is operating or occupying a company-owned vehicle. The 
exclusivity issue also arises with regard to no-fault benefits. See 2A ARTHUR 
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 71.24(e) (1989). 
453. In Boris v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 515 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), 
Charles Boris was injured by an uninsured motorist while driving a company 
truck. He filed a workers' compensation claim, then sought recovery under his 
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difficult issue arises when the employer is self-insured. Since the self-
insured employer must provide the same benefits available under an 
insurance policy, however, it would appear that the injured worker 
would not be barred. 4s4 The offset provision in section 543(d) reflects 
a legislative intent that the injured worker's uninsured motorist claim 
be excluded by the availability of workers' compensation benefits 
only to the extent necessary to avoid a double recovery. 4SS To hold 
that an injured worker is restricted to filing a workers' compensation 
claim and to pursuing the uninsured motorist, from whom he will 
undoubtedly not be able to collect even if he obtains a judgment, is 
inconsistent with the public policy of providing a full recovery to 
employer's automobile fleet policy with Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual was 
both the workers' compensation insurer and the automobile liability insurer 
for Boris' employer. In turn, Liberty Mutual denied uninsured motorist cov-
erage to Boris based on the exclusivity provision of Pennsylvania's workers' 
compensation act. The Boris court rejected Liberty Mutual's position, stating 
that 
the employer's freedom from suit under the Workers' Compensation 
Act does not logically extend to the carrier of uninsured motorist 
benefits. The injured employee who seeks such coverage asserts only 
that he was injured at the hands of some third party who was not 
adequately insured. The employer cannot be implicated in such wrong-
doing in the slightest. 
[d. at 24. 
454. See Hines v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 305 Md. 369, 377-79, 504 A.2d 632, 
636-37 (1986). In that case, Hines, an employee of Potomac Electric Power· 
Company (PEPCO), was injured by an uninsured motorist while driving a 
PEPCO vehicle. The vehicle was self-insured by PEPCO. Hines made a 
workers' compensation claim and received approximately $35,000 in benefits. 
He then made personal injury protection and uninsured motorist claims against 
PEPCO. The exclusivity issue was not addressed, but the holding suggests that 
the exclusivity provision of Maryland's workers' compensation act would not 
bar an employee's claim. 
455. C/. Perkins v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 799 F.2d 955, 962 (5th Cir. 1986). 
Because Mississippi lacked a set-off provision in its uninsured motorist statute, 
the Perkins court concluded that a workers' compensation claim was the 
exclusive remedy. The Perkins court also rested its decision on the fact that 
Perkins, who had been injured while a passenger in his employer's vehicle and 
as a result of the co-employee driver's negligence, was not legally entitled to 
recover damages from the co-employee driver. The driver was uninsured; he 
did not have his own personal auto policy, and he was not covered by his 
employer's automobile policy because of a "co-employee" exclusion. However, 
the driver was entitled to tort immunity because the Mississippi workers' 
compensation statute barred suits between employees. As Perkins demonstrates, 
the issue of the injured employee's right to recover uninsured motorist benefits 
from the employer's insurer often arises in other states when a company vehicle 
becomes uninsured because the employee-driver is excluded by a co-employee 
clause in the employer's motor vehicle liability policy. In Maryland, co-employee 
exclusions are invalid. See Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 626, 
552 A.2d 889, 893 (1989). 
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victims of uninsured motorists.4s6 Uninsured motorist insurance and 
workers' compensation benefits provide separate and distinct types 
of coverage, but workers' compensation benefits certainly do not 
fully compensate the injured worker. 4S7 
Consistent with the concept of a full recovery, section 543(d) 
also implicitly prevents the workers' compensation insurer from as-
serting a lien on the uninsured motorist benefits received by the 
injured employee. Subtitle 9 of the Maryland Workers' Compensation 
Act, addressing liability of third parties, is the successor to section 
58 of Article 101.458 Section 9-901 preserves the injured worker's 
right to sue "a person other than an employer" when that person is 
liable for the employee's injury or death.4s9 Section 9-902 preserves 
the compensation insurer's right to recoup the amount of the workers' 
compensation award in two ways. First, under section 9-902(a), the 
workers' compensation insurer can bring a claim against the "third 
party who is liable for the injury or death of the covered em-
ployee."460 This must be done within two months after the Workers' 
Compensation Commissioner has made the award.461 If the workers' 
compensation insurer does not bring the action within the two month 
period, then the employee is allowed to sue the third party,462 and 
the workers' compensation insurer holds a statutory lien on the third-
party settlement. 463 The language and legislative history of Subtitle 9 
clearly preserve the workers' compensation insurer's right to any 
monies recovered by the injured worker from a third-party tortjea-
sor,464 but it is doubtful that Subtitle 9 could, without some strain, 
456. In Boris v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 515 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), 
the court held that denying a worker the right to uninsured motorist benefits 
"would be contrary to the voluminous case law demanding broad applicability 
of the Uninsured Motorist Act." Id. at 25. 
457. The Boris court found significant the fact that workers' compensation benefits 
do not provide for pain and suffering, but uninsured motorist coverage does. 
See id. The fact that the employer paid two premiums for two different types 
of insurance coverage is also significant. Often, both workers' compensation 
insurance and uninsured motorist insurance is provided to the employer by the 
same insurer. Even this factor, however, would not provide an exclusivity 
defense to the uninsured motorist insurer. While the injured employee's unin-
sured motorist action may coincidentally be against the same insurer that was 
his employer's workers' compensation insurer, the uninsured motorist action 
is not against the insurer in its capacity as workers' compensation insurer. 
Instead, it is against the insurer in its capacity as uninsured motorist insurer. 
458. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. §§ 9-901 to -903 (1991 & Supp. 1992) 
(Revisor'S Notes); see also id. Tables of Comparable Sections. 
459. Id. § 9-902. 
460. Id. § 9-902(a). 
461. See id. § 9-902(c). 
462. Id. 
463. See id. §§ 9-902(e), (0; see also id. § 9-903. 
464. The second report of the Commission to Study Maryland's Worker's Compen-
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be interpreted as allowing a workers' compensation insurer to assert 
a lien against uninsured motorist benefits flowing to the injured 
worker. 46s The majority of other jurisdictions that have considered 
the issue have determined that the workers' compensation insurer has 
no right to assert a lien on the uninsured motorist benefits.466 
The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement contains a work-
ers' compensation offset provision and an anti-subrogation exclusion. 
The offset provision is contained in the "Limitation of Liability" 
section, which provides that 
any amounts otherwise payable for damages under [unin-
sured motorist coverage] shall be reduced by all sums: 
2. Paid or payable because of the "bodily injury" under 
any of the following or similar law: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law.461 
The anti-subrogation provision operates as an exclusion: 
This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit: 
sation Laws and the Operation of the State Industrial Accident Commission 
referred to tort actions: "The Study Commission believes that the fact that 
disability or death resulted under circumstances giving rise to an action against 
a third party tortfeasor, should not operate, under any circumstances, to 
decrease the benefits properly allowable under Article 101." Brocker Mfg. & 
Supply Co. v. Mashburn, 17 Md. App. 327, 333, 301 A.2d 501, 504 (1973) 
(quoting study commission) (emphasis added). 
465. Although it could be argued that under Subtitle 9 an uninsured motorist insurer 
is a third person, the reference to "joint tort-feasors" in MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMP. § 9-901(2) makes it clear that Subtitle 9 is designed to preserve 
the employee's common law right to proceed against a third-party tortfeasor 
for personal injuries. An uninsured motorist action is a contract action. 
Moreover, the reference to "damages" in Subtitle 9 is another clear indication 
that the type of action contemplated by that section is a tort action. Uninsured 
motorist benefits are not "damages"; they are first-party coverage benefits 
that compensate the injured insured for damages he is legally entitled to recover 
from the uninsured motorist. Cf. 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 483, 487 (1976) ("Similar 
to a workmen's compensation award, an insurer's payment of economic loss 
benefits approximates an award of previously fixed compensation, as distin-
guished from damages.") (citing Hurt v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' 
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 175 Md. 403, 2 A.2d 402 (1938». 
466. Larson states that "[a] comparatively recent problem in double recovery 
presents the question of whether a[n] insurer that has paid compensation 
benefits should have a lien upon the proceeds of the claimant's private uninsured 
motorist policy. At this writing, the almost unanimous holding disfavors any 
such lien." 2A LARSON, supra note 452, § 71.23(a). 
467. ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Limit of 
Liability. The reduction does not apply if the tort feasor's vehicle has liability 
insurance. See id. This is so because the compensation insurer can satisfy its 
lien from the tortfeasor's liability policy. 
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1. Any insurer or self-insurer under any of the following 
or similar law: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law. 
2. Any insurer of property.468 
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The offset provision tracks section S43(d).469 The anti-subrogation 
provision is designed "to prevent subrogation by a workers' com-
pensation or disability benefits insurer to the insured's right against 
the uninsured motorist. "470 Although Maryland courts have not ad-
dressed the validity of the anti-subrogation provision, other states 
have upheld it.47 1 In these states, the validity of the offset provision 
is of utmost importance. If the offset provision is valid, then the 
anti-subrogation provision is also valid. 472 In Maryland, the uninsured 
motorist statute permits an offset, and it is therefore inescapable that 
the anti-subrogation provision precludes the workers' compensation 
insurer from asserting a lien on the uninsured motorist benefits 
received by the injured worker. 
Likewise, the workers' compensation insurer would not have a 
right to the uninsured motorist benefits withheld by the uninsured 
motorist insurer. The offset provision and the anti-subrogation clause 
are mutually constitutive opposites; the latter is valid because the 
former is valid.473 Together, they seek to provide a full recovery and 
prevent a double recovery. Underpinning both workers' compensation 
and uninsured motorist coverage is the concept that the injured party 
should not receive double recovery for his loss. This prohibition is 
accomplished by allocating the loss between the workers' compen-
sation insurer and uninsured motorist insurer. 474 Certainly, from an 
468. ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Exclusions, 
B. 
469. The offset provision, however, refers to amounts "paid or payable." This 
conflicts with § 543(d)'s reference to "has recovered." See supra note 448. 
470. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.42(2). 
471. See generally id. 
472. Larson notes that "if the offset is valid, the question whether the compensation 
insurer has a lien against the proceeds of the uninsured motorist policy is 
quickly answered, since there are no such proceeds left after the offset that 
can be identified with the compensation insurer's lien." 2A LARSON, supra 
note 439, § 71.23(c). He concludes that "[t]he issue of such an insurer's lien, 
then ... can arise only in two situations: When no such offset exists, or when 
such an offset has been found void." [d. This conclusion "is even more 
obviously true if the clause forbidding that any of the proceeds of the policy 
should inure to the benefit of the compensation insurer is found valid." [d. § 
71.23(c) n.44. 
473. Larson notes that the anti-subrogation clause is valid in those cases where the 
workers' compensation offset is valid. [d. § 71.23(b). 
474. In this way, the workers' compensation insurer shares the total loss with the 
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administrative standpoint, the uninsured motorist offset, in combi-
nation with the elimination of the workers' compensation lien on the 
uninsured motorist benefits, is the most efficient means of assuring 
that the injured motorist will not enjoy a double recovery.47S 
The overriding policy of providing a full recovery to the injured 
insured also enables the injured insured to seek additional workers' 
compensation benefits after he has recovered from the uninsured 
motorist insurer. Section 9-903 of the Maryland Workers' Compen-
sation Act ordinarily allows a workers' compensation insurer to offset 
future compensation benefits by the amount of the judgment received 
by the injured worker from a third-party tortfeasor. 476 Since the 
uninsured motorist insurer is not a third-party tortfeasor, and the 
uninsured motorist insurer. The workers' compensation insurer would be sub-
rogated along with the uninsured motorist insurer against the uninsured mo-
torist. The injured insured's tort action against the uninsured motorist is exactly 
the type of action against a "third person" contemplated by Subtitle 9. It also 
preserves the uninsured motorist insurer's subrogation right, as well as the 
workers' compensation insurer's subrogation right. See 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 483, 
489 (1976) ("[I]f the claimant acts upon his right to make claim against the 
person allegedly responsible for the accident, safeguarded by Article 48A, 
Section 542, then the hospital lien will attach to any sums of money which he 
collects in judgment, settlement, or compromise of his claim .... "). 
475. Cj. Gray v. State Rds. Comm'n, 253 Md. 421, 429, 252 A.2d 810, 815 (1969); 
Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. Salvo, 231 Md. 262, 189 A.2d 638 
(1963). At the time of these two cases, the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment 
statute contained a provision eliminating the workers' compensation lien where 
a payment from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund had been reduced 
by amounts received through workers' compensation. The lack of a correspond-
ing provision for a workers' compensation offset, however, rendered the lien 
prohibition ineffective. Thus, in Salvo the court denied the Fund the right to 
reduce its payment by the amount of Salvo's workers' compensation award, 
and in Gray, the court upheld the Workmen's Compensation Commission's 
determination that Gray's workers' compensation insurer was entitled to credit 
for the amount Gray had received from the Fund. 
The current uninsured motorist statutory scheme is in one sense the 
opposite of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Act that was the subject of 
the disputes in Salvo and Gray. Unlike the current uninsured motorist statute, 
which contains a workers' compensation offset, thus denying the workers' 
compensation insurer the right to subrogation against the uninsured motorist 
insurer and placing the primary payment obligation upon the workers' com-
pensation insurer, the statutory scheme at the time of Salvo and Gray placed 
primary payment responsibility upon the Fund. 
In noting that after the time of Gray's accident, the Unsatisfied Claim 
and Judgment statute had been amended to provide for a reduction in Unsat-
isfied Claim and Judgment Fund payments by the amount of workers' com-
pensation awards (consequently activating the lien prohibition), the Gray court 
commented that the amended procedure "presents a more orderly method of 
preventing a double recovery, while conserving the assets of the Unsatisfied 
Claim and Judgment Fund." 
476. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMF. § 9-903(b) (1991). 
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uninsured motorist benefits are not an amount recovered by the 
injured worker in a suit against a third-party tortfeasor, section 9-
903's credit does not apply.477 Although it is designed to preclude 
double recovery, section 9-903 was not designed to prevent the injured 
worker from obtaining a full recovery. 478 Similarly, the uninsured 
motorist statute seeks to balance the desire to provide a full recovery 
and the need to prevent a double recovery. A person, however, can 
recover both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits 
and still not be fully compensated. Therefore, an injured worker 
who has received both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist 
benefits should be able to reopen the workers' compensation claim 
if he can show that he has not been compensated fully.479 
477. It is clear that, if the uninsured motorist insurer is not a third party in §§ 9-
901 or 9-902, then the uninsured motorist benefits are not "the amount" 
received by the injured employee in § 9-903. The cases dealing with the credit 
provision in section 58 refer to monies received by the injured worker from a 
third party tortfeasor. See, e.g., Brocker Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Mashburn, 17 
Md. App. 327, 301 A.2d 501 (1973). 
478. See Mashburn, 17 Md. App. at 339, 301 A.2d at 506. The Mashburn court 
stated as follows: 
We think it clear that the intent of the 1957 amendment was, in 
essence, that an injured employee may, by the combined result of his 
compensation claim and a proceeding against a negligent third party, 
recover more than he could recover under the Act, but he can never 
recover less. If he were to receive less from the third party than he 
is entitled to receive under the Act, he may "reopen the claim ... 
to recover the difference between the amount ... received [from the 
third party] ... and the full amount of compensation which would 
be ... payable" under Art. 101. A reading of the Study Commission's 
Report, together with the 1957 enactment can, in our opinion, lead 
to no other reasonable interpretation. 
The construction placed upon § 58 by appellants would deprive 
the appellee of benefits under the Act by limiting recovery to the 
amount obtained from the negligent third party (less any sum he is 
called upon to reimburse the employer-insurer), and would almost 
certainly discourage third party actions by other claimants where there 
is a possibility, such as here, of large future medical payments and 
thereby defeat the will of the General Assembly. 
[d. at 337, 301 A.2d at 506. 
479. Fundamental fairness, however, and the general prohibition against a double 
recovery will preclude the worker from securing additional workers' compen-
sation benefits if the commissioner decides that the worker will recover twice. 
Thus, despite the lack of a specific statutory provision supporting the credit, 
the workers' compensation insurer is protected. In this sense, the workers' 
compensation insurer's credit is not absolute. The workers' compensation 
insurer, however, is protected and may avoid future compensation payments 
depending on the resolution of the "double recovery" issue by the compensation 
commissioner. 
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XII. NOTIFICATION AND COOPERATION DUTIES 
The hybrid nature of uninsured motorist insurance creates nu-
merous notification and cooperation problems between the insured 
and the insurer. The Personal Auto Policy and the Maryland Unin-
sured Motorist Endorsement place affirmative duties of notification 
and cooperation on the insured. These duties are designed to afford 
the uninsured motorist insurer the opportunity to litigate the unin-
sured motorist claim and to preserve the uninsured motorist insurer's 
subrogation rights against the tortfeasor. 480 The injured insured has 
three alternatives when pursuing a claim involving an uninsured 
motorist. First, he may sue the tortfeasor in tort, obtain a judgment 
and then enforce the judgment against the uninsured motorist insurer. 
Second, he may sue the uninsured motorist insurer and, as part of 
the case, prove that the tortfeasor's negligence proximately caused 
his injuries. Third, the injured insured may combine the tort and 
contract claims in a single action. 481 Maryland courts seem to favor 
the third approach because it promotes judicial economy and gives 
each party his day in court. 482 
480. Part E of the Personal Auto Policy provides: 
We have no duty to provide coverage under this policy unless there 
has been a full compliance with the following duties: 
A. We must be notified promptly of how, when and where the 
accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the names 
and addresses of any injured persons and of any witnesses. 
B. A person seeking any coverage must: 
1. Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense 
of any claim or suit. 
2. Promptly send us copies of any notices or legal papers 
received in connection with the accident or loss. 
3. Submit, as often as we reasonably require: 
a. to physical exams by physicians we select. We will pay 
for those exams. 
b. to examination under oath and subscribe the same. 
4. Authorize us to obtain: 
a. medical reports; and 
b. other pertinent records. 
5. Submit a proof of loss when required by us. 
C. A person seeking Uninsured Motorists Coverage must also: 
1. Promptly notify the police if a hit-and-run driver is involved. 
2. Promptly send us copies of the legal papers if a suit is 
brought. 
ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, II. Part E-Duties After an Accident or Loss. The 
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement replaces paragraph C. 2. with: 
2. Promptly notify us if a suit is brought. We request that a 
copy of any legal papers served accompany the notice. 
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, II. Part E-Duties After an Accident or Loss. 
481. See Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501 (1990); 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465 (1981); ct. 
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Under the first alternative, the insured does not have to obtain 
the insurer's permission to sue the tort feasor , and any "consent to 
sue" provision is unenforceable.483 The judgment is binding on the 
insurer if it had notice of the action and reasonable opportunity to 
intervene.484 Even a default judgment is binding on the uninsured 
motorist insurer as long as the uninsured motorist insurer's due 
process right to a day in court was fulfilled.48s The insured's ability 
to first obtain a default judgment against the tort feasor and then 
enforce it against the uninsured motorist insurer leads to procedural 
difficulty. Because the insured does not have to notify the uninsured 
motorist insurer of a possible uninsured motorist claim until he 
reasonably believes he has such a claim,486 the first notice an insurer 
may have of the uninsured motorist claim is after a default order 
has been entered against the tortfeasor. 487 Even if the insurer inter~ 
venes in the tort action, it may not be able to remove the order of 
default entered against the uninsured tortfeasor.488 The insurer's role 
then would be limited to litigating the damage aspects of the case. 
Without the "due process" protection, an injured insured would 
Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 Md. 548, 403 A.2d 1229 (1979) 
(stating that the insured need not pursue a claim against the uninsured tortfeasor 
to judgment). 
482. In Webb, the court of appeals stated that a second suit against the uninsured 
motorist insurer "represents neither a proper utilization of judicial resources 
nor a sound use of premium dollars." Webb, 291 Md. at 739, 436 A.2d at 
475. When an underinsured motorist is involved, the third alternative is almost 
automatically necessary. Combining the tort and contract actions presents 
several problems with the conduct of the trial. For a discussion of one such 
problem, see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Miller, 315 Md. 182, 553 A.2d 1268 
(1989). 
483. Webb, 291 Md. at 731-33, 436 A.2d at 472-73. 
484. See id. at 732, 436 A:2d at 471. 
485. See id. at 733 n.8, 436 A.2d at 471 n.8. 
486. [d. at 748 n.12, 436 A.2d at 481 n.12. 
487. See MD. RULE 2-613. 
488. Under MD. RULE 2-613(c), only the defendant against whom an order of default 
has been entered can move to vacate the order. The uninsured motorist insurer 
would lack standing to remove it. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md. 
App. 615, 619 n.3, 519 A.2d 219, 221 n.3 (1987). Moreover, even if the injured 
insured had sued the uninsured motorist and the uninsured motorist insurer in 
the same case, a default judgment could still be entered against the uninsured 
motorist notwithstanding the presence of the uninsured motorist insurer. How-
ever, a court has the power to remove or defer entry of the order under MD. 
RULE 2-602. See Quartertime Video & Vending Corp. v. Hanna, 321 Md. 59, 
580 A.2d 1073 (1990) (per curiam) (finding default judgment entered against 
one of several defendants subject to revision by the trial judge until a final 
judgment is entered). Therefore, if the insured notifies the insurer after the 
entry of the default judgment but before the court determines an award of 
compensation, the insurer can intervene and move to revise the default judgment 
under MD. RULE 2-602. 
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always try to obtain a default judgment against the uninsured mo-
torist before notifying the insurer of the uninsured motorist claim, 
thereby precluding litigation of whether the insured is legally entitled 
to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The uninsured motorist in-
surer seeks to preclude this eventuality by imposing specific notifi-
cation and cooperation duties on the insured.489 
The injured insured's second alternative raises significant prob-
lems with respect to the statute of limitations. In many states, the 
limitation periods for tort and contract actions are different.490 Mar-
yland litigants do not have this problem because the same three year 
period applies to both contract and tort actions. 491 Nevertheless, 
inequities can arise because of the application of the discovery 
standard to the limitation periods. Since an uninsured motorist claim 
is a breach of contract action, the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until the insured knows or should know that the 
uninsured motorist insurer is denying liability. 492 In contrast, the 
limitation period for the tort action against the uninsured motorist 
ordinarily begins to run on the date of the accident. 493 
This conflict between the running of the tort and contract 
limitation periods may prejudice the insurer's ability to recoup any 
uninsured motorist benefits it may pay to its insured. While Maryland 
courts have not directly addressed the theory on which the uninsured 
motorist insurer can recover from the uninsured tortfeasor, the court 
of special appeals has correctly observed that it is a right of subro-
gation. According to the court, "[t]o the extent it has paid uninsured 
motorist benefits, the insurer stands in the shoes of its insured and 
succeeds to his claim. That is the essence of subrogation. "494 Indeed, 
the insurer's only possible theory on which to base its recovery 
against the tort feasor is subrogation.495 Although some states ex-
489. See supra note 480. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement also states 
that 
[n]o judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought against the 
owner or operator of an "uninsured motor vehicle" is binding on us 
unless we: 
1. Received reasonable notice of the pendency of the suit resulting 
in the judgment; and 
2. Had a reasonable opportunity to protect our interests in the 
suit. 
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorists Coverage, Insuring 
Agreement. 
490. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.49. 
491. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1989 & Supp. 1992). 
492. See Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501 (1990). 
493. The action would arise at the point when the insured knew or should have 
known he had a claim against the tortfeasor. 
494. See Maryland Ins. Ouar. Ass'n v. Muhl, 66 Md. App. 359, 376, 504 A.2d 
637, 646 (1986). 
495. The uninsured motorist insurer's claim cannot be based on contribution. The 
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pressly authorize the insurer's subrogation right,496 Maryland does 
not. By preserving the injured insurer's right to proceed against the 
uninsured tortfeasor, however, section 542 implicitly establishes the 
uninsured motorist insurer's right of subrogation. 497 
Resting the insurer's right of recovery from the tort feasor on a 
right of subrogation is troublesome. Because an insured does not 
have an uninsured motorist claim until he knows or should know 
the uninsured motorist insurer is denying liability,498 the insurer may 
not receive any notice of the uninsured motorist claim until after the 
tort limitation period has expired, thereby precluding a subrogation 
claim.499 The insured may even be able to manipulate the limitations 
periods to deny the insurer a right of subrogation. soo 
uninsured tortfeasor and the uninsured motorist insurer certainly do not stand 
in aequali jure. See generally 5A MD. L. ENCYCL. Contribution §§ 1-5 (1982) 
(discussing joint liability based upon legal relationship). Nor are the tortfeasor 
and the uninsured motorist insurer in pari delicto. The liability of the uninsured 
motorist insurer rests on a contractual basis and, therefore, the uninsured 
motorist insurer cannot be considered a joint tortfeasor under the Uniform 
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 16 
(1991) (defining joint tortfeasors as "two or more persons jointly or severally 
liable in tort for the same injury"); see also Robinson v. Adco Metals, Inc., 
663 F. Supp. 826, 831-33 (D. Del. 1987). Similarly, the insurer would not have 
an indemnity claim. The right to indemnification derives either from a contract 
between the indemnitor and the indemnitee or, absent a contract, from a 
special relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. See generally 
12 MD. L. ENCYCL. Indemnity §§ 1-8 (1961). Neither situation is present when 
the uninsured motorist insurer pays unInsured motorist benefits to its insured. 
There are three types of subrogation recognized in Maryland: legal, con-
ventional, and statutory. See Bachmann v. Glazer, 316 Md. 405, 413, 559 A.2d 
365, 369 (1989). Legal subrogation is often called equitable subrogation. 
Conventional subrogation is often called contractual subrogation. See Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 74 Md. App. 539, 552-
53, 539 A.2d 239, 245-46 (1988) (discussing the elements of equitable and 
conventional subrogation). 
496. See generally 3 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
§ 31.100 (1993). 
497. Section 542 of the Maryland Insurance Code provides that "[nJothing in this 
subtitle shall be deemed to affect the right of any person to claim and sue for 
damages or losses sustained by him as the result of a motor vehicle accident." 
The section does not preserve the insurer's right to recoup personal injury 
protection payments. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 542 (1991); see id. § 54O(c) 
(eliminating subrogation); see also id. § 481B (prohibiting subrogation with 
regard to medical payments under a motor vehicle insurance policy). 
498. See Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501 (1990). 
499. Arguably, the injured insured's act of making a personal injury protection 
claim against his insurer should place the insurer on notice that litigation may 
result from the accident. Thus, not only is the insurer prepared to defend its 
insured in case the other party in the accident seeks compensation, but the 
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The Personal Auto Policy contains a subrogation provision. sOI 
Once the insurer compensates the insured, the insurer has the right 
to proceed against the tortfeasor. SOl Any recovery made by the insurer 
reimburses the insurer; any excess inures to the benefit of the insured. 
The Personal Auto Policy and the Maryland Uninsured Motorist 
Endorsement address the conflict in limitation periods by placing an 
affirmative obligation on the insured· to preserve the insurer's right 
to recover damages from the uninsured tortfeasor. so3 The Personal 
Auto Policy and the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement also 
require that the insured notify the insurer of a. suit against the 
tort feasor in a timely fashion.s04 
The insured may also impair the insurer's subrogation rights by 
entering into a settlement agreement with the tort feasor . 50S The in-
insurer should also be aware that a possible uninsured motorist claim may 
result should its insured seek compensation from the other party. 
500. C/. Cotham & Maldonado v. Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 556, 273 
A.2d 115 (1971) (rejecting the theory that the limitations period on an indemnity 
claim arises from the date of the wrong because "by the manipulation of the 
time of filing suit and the speed with which the plaintiff then proceeded, the 
plaintiff could easily place [the party asserting an indemnity claim) outside the 
statutory period"). 
501. Part F of the Personal Auto Policy contains the following subrogation agree-
ment: 
A. If we make a payment under this policy and the person to or for 
whom payment was made has a right to recover damages from another 
we shall be subrogated to that right. That person shall do: 
1. Whatever is necessary to enable us to exercise our rights; and 
2. Nothing after loss to prejudice them. 
ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, Part F. It also contains a "trust agreement," 
which states: 
[d. 
B. If we make a payment under this policy and the person to or for 
whom payment is made recovers damages from another, that person 
shall: 
1. Hold in trust for us the proceeds of the recovery; and 
2. Reimburse us to the extent of our payment. 
502. See, e.g., Wescott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 397 A.2d 156 (Me. 1979). 
503. See supra note 501. 
504. See supra note 480. In other states, insurers seek to protect themselves by 
including a limitation period within the contract. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, 
§ 24.49 ("An increasing number of companies are adding endorsements to 
their uninsured motorist coverage setting forth the time period within which 
claims may be made. These periods run from six months to three years. "). 
Such a provision would be invalid in Maryland. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, 
§ 377B (1991). Several states have enacted a specific limitations period applicable 
to the uninsured motorist insurer's subrogation claim. California, for example, 
provides that an insurer may bring a subrogation action within three years of 
the date of the payment to the insured. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (West 
1988). 
505. A general release granted to a tort feasor arguably would not release the insurer 
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troduction of reduction underinsured motorist coverage506 makes this 
problem even more acute because the financially responsible but 
under insured tortfeasor's liability insurer will try to obtain a general 
release from the injured party before paying its liability limits.507 The 
cooperation provisions of the Personal Auto Policy are designed to 
prohibit the insured from entering into any settlement agreement 
without the knowledge and consent of the insurer. 508 If the uninsured 
providing the uninsured motorist coverage. The scope of the release must be 
determined by the intent of the parties and, absent a specific provision releasing 
the victim's uninsured motorist insurer from liability under the first-party 
claims, the insurer would still be obligated to provide uninsured motorist 
benefits. See Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 546 A.2d 654 
(1988) (refusing to allow general release given to an insurer providing protection 
against robbery and burglary to operate as a release of an uninsured motorist 
insurer because the uninsured motorist insurer "was not a party to the release, 
paid no consideration to be released, and was unaware of the existence of the 
release at the time it was originally executed"), vacated, 322 Md. 713, 589 
A.2d 956 (1991); c/. Thomas v. Erie Ins. Exch., 229 Md. 332, 182 A.2d 823 
(1962) (holding that general release of tortfeasor released injured party's right 
to benefits under the medical payment provision of the tortfeasor's policy). 
506. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
507. Some states have enacted provisions to protect the motorist who complies with 
the financial responsibility provisions but, nevertheless, is underinsured in 
comparison to the injured party. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Maldonado, 515 
A.2d 690 (Del. 1986) (discussing Delaware's statute). In Maryland, the unin-
sured motorist insurer will still be able to pursue the tortfeasor even if the 
tortfeasor has complied with the financial responsibility provisions. The situ-
ation is no different than when the injured party obtruns a judgment against 
the tortfeasor in excess of the tortfeasor's liability limits; the fact that the 
tortfeasor complied with the financial responsibility provisions does not preclude 
the injured party from pursuing a recovery above and beyond the liability 
limits. But c/. 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 44.4 ("[T]he assertion of a right of 
subrogation - by the underinsured motorist insurer in n,gard to the tort feasor 
or the tortfeasor's insurer - is inimical to the very character of the underinsured 
motorist coverage so long as the insured has not been fully indemnified."). 
508. See supra note 480. The 1966 Standard Form contains a specific "consent to 
settle" clause: 
This insurance does not apply ... to bodily injury to an insured with 
respect to which such insured, his legal representative or any person 
entitled to payment under this insurance who shall, without written 
consent of the company, make any settlement with any person or 
organization who may be legally liable therefor[.] 
1 WIDISS, supra note 19, app. A at 14. The validity of a "consent to settlement" 
clause in Maryland has not been addressed specifically. In Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721,436 A.2d 465 (1981), the court indicated 
that "[u]nlike consent to sue clauses, consent to settle clauses are generally 
upheld, at least to the extent that settlements, consent judgments, releases, 
covenants not to sue, etc., between insureds and the uninsured motorists are 
not binding upon insurers unless the insurers have given their consent." [d. at 
740, 436 A.2d at 476; see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 
241 Md. 58, 69, 215 A.2d 467, 473 (1965) ("The purpose of the exclusion in 
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motorist insurer does not know about, or knows but does not approve 
of,509 an insured's settlement with the uninsured tortfeasor, then the 
insured certainly has breached his duty to cooperate. Whether this 
violation relieves the insurer of its obligations under the policy is 
another question. 
Under the Maryland Insurance Code, an insurer must show 
actual prejUdice in order to escape its contractual obligations based 
on an insured's breach of his duty to notify or to cooperate.5lO No 
Maryland court has addressed the concept of "actual prejudice" in 
an uninsured motorist context. 511 Courts from other jurisdictions are 
regard to settlement is to protect the company from the payment of claims 
which have not been determined by a court, but merely by agreement of the 
parties themselves. "). 
509. As a practical matter, the uninsured motorist insurer should disapprove of a 
settlement only if there is a real possibility that it can collect money above 
and beyond the liability policy. Once the uninsured motorist insurer becomes 
aware of the possible settlement, it can then investigate the tortfeasor's assets. 
If there is no reasonable probability of recouping any uninsured motorist 
payments, then there is no reason to withhold approval of the settlement. See 
generally 3 No-Fault and Uninsured Automobile Insurance § 30.80(4) (1993). 
For an excellent discussion of the problems of settling claims when the tortfeasor 
has liability insurance and the injured claimant wants to seek uninsured motorist 
benefits, see J. Sue Myatt, Settlement Procedures in Underinsured Motorist 
Cases: The Underinsurer's Dilemma Between Preserving the Insurer's Subro-
gation Right and Protecting the Insured's Settlement Right, 14 J. CORP. LAW 
175 (1988). 
510. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1991). It is not clear whether § 482 would 
apply to an insurer seeking to disclaim uninsured motorist coverage based on 
its insured's failure to notify or cooperate. Section 482's prejudice requirement 
is applicable when "any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of 
liability insurance issued by it." Id. (emphasis added). "Liability" insurance 
is not defined by the Insurance Code; however, § 482 is contained in Subtitle 
28, entitled "Casualty Insurance," which contains a specific section addressing 
uninsured motorist coverage. See id. § 481A (requiring uninsured motorist 
insurance to cover damage caused by a vehicle insured by an insolvent insurer). 
Uninsured motorist insurance falls into the definition of casualty insurance. 
See id. § 68 (defining casualty insurance as "[i]nsurance against legal, con-
tractual or assumed liability for death, injury or disability of any human 
being .... "). The holding in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 
278 Md. 548, 336 A.2d 13 (1976), also supports the conclusion that § 482 is 
applicable to an insurer who disclaims uninsured motorist coverage based on 
its insured's failure to notify or cooperate. In Harvey, the court of appeals 
held that § 482 was not applicable to an insurer who sought to disclaim 
coverage based on its insured's failure to submit a proof of loss for personal 
injury protection within the express statutory time period mandated by MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 544(a)(l) (1991). See generally Note, A Legal Process 
Analysis for a Statutory and Contractual Construction of Notice and Proof of 
Loss Insurance Disclaimers - Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 
38 MD. L. REV. 299 (1978). Since Subtitle 35 does not impose any specific 
time limit for making an ·uninsured motorist claim, § 482's "actual prejudice" 
standard should apply. 
511. See Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 482 A.2d 503 
(1984) (discussing actual prejudice in a liability context). 
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divided. Some courts hold that all the insurer has to do is show that 
its subrogation rights were eliminated.S12 Other courts take a narrower 
view, holding that the insurer must show not only that its subrogation 
rights were eliminated but also that, if the rights had not been 
eliminated, it would actually have been able to collect from the 
tort feasor . 513 Showing a denial of an opportunity is, of course, less 
burdensome than showing the opportunity would have been success-
ful. Allowing the insurer to escape its indemnification obligation 
because of a theoretical loss of its subrogation rights is inconsistent 
with the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute.Sl4 
XIII. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
The uninsured motorist insurer's liability is not necessarily lim-
ited by the amount of uninsured motorist insurance provided in the 
policy. Maryland does not allow the recovery of extra-contractual 
damages based on an uninsured motorist insurer's bad faith refusal 
to pay an uninsured motorist claim.sls In Johnson v. Federal Kemper 
Insurance Co., 516 the court rejected the application of bad faith 
liability to first-party situations, reasoning that first- and third-party 
claims presented different situations.S17 The court also rejected the 
insured's argument that the Insurance Code's Unfair Claims Act 
created a right to extra-contractual damages. SIS The Johnson court's 
holding does not, however, insulate the uninsured motorist insurer 
from extra-contractual liability. An insurer's unreasonable and bad 
faith refusal to pay a claim may constitute a conversion. sl9 Moreover, 
512. See Paape v. Northern Assurance Co. of Am., 416 N.W.2d 665 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1987); accord Charest v. Union Mut. Ins. Co. of Providence, 313 A.2d 
407,410 (N.H. 1973) ("The exclusion of [uninsured motorist] coverage occurs 
when the insured settles with the uninsured motorist without the insurer's 
consent. The policy does not make it dependent on whether the right of 
subrogation will eventually produce a reimbursement. "). 
513. See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Taplis, 493 So. 2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1986); see also Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 395 So. 2d 330, 331 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that the "technical and illusory 'loss'" of 
the insurer's subrogation rights cannot result in a forfeiture of the injured 
insured's uninsured motorist insurance). 
514. See generally 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 15.1. 
515. Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 536 A.2d 1211, cert. 
denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844 (1988). 
516. 74 Md. App. 243, 536 A.2d 1211, cert. denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844 
(1988). 
517. [d. at 247, 536 A.2d at 1213. 
518. The court rejected the insured's argument that MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 
230A (unfair claim settlement practices) and § 240B (notice of renewal premium 
due) created a tort action. [d. at 248, 536 A.2d at 1213. 
519. In Caruso v. Republic Insurance Co., 558 F. Supp. 430,434-35 (D. Md. 1983), 
the court found similarity between the allegations in Caruso's complaint and 
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the insured may have a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. ~20 Either claim would support punitive damages if the insured 
could show actual malice; the standard, however, is difficult to 
meet.~21 
The uninsured motorist insurer may also be liable for attorney's 
fees incurred by the insured under certain circumstances. ~22 Maryland 
courts have not addressed whether an insured is entitled to recover 
attorney's fees when he establishes coverage in a declaratory judgment 
action. A separate declaratory judgment action, though rare, may 
arise when the insurer disclaims coverage on an independent coverage 
ground.S23 Neither the uninsured motorist statute nor the Uniform 
the allegations in Food Fair Stores v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975): 
The allegations in this case, that the insurer failed to pay a claim 
when it had no good faith defense to payment under the terms of the 
insurance contract, are analogous to those in Hevey. As in Hevey, 
the alleged unjustified withholding of payments by the insurer here, 
if true, constitutes the tort of conversion. The conversion is sufficiently 
intertwined with the insurance contract, as it was with the employment 
contract in Hevey, as to fit the Court of Appeals' definition of tort 
arising out of a contractual relationship. 
Caruso, 558 F. Supp. at 435. 
520. Caruso, 558 F. Supp. at 435 n.24 (citing Sere v. Group Hosp., Inc., 443 A.2d 
33 (D.C. App. 1982». The insurer may also commit fraud in the application 
process. 
521. The Caruso court noted that "[w]hile the decision here with respect to first 
party claims may seem harsh, it does not preclude insureds from seeking 
punitive damages when insurers refuse or delay payment; it merely elevates the 
standard for recovery." Caruso, 558 F. Supp. at 435 (footnote omitted). 
522. In Maryland, the insured is clearly not entitled to recover attorney's fees when 
he brings a contract action against the insurer under the uninsured motorist 
provisions of the contract because he is not legally entitled to recover attorney's 
fees from the uninsured motorist. In some states, the award of attorney's fees 
in uninsured motorist cases is allowed by statute. In absence of such legislation, 
courts, in general, will decline to award attorney's fees. See generally 2 WIDISS, 
supra note 19, § 20.5. 
523. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465 
(1981), the court of appeals noted that an uninsured motorist carrier may have 
legitimate "coverage defenses" to an uninsured motorist claim. The court noted 
that the uninsured motorist carrier could assert these defenses in a separate 
action or as a counterclaim in the uninsured motorist case: 
When an initial claim is in tort, a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party claim may be in contract, and vice versa. Thus, if the insurer 
intervenes in the underlying tort case, the plaintiff insured could 
amend his declaration and add a contract claim against the insurer 
ground upon the uninsured motorist endorsement. Moreover, in a 
circuit court action, if an insured plaintiff fails to assert a contract 
claim against the insurer under the endorsement, but if an actual 
controversy concerning coverage exists apart from the "tort" issues 
the insurer could make a claim against the plaintiff under the De-
claratory Judgment Act. 
Id. at 742-43, 436 A.2d at 477 (citations omitted). If the insurer brings a 
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Declaratory Judgments ActS24 authorizes the award of attorney's fees 
to an insured who brings a declaratory judgment action to determine 
coverage under an uninsured motorist endorsement. 
In Maryland, attorney's fees are ordinarily not awarded in a 
declaratory judgment action. s2s They are recoverable when an insured 
brings a declaratory judgment action to establish the insurer's duties 
to defend and indemnify. S26 This is a well-established exception. S27 
The court of appeals has admitted that the recovery of the attorney's 
fees is based on an "unrefined" legal theorY,S28 and recently refused 
to extend the exception to an action involving a breach of a policy 
of health insurance.S29 Nevertheless, the award is usually justified on 
two grounds. First, the insurer is said to have "authorized" the 
expenditure of the fees by its failure to defend.s30 Second, the fees 
are considered part of the damages sustained by the insured as a 
result of the insurer's breach of its contractual duty.S31 Awarding 
attorney's fees on the ground that the insurer authorized them is 
always questionable, even in third-party situations. On the other 
hand, the attorney's fees certainly arise naturally from the uninsured 
motorist carrier's disclaiming coverage.S32 Public policy also supports 
declaratory judgment action· as a counterclaim to the insured's uninsured 
motorist claim, or just raises the independent coverage issues as affirmative 
defenses to the insured's uninsured motorist claim, then, assuming that attor-
ney's fees are appropriate, the court will have to award attorney's fees to the 
insured who successfully defends the counterclaim or rebuts the affirmative 
defenses. The insured would not otherwise be entitled to the attorney's fees he 
incurred in pursuing his uninsured motorist claim. See supra note 514. 
524. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. Paoc. §§ 3-401 to -409 (1989). 
525. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422 
A.2d 8, IS (1980). . 
526. See, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 
842, 849 (1975). The origin of awarding attorney's fees in third-party situations 
probably stems from the general proposition that when a person's wrongful 
conduct places another in litigation with a third person, the legal expenses are 
considered a natural consequence of the wrongful act. See McGaw v. Acker, 
Merrall & Co., III Md. 153, 160, 73 A. 731, 735 (1909). 
527. Continental Cas. Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 538, 489 A.2d 536, 
547 (1985). 
528. See id. at 537, 489 A.2d at 547. 
529. See Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, 327 Md. I, 10-17, 607 A.2d 537, 
541-45 (1992). In Collier, the court of appeals refused to award attorney's fees 
in a case involving an action to compel health insurance coverage. [d. The 
court's treatment of this issue in the context of first-party health insurance 
casts significant doubt on the likelihood of recovery of attorney's fees in the 
uninsured motorist coverage context. See id. 
530. Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 350-63, 258 A.2d 225, 
233-39 (1969). 
531. [d.; see American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84,422 
A.2d 8, 14 (1980). 
532. In Johnson, the court rejected the insured's claim for punitive damages: 
[The insured] did not assert at the trial level, any tort claim other 
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the extension of the exception to the uninsured motorist context. 
The Maryland appellate courts have not attempted to analyze 
the "unrefined legal theory" underlying the award of attorney's fees 
in third-party situations. It is clear, however, that the award of 
attorney's fees is a public policy decision aimed at punishing the 
insurer and deterring it from leaving the insured to fend for himself. m 
If the insurer were not liable for the attorney's fees then it would 
refuse to defend every time the insured was sued, thereby leaving 
the insured to defend the tort actions, subjecting the insured to a 
possible default judgment, and placing the burden on the insured to 
bring a declaratory judgment action against the insurer to establish 
coverage. The award of attorney's fees in third-party situations is 
especially appropriate because a third party-the injured plaintiff in 
the tort case-is involved. By "punishing" the insurer, the court 
sends a message to the insurance industry that the insurer's duty to 
defend is near absolute, and that there is a public policy to protect 
insureds in tort cases by providing them with a defense. Making the 
insurer liable for the attorney's fees incurred by the insured in the 
declaratory judgment action also encourages resolution and settlement 
of tort actions. s34 In short, the award of attorney's fees protects the 
insured and encourages proper handling of claims. 
Awarding attorney's fees when an insurer wrongfully refuses to 
defend a tort claim against its insured recognizes the significant 
differences between first and third-party coverage. Admittedly, the 
potential harm to the insured in third-party instances does not exist 
in a first-party instance. A first-party dispute is merely a dispute 
between two parties to a contract, m and third parties, such as injured 
than [the claim of bad faith]. Therefore, she is entitled to damages 
recoverable in an action for breach of contract. It is well-settled that 
such damages are those which arise naturally from the breach of [the] 
contract itself, or those which can be shown to have been contemplated 
by the parties when they entered into the contract as the probable 
result of a breach. . . . In an action for breach of contract above, 
such as this one, punitive damages are not available even if the 
plaintiff can show actual malice. 
Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 248, 536 A.2d 1211, 
1213-14 (1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
533. Cj. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith, 318 Md. 33, 568 A.2d 
35 (1990) (noting that an award of attorney's fees generally serves as a tool 
for punishing wrongful conduct in ruling that a jury could consider the amount 
of the plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees when calculating an award of 
punitive damages). 
534. For a discussion of the insurer's duty to defend, see Andrew Janquitto, Insurer's 
Duty to Defend in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 1 (1988). 
535. In Johnson, the court, after addressing the element of bad faith in third-party 
claims, stated that 
a first party claim presents an entirely different situation. The insured 
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members of the public, are not involved. Resolving the dispute lies 
within the power of the insured and insurer. Nevertheless, the over-
riding public policy that innocent victims of uninsured motorists 
should be compensated weighs in favor of extending the exception 
to the uninsured motorist context. Awarding attorney's fees when 
the insured establishes the existence of uninsured motorist coverage 
in a declaratory judgment action certainly protects the insured and 
encourages proper handling of claims. S36 
XIV. CONCLUSION 
Uninsured motorist insurance in Maryland serves several vital 
purposes. It fills the gaps inherent in Maryland's comprehensive 
motor vehicle insurance scheme by placing the injured insured in the 
same position he would have been in had the tort feasor maintained 
liability insurance. As originally designed, uninsured motorist cov-
erage was supposed to place the accident victim in the same position 
as if the uninsured tort feasor maintained liability coverage in an 
amount equal to the minimum required coverage under the financial 
responsibility laws of Maryland. Beginning in 1981, and continuing 
through the 1980's and into the 1990's, the Maryland legislature 
made substantial changes to the uninsured motori$t statute. These 
changes reflected the shift in public policy underlying the uninsured 
motorist statute from providing a minimum recovery to providing 
the opportunity for a full recovery. In this sense, uninsured motorist 
insurance furthers the state's desire to shift the burden of caring for 
victims of motor vehicle accidents from the state to the private sector. 
A private loss, after all, is more palatable than a public evil. 
retains all rights to control any litigation necessary to enforce the 
claim. Because it involves a claim by the insured against the insurer, 
rather than a claim by a third party against both the insurer and 
insured, there is no conflict of interest situation requiring the law to 
impose any fiduciary duties on the insurer. Instead, the situation is a 
traditional dispute between the parties to a contract. 
Johnson, 74 Md. App. at 247, 536 A.2d at 1213. 
536. A separate declaratory judgment action is often unnecessary. Rather, the injured 
victim should sue the insurer directly. As part of his case, the victim would 
have to prove that he was insured under the policy - an essential element in 
every uninsured motorist case. The insurer, if it has an independent coverage 
defense, can then raise that defense, as well as raising whatever defenses it 
had to the uninsured motorist claim, e.g. no liability of the uninsured motorist, 
no proximate cause, no damages, contributory negligence, etc. Bifurcation of 
the trial may be appropriate to avoid confusion, and a resolution of the 
independent coverage issues may obviate the need for trial of the uninsured 
motorist claim. 
